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Abstract 
This thesis explores the history of religious life among Muslim communities in Soviet 
Tajikistan from 1950 to 1985. The analysis of the history of religious life of the Muslim 
population during this period is contextualised within the background of changing Soviet 
religious policy and its implementation in Tajikistan. The thesis seeks to explain how and 
why the interactions between the various actors in the field of religious policy affected the 
implementation of unionwide decrees and decisions in the distinct religious context of the 
Soviet peripheral regions. In so doing, it also examines how Muslim religious figures 
functioned and how the communities in Soviet Tajikistan practiced their religion in the 
context of continuous administrative pressure and atheist propaganda. 
With the formation of special councils and various commissions under the local 
government, the Soviet state succeeded in creating a bureaucratic system for the analysis, 
monitoring and regulation of religious activity. Nevertheless, the findings of this thesis 
suggest that in the specific local context, the implementation of Soviet religious policy was 
dependent on how the officials representing the state and the religious figures representing 
religion understood and carried out this policy. 
The practice of obligatory religious rituals by both state officials and ordinary people in 
turn blurred the dividing line between the strata of population defined as Muslim believers, 
the clergy and Soviet officials. The thesis reveals that religious practices and activity 
evolved in various ways in the context of continuous surveillance by the state. Muslim 
religious figures in Tajikistan like their fellow clergy in other parts of Soviet Union used 
different strategies to integrate and adapt themselves to the changing state religious policy 
and social transformations. 
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Introduction 
Religious life in Soviet Tajikistan as in many other parts of the Soviet Union underwent 
considerable transformation due to changes in the Soviet state’s religious policy. From the 
establishment of the Soviet government in 1917 to the early 1940s; the Muslim population 
of Tajikistan experienced the destruction of such important resources as its religious 
schools and literature, as well as the repression of its religious leaders. During the Second 
World War, the Soviet state tempered its repressive religious policy to allow religious 
believers to open places of worship and resume their religious activity. In the larger 
context of the Muslim-populated republics of the Soviet Union, this change in religious 
policy prompted the opening of significant numbers of mosques and an increase in 
religious activity.  
In 1943, the Soviet government responded positively to the request of the leading Muslim 
dukhovenstvo (clergy) from Central Asia to establish a religious administration, which was 
known as SADUM.
1
 This directorate become responsible for supervising the activity of 
Muslim clergy, and transferring donations from the official registered mosques in different 
parts of Central Asia to its headquarter in Tashkent.
2
 The activities of SADUM were in 
turn monitored by the Council for the Affairs of the Religious Cults (CARC) that was 
established in Moscow in 1944.
3
  
Over the course of more of than four decades, the CARC and later CRA worked to ensure 
the compliance of religious believers with the Soviet legislation on religion and attempted 
to secure a legal but limited space for religious activity. The religious activities of the 
Muslim population of Tajikistan in this period, like that of most believing citizens of the 
Soviet Union, became subject to continuous study and monitoring by the special 
                                                          
1
 SADUM-from Russian Dukhovnoe upravlenie musul'man Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana (Spiritual Directorate 
of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan). 
2
 Yaakov Ro’i, Islam in the Soviet Union: From World War II to Perestroika (London, 2000), pp. 104-105. 
3
 Sovet po delam religioznykh kul'tov pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR (The Council for the Affairs of Religious 
Cults) (CARC) under the Council of the Ministers of the USSR was formed in May 1944. A separate council 
to regulate religious activity among Orthodox Christians i.e., The Council for the Affairs of the Russian 
Orthodox Church (CAROC) was formed in 1943. In December 1965 the two councils were merged into 
Sovet po delam religii pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR (The Council for Religious Affairs) (CRA). The CRA was 
dissolved in 1991. The abbreviation of CARC will therefore be used in this thesis for the years from 1944 to 
1965 and CRA for dates from 1966 to 1985.  
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upolnomochennye of CARC in each republic and province.
4
 On the ground, the various 
bureaucratic bodies of the local government and the Communist Party continuously 
monitored the religious situation.  
This thesis examines the history of the religious life of the Muslim population in Tajikistan 
from 1950 to 1985. It looks into the religious history of the Muslim population from two 
distinct but interrelated aspects: a) the implementation of Soviet state religious policy 
among Muslim communities in a particular province of Tajikistan, and b) the ways through 
which Muslim communities practiced their religious rituals in the context of state 
regulation and delimitation of the influence of religion. It therefore seeks to explain how 
the various actors, the state officials and religious figures in the specific cultural and 
religious landscape, implemented and adjusted the state religious policy. In so doing, it 
also analyses how the ordinary population, state officials and religious figures defined their 
relationships with the Soviet state and with their religious tradition and community 
performing religious rites. 
Studies on Islam in Soviet Tajikistan 
The various aspects of religious life among the Muslim population in Tajikistan have been 
tackled in the general scholarship on religion (Islam) and its place in Soviet society. Inside 
the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic (Tajik SSR), the Soviet atheist-oriented research 
appeared in various forms, such as academic monographs, propagandistic and polemical 
pamphlets about Islam, articles in newspapers and journals, in particular Agitator 
Tadzhikistana.
5
 In the propaganda field, the main concern of the experts on atheism was to 
highlight the progressive Soviet state ideology, which treated religion as a reactionary 
force. Religious rituals were depicted as ‘vestiges of the past’ and ‘traditionalism’ that 
were expected to disappear under the influence of scientific advances.
6
 More precisely, 
researchers in this field focused on indicating the ‘anti-social activities’ of the religious 
                                                          
4
 Studies on the CARC archives translate the word upolnomochennyi (lit. plenipotentiary representative) into 
English variously as commissioner or bureaucrat. Throughout my thesis, I often use these three terms 
interchangeably. 
5
 Agitator Tadzhikistana was an atheist propaganda magazine published fortnightly in Tajik and Russian, and 
which promoted atheism over religious issues, views and practices. 
6
 R. Mawliutov and R. Majidov, Islom (Dushanbe, 1980).  
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figures who were involved in healing, shrine pilgrimage and worship across the Tajik 
SSR.
7
 
Like the propaganda literature, academic research, in particular Soviet ethnographic 
studies, also attempted to provide more practical solutions to eradicate ‘harmful religious 
customs’, especially their survival in the family milieu and society in general. The main 
findings of most of the Soviet ethnographic research were to demonstrate that as a result of 
socialism the indigenous people in the provinces of the Tajik SSR, had moved away from 
‘patriarchal and feudal relations’ and primitive economic relations towards socialism, by-
passing the capitalist stage of development.’8 The increase in the research on religious 
views and practices suggested that the Soviet scholars knew about the strong presence of 
traditional practices in the Muslim-populated republics of Central Asia.
9
  
Through systematic analysis of the local sources on religion in Soviet Tajikistan from 1960 
to late 1980, Muriel Atkin rejected the different assumptions of some media and political 
analysts, which predicted the spread of an Islamic revival from the Middle East to Central 
Asia and Caucasus and its threat to Soviet rule. Her case study of Islam in Soviet 
Tajikistan pointed out that religion was not going to be a driving force to challenge Soviet 
rule in this particular republic. Atkin’s analysis was not, however, linked to the religious 
situation in other Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union.
10
 Nevertheless, her study 
stressed what the Soviet atheist-oriented analysts themselves acknowledged, namely, that 
religion (Islam) had a strong presence among the various Muslim groups in Tajikistan. 
The details of ritual performance and the activities of religious figures provided in the 
Soviet atheist-oriented and ethnographic research served as first-hand information for 
Western scholarship on Islam in Central Asia. As Mark Saroyan pointed out, Soviet 
                                                          
7
 It was estimated that dozens of doctoral dissertations were written between the years 1965 and 1980, several 
of which were on Islam in Central Asia, see the review of atheist research on religion in Tajik SSR, in Muriel 
Atkin, The Subtlest Battle: Islam in Soviet Tajikistan (Philadelphia, 1989), p. 45.  
8
 L. F. Monogarova, Preobrazovaniia v bity i kul'ture pripamirskikh narodnostei (Moscow, 1972). About the 
development of Soviet ethnographic studies on Tajikistan, see for instance the article by L. Monogarova and 
I. Mukhiddinov, ‘Etnographicheskoe izuchenie Sovetskogo Badakhshana’ in R. M. Masov, ed., Ocherki po 
istorii Sovetskogo Badakhshana (Dushanbe, 1985), pp. 352-384. 
9
 Michael Kemper, Studying Islam in the Soviet Union: Inaugural Lecture (Amsterdam, 2009), p. 17.  
10
 See the review of Atkin’s book by Beatrice Forbes Manz, in International Journal of Middle East Studies, 
3 (1991), pp. 471-473. 
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research on Islam provided Western researchers not only with empirical data but also with 
a theoretical framework to interpret the practice of religion. Western scholarship on Islam 
highlighted the fact that Islam as a tradition represented a past phenomenon and often 
remained opposed to the Soviet regime.
11
 Similar arguments about religion, including 
Islam being a remnant of the past feudal-system were made by the Soviet scholars. 
Saroyan’s analysis concluded that religion was not a fixed phenomenon, but had been 
reproduced and reconstructed by Soviet Muslims as a new social identity.
12
 
Introductory information and statistical data about the Muslims of Soviet Union and their 
educational attainment were provided by outside, including Western scholars.
13
 However, 
the majority of Western researchers had neither the opportunity to observe the real life of 
Soviet Muslims nor did they have easy access to Soviet documents. In contrast to the 
detailed ethnographic studies of social transformation among the indigenous populations of 
Central Asia, Western scholarship provided rather broad analyses of the entire region. 
Produced at a distance, most of the external writing about Islam in Soviet Central Asia, 
including the Tajik SSR, did not provide readers with a coherent picture of how did 
ordinary Muslim understand their religion, performed rituals or defined their Muslim and 
Soviet identities.
14
 
                                                          
11
 This criticism referred to bulk of literature produced by the Sovietologist school on Islam in the Soviet 
Union, including works of A. Bennigsen and Ch. Lemercier-Quelquejay,‘Muslim Religious Conservatism 
and Dissent in the USSR,’ Religion in Communist Lands, 3 (1978), pp. 153-161; A. Bennigsen and E. 
Wimbush, Mystics and Commissars: Sufism in the Soviet Union (Berkeley, 1985); and Alexandre Bennigsen 
and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslims of the Soviet Empire: A Guide (Bloomington, 1986). 
12
 See Mark Saroyan, ‘The Reinterpretation and Adaptation of Soviet Islam’ in Edward W. Walker ed., 
Minorities, Mullahs and Modernity: Reshaping Community in the Former Soviet Union (Berkeley, 1997), pp. 
64-94. 
13
 See Shirin Akiner, Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union (London, 1986). 
14
 An anthropological study by Gillian Tett of the marriage system in a Tajik village provides an interesting 
discussion of how the Muslim population in the last years of Soviet rule, during the perestroika 
(restructuring) era reconciled their Muslim and Soviet identity in a ‘single world view and society’. See 
Gillian Tett, ‘Ambiguous Alliances: Marriage and Identity in a Muslim Village in Soviet Tajikistan’, 
unpublished PhD thesis (University of Cambridge, 1996), p. 197; A study by Gabrielle van den Berg on the 
performance of minstrel poetry among the Ismailis of Badakhshan also offers a detailed analysis of maddoh 
(performance of religious poetry) among the Ismailis of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province in the 
late Soviet period and the immediate aftermath of independence in Tajikistan. See Gabrielle van den Berg, 
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Western scholarship on Islam in Soviet Central Asia also focused mainly on highlighting 
the threat posed by this religiosity to the integrity and security of the Soviet state.
15
 This 
view about the ‘Islamic threat to the Soviet Union’ provided a basis for misinterpreting the 
revival of religious life in the former Muslim republics of Central Asia as the ‘rise of 
fundamentalism’.16 The political developments in Tajikistan in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, including the formation of the Islamic Renaissance Party, provided a good case of 
this misunderstanding of the position and role of religion. These views about the rise of 
Islam in politics often sidelined an understanding of the cause of political turmoil in 
independent Tajikistan, which had deep roots in the existing regional, clan, economic and 
social divisions dating to the Soviet period.
17
The various aspects of religious life in 
Tajikistan, such as the link between Islam and politics, Muslim identity, the influence of 
religion on youth, the organisation of the Muslim community and the practice of rituals 
have been explored in a number of anthropological and political studies in recent years, 
which have provided a general account of religious life during the whole Soviet period.
18
 
Nevertheless, most of these studies provide limited reference to the changing Soviet 
religious policy and its consequences for Muslim communities in the post-Second World 
War period. 
This thesis examines the particular period of the implementation of Soviet religious policy 
among Muslim communities in Tajikistan. It is therefore more relevant to locate my study 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Minstrel Poetry from the Pamir Mountains: A Study into the Songs and Poems of the Ismailis of Tajik 
Badakhshan (Wiesbaden, 2004). 
15
 Will Meyer, Islam and Colonialism: Western Perspectives on Central Asia (London, 2002). 
16
 See Anna Zelkina, ‘Islam and Security in the New States of Central Asia: How Genuine is the Islamic 
Threat’, Religion, State and Society, 3-4 (1999), pp. 355-372. 
17
 Valentin Bushkov and Dmitri Mikulskii, Anatomiia grazhdanskoi voiny v Tadzhikistane: Etno-sotsial'nye 
protsessy i politicheskaia bor'ba, 1992-1996 (Moscow, 1997); Shirin Akiner, Tajikistan: Disintegration or 
Reconciliation? (London, 2001) and John Anderson, Religion, State and Politics in the Soviet Union and 
Successor States (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 200-205. 
18
 See for instance, recent studies on the Ismailis of Tajikistan by Jonah Steinberg, Isma‘ili Modern: 
Globalisation and Identity in a Muslim Community (Chapel Hill, 2011); Otambek Mastibekov, 
Leadership and Authority in Central Asia: The Ismaili Community in Tajikistan (forthcoming); and 
on Muslim youth in post-Soviet Tajikistan, see Colette Harris, Muslim Youth: Tensions and 
Transitions in Tajikistan (Oxford, 2006). 
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within the literature on the post-Second World War history of Soviet state policy towards 
religious societies and particularly how the central decrees and decisions were carried out 
in a specific ethnic and religious context on the Soviet periphery. 
The Muslim communities in the Tajik SSR, like any other believing citizens of the Soviet 
Union, shared a common experience of state institutionalisation of their religious activities 
in the period after Second World War. In this respect the literature on the process of 
implementing Soviet secular and anti-religious policy in its different multi-ethnic and 
multi-religious parts suggests important and interesting comparison for my thesis. Studies 
on the history of Soviet religious policy, Islam, and the institutionalisation of Muslim life 
from 1941 to 1991 have all pointed to the changing nature of Soviet religious policy under 
each phase of its leadership as well as the complexity of carrying out this policy in each of 
the Muslim-populated republics.
19
 A detailed examination of the official institutions that 
promoted legally supervised religious figures and mosques in Central Asia pointed out 
their successful collaboration in this field.
20
 In the Tajik SSR, a number of religious figures 
in the legalized mosques benefitted from this official institutionalization and education 
through SADUM.
21
 Stephane Dudoignon’s study revealed that a distinct form of religious 
revival took place among the Muslims of the Tajik SSR from the post-Stalinist years to the 
                                                          
19
 For more on the development of Soviet religious policy under its different rulers, its different ways of 
implementation by local government organs, and consequences for religious communities, see the analysis of 
CRA archives by John Anderson, Religion, State and Politics in the Soviet Union and Successor States 
(Cambridge, 1994). For the detailed analysis of archival sources on Soviet policy towards Islam, see Yaakov 
Ro’i, Islam in the Soviet Union: from World War II to Perestroika (London, 2000). Reviewing this book, 
Devin DeWeese contended that Roy’s study resulted in repeating the terms and framework through which the 
authors of Soviet archival reports approached their subject. In DeWeese’s view, a critical analysis of the 
Soviet archives and concepts requires clarifying them through use of the vocabulary borrowed from the field 
of Islamic and religious studies. See Devin DeWeese, ‘Islam and the Legacy of Sovietology: A Review Essay 
on Yaakov Roi’s’ Islam in the Soviet Union’, Journal of Islamic Studies, 3 (2002), pp. 298-330.  
20
 Eren Tasar has provided detailed analysis of the Communist Party and CARC archives regarding the 
collaboration of the commissioners of this council with SADUM’s affiliated religious figures, in the Central 
Asian republics Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in his thesis, ‘Soviet and Muslim: The 
Institutionalization of Islam in Central Asia, 1943-1991’, unpublished PhD thesis (Harvard University, 
2010). 
21
 See Alowiddin Nazarov, ‘Istoriia religioznoi zhizni musul'man Tadzhikistana v 1941-1991’, unpublished 
candidate dissertation (Dushanbe, 2004) on the role of SADUM in supervising the activities of the official 
mosques in Soviet Tajikistan. 
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1980s, due to the activities of the various protagonists in informal education circles and 
Sufi networks.
22
 In his analysis of state archives on Islam in the Soviet Union, Ro’i 
provides some references and a brief account of the activity of Ismailis in the Gorno-
Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast of the Tajik SSR.
23
 In this thesis an analysis of state 
documents will be combined with data from oral interviews to look into the little-studied 
case of the implementation of Soviet religious policy in the Gorno-Badakhshan 
Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) of the Tajik SSR in the years from 1950 to the 1985. This 
analysis of the history of Soviet state policy, in particular as regards the Ismaili majority in 
this province, provides an important area for comparison to understand the recent process 
of institutionalization of religious activity by the nation-state and external religious 
institutions.
24
 
My study of the state religious policy and Muslim institutions in Gorno-Badakhshan 
province will highlight many similarities and differences in the challenges and complexity 
of executing central Soviet policy by the local officials.
25
 It will also reveal the different 
                                                          
22
 See, Stephane A. Dudoignon, ‘From Revival to Mutation: The Religious Personnel of Islam in Tajikistan, 
from de-Stalinization to Independence (1955-91)’ Central Asian Survey, 1 (2011), pp. 53-80. 
23
 See pages on the Ismailis in Ro’i, Islam in the Soviet Union, pp. 422-424.  
24
 John Anderson, ‘Social, Political and Institutional Constraints on Religious Pluralism in Central Asia’, 
Journal of Contemporary Religion, 2 (2002), pp. 181-96. For more on recent religious changes, including the 
formation of religious institutions among the Ismailis of Tajikistan, see Jonah Steinberg, Isma‘ili Modern: 
Globalisation and Identity in a Muslim Community (Chapel Hill, 2011); and Farhad Daftary, ed., A Modern 
History of the Ismailis: Continuity and Change in a Muslim Community (London, 2011). The Ismaili 
population has constituted the majority of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast since its establishment 
in 1925. As a religious community the Ismailis of Badakhshan are the murids (followers) of the Ismaili 
Imam, Shah Karim al-Husayni, Aga Khan IV, who is considered their spiritual leader. Throughout their 
history the Ismailis consisted of different branches and have been defined in various terms and names, such 
as tariqa or madhab, movement or sect. At present the community is known by its official name of the Shia 
Imami Ismaili Muslims or Ismaili tariqa when referring to their particular interpretations of religion. For 
more on the complex history of the Ismailis, see Farhad Daftary, The Isma’ilis: their History and Doctrines 
(2nd ed., Cambridge, 2007); The Sunni population of Gorno-Badakhshan are the followers of the Hanafi 
school of Islam. For more on the Sunni population in Gorno-Badakhshan, see N. Emel'ianova, Darvaz: 
religioznaia i kul'turnaia zhizn' Tadzhiksko-Afganskogo prigranich'ia (Moscow, 2007; and Frank Bliss, 
Social and Economic Change in the Pamirs (Gorno-Badakhshan, Tajikistan) (London, 2006), pp. 221-242. 
25
 For a closer comparison of how local authorities adjusted the rules and views of central officials in the 
field of religious policy, especially in the Muslim populated republics and provinces of Soviet Union, see 
Vera Exnerova, ‘Caught Between the Muslim Community and the State: The Role of the Local Uzbek 
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levels of interaction and the dynamic relationships between the two often distinct and 
separate categories of state and religion through the agents representing them.
26
  
It fact Muslims remained loyal to Soviet state ideology, although the state succeeded to a 
great extent in removing religion from the public sphere. The Soviet state isolated its 
Muslim population from the rest of the Islamic world.
27
 This isolation itself points to the 
separation of religion from a society dominated by Soviet atheist ideology and education. 
As a result of this isolation, a distinct cultural experience emerged among Muslims of 
Soviet Union.
28
 The Soviet modernization and secularization policies, however, provided 
space for the survival of the religion as a custom in some areas of Central Asia. In her 
study on religious influence among the population of Khorezm (Uzbekistan), Krisztina 
Kehl-Bodrogi pointed out that religion had less effect among the population of this remote 
province. The reason for this weak influence of religion was the disconnection of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Authorities in Fergana Valley, 1950s-1980s’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 1 (2006), pp. 101-112; and 
for the differences in the views in religious policy by central policymakers and local authorities, see Sonja 
Luehrmann, ‘A Multireligious Region in an Atheist State: Unionwide Policies Meet Communal Distinctions 
in the Postwar Mari Republic’, pp. 272-301 in the study by Catherine Wanner, ed., State Secularism and 
Lived Religion in Soviet Russia and Ukraine (New York, 2012).  
26
 The fundamental point of the 1918 decree on the separation of state from religion (church) not only 
remained an unchanged principle for official bodies dealing with religious policy but also found its reflection 
in academic studies on religion. The distinction between religion and state informed the various themes of 
atheistic and academic research on religion (Islam) as a reactionary phenomenon, with its dogmas and 
practices opposed to the modern science and social change in the socialist state. For more on the Soviet anti-
religious (Islamic) discourse see, V. Bobrovnikov, ‘The Contribution of Oriental scholarship to the Soviet 
anti-Islamic Discourse: from the Militant Godless to the Knowledge Society’, in M. Kemper and S. 
Conermann, ed., The Heritage of Soviet Oriental Studies, (London, 2011), pp. 66-85; and for the comparative 
analysis of the conceptual dichotomies of religion (Islam) and modernization in Soviet state, see Mark 
Saroyan, ‘Rethinking Islam in the Soviet Union’, in Susan Gross Solomon, ed., Beyond Sovietology: Essays 
in Politcs and History (New York, 1993), pp. 23-52. Saroyan’s critical analysis was mainly about the 
theoretical and empirical findings of Soviet and Western studies on Islam prior to 1991. In this sense, his 
criticism is relevant to re-reading the data produced by CARC commissioners, which highlight the division 
and distinction between the Soviet state and religion.  
27
 See Adeeb Khalid, ‘Being Muslim in Soviet Central Asia, or an Alternative History of Muslim Modernity’, 
Journal of Canadian Historical Association/Revue de la Société historique du Canada, 2 (2007), pp. 123-
143. 
28
 See Paolo Sartori, ‘Towards the History of the Muslims’ of Soviet Union’, Die Welt des Islams, 50 (2010), 
pp. 315-334. 
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Muslim population of Khorezm from the mainstream Islamic teaching and shar‘ia.29 The 
consequences of Soviet religious policy in limiting the activity of religious figures and 
reducing the performance of religious rituals to a minimal level among the Muslim 
communities in the Tajik SSR cannot be underestimated. Nevertheless, I also indicate that 
improving socio-economic conditions strengthened the social status of the religious figures 
within their community in this republic. Ironically, this situation evolved in the face of the 
continuous surveillance of religious activity as well as widespread atheist propaganda 
against the religious views.  
The implementation of religious policy in different parts of the Soviet Union also had 
different implications for each of the diverse religious communities.
30
 In Ro’i’s analysis, 
the various organs of local government also behaved as obstacles to the cooperation that 
the central authorities desired to have with Islam.
31
 Such instances also appear in the 
context of this study. However, considering the existing social and cultural context, the 
local government authorities provided a milieu for religious activity, which was more fluid 
rather than the limited central official framework for cooperation between state and 
religious institutions. In my analysis of the recent history of Muslim communities in the 
Tajik SSR, the concepts of state and religion are therefore used in a more elastic sense. The 
concepts of state and religion in this thesis are analysed in the contexts interactions and 
relations between the agents representing them, i.e. the local officials and the religious 
figures. 
For this reason, it is important to draw parallels between the formation of modern concepts 
of state and religion in Soviet Union with that of other modern states. Studies on religion 
and the state in modern China, for example, have highlighted the interaction between the 
various actors, the agents of the state and of religion, in implementing religious policy. In 
this analysis, the modern concepts of state and religion both appear to be in the process of 
formation, as does the institutionalisation of religious activity.
32
 What makes the context of 
                                                          
29
 See Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, Religion is Not So Strong Here: Muslim Religious Life in Khorezm after 
Socialism (Berlin, 2008), p.13. 
30
 Religion, State and Politics in the Soviet Union, pp. 219-220. 
31
 Islam in the Soviet Union, p. 681. 
32
 See Yoshiko Ashiwa and David L. Wank, ed., Making Religion, Making the State: The Politics of Religion 
in Modern China (Stanford, 2009). 
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religion and state in modern China and the Soviet Union comparable is that in both 
countries the state and the ruling Communist party with their anti-religious ideology and 
policy; envisaged a limited space for religious activity. However, unlike in modern China, 
there were not multiple actors, organisations and individual religious institutions in Soviet 
Tajikistan. Yet the existing cultural context and religious traditions provided a space for 
officials and religious figures to form their own understanding of state religious policy and 
religious activity. 
Using information I have extracted from Soviet archives, I indicate how and why local 
officials and religious figures played roles such as intermediaries between what was 
considered state policy and religion in the particular socio-cultural and economic context 
of the Muslim communities in Gorno-Badakhshan. In many parts of the Soviet Union, the 
various agents or social actors in the field of religious policy, as well as ordinary believers, 
did not remain passive recipients of the state’s anti-religious policy and ideology. Some of 
these cases have been examined in recent studies.
33
 While the impact of Soviet religious 
policy differed in each decade following the Second World War, my thesis also 
demonstrates that over this period there was a nuanced implementation of central state 
policy in Gorno-Badakhshan.  
The various actors, i.e., the officials, religious figures and ordinary community members in 
this province, had their own ways of adjusting to and adapting state decrees and decisions. 
As can be gleaned from the archival sources under study here, they had to consider the 
local situation and especially popular ties to tradition, authority and the local 
circumstances, rather than what was stipulated by the decisions and decrees from the top 
and by state legislation. I analyse the activities of the CARC commissioners in Gorno-
Badakhshan and their collaboration with local officials against the backdrop of the 
formation of the Soviet state in its peripheral territories. The implementation of religious 
policy in this province was part of the larger ideological and socio-economic policy taken 
by the Soviet Union to transform indigenous societies with distinct traditional customs and 
ways of living.
34
 As an analysis of data under study indicates, the registration of religious 
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 See Catherine Wanner, ed., State Secularism and Lived Religion in Soviet Russia and Ukraine (New York, 
2012).  
34
 For more on the socio-cultural and economic transformations in Soviet Badakhshan, see R. M. Masov, ed., 
Ocherki po istorii Sovetskogo Badakhshana (Dushanbe, 1985). 
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figures, the bureaucratization of religious policy and its administration through local 
government were all part of the formation of the Soviet state in its borderland areas.  
Muslim Experience of Soviet Religious Policy  
The study of the history of religious life among the Muslim population of Tajikistan needs 
to be located within the context of general Soviet state rules and decrees in the field of 
religious policy. It was against the backdrop of the legislation and decrees of the 
Communist Party and the Soviet government that the religious policy in the various 
republics and oblasts (provinces) was applied. The change in the state religious policy 
towards the believers during the Second World War led to an increase in religious activity, 
which alarmed the state, causing it to renew its repressive measures by closing down 
religious societies, including mosques, from 1947 to 1953. In the years between 1953 and 
1959, some concessions were made again to religious believers, but these were in turn 
followed by a more aggressive anti-religious campaign from 1959 to 1964 under the rule of 
Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev (1894-1971). The years between 1965 and 1985 were 
considered the period of the ‘normalization’ of state policy towards religion, including the 
promotion of official religious figures over those deemed to be illegal and ‘wandering’ 
clergy. Finally, it was during the period of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost 
(openness) from the mid-1980s to 1991 that more freedom was given to believers, 
including Muslims, to revive their religious activity and practices and to re-open old 
mosques or build new mosques and madrasas and express themselves more actively in the 
public sphere and even in politics.
35
 
This thesis examines the implications of these major changes and the implementation of 
Soviet religious policy in the specific Muslim context in Gorno-Badakhshan. The 
appointment of a special bureaucratic representative in the Tajik SSR and its provinces 
followed the same procedure and rationale as in other parts of the former Soviet Union.  
                                                          
35
 For more on the chronology and periodization of the changes in Soviet religious policy under each of its 
leaders and their impact on the Muslim populations, see Phillip Walters, ‘A Survey of Soviet Religious 
Policy’, in S. P. Ramet, ed., Religious Policy in the Soviet Union (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 3-31; John 
Anderson, Religion, State and Society in the Soviet Union and Successor States (Cambridge, 1994); and 
Yaakov Ro’i, Islam in the Soviet Union: From World War II to Perestroika (London, 2000).  
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According to CARC, operational statutes, the commissioners’ primary tasks were to study 
and ensure the compliance of Soviet citizens, primarily believers, with state legislation.
36
 
These unique tasks and rules were though practiced differently and irregularly in this 
province of the Tajik SSR. An assessment of the religious situation by the CARC 
representative in this province from 1950 to 1960 paved the way for decreasing the number 
of religious figures and registering them as official khalifas and domullos according to the 
administrative divisions the sel'sovets (village councils).
37
 The registration of the official 
clergy reveals more about the state strategy of integrating the required number of religious 
figures in its policy and rendering the rest illegal and subject to administrative pressures. 
However, this process of formally appointing some officials and dealing with the rest of 
the unregistered religious figures was in turn marred by bureaucratic and propaganda 
problems. As the CARC documents reveal, the local officials delayed the process of 
appointing the official religious figures, failed to report on the religious situation in a 
timely manner or were unwilling to reveal instances of unlawful ritual performance. 
In this context of divide and rule in the field of religious policy, relations varied between 
the CARC commissioner, the local officials, and the religious figures. The local officials 
would pressurise the religious figures when commanded to do so by the central 
government or party organs. Overall, however, they appeared cautious in dealing with the 
specific issues surrounding the performance of rituals and the activities of the religious 
figures. As my analysis of state archives reveals, the monitoring of religious activity was 
handled subtly and sensitively by the local officials who had to present an account of the 
religious situation that would satisfy the requirements of the party and state authorities 
from the centre and the republic. These accounts of the religious situation also seemed 
moderate and did not reveal the realities of the practice of Islam within the community. 
Therefore, the implementation of religious policy in this context had its own rationale and 
was determined by specific attitudes, practices and the existing connections between 
religious figures and officials. The dynamic of local relations and connections such as 
kinship and economic ties determined the outcome of the competition and cooperation 
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 See Dmitrii, Yuri Arapov, Islam i Sovetskoe gosudarstvo (1944-1990). Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow, 
2011). 
37
 A khalifa had served as an assistant to the Ismaili pirs (masters) in the past but emerged in the Soviet 
period as an official religious figure among the Ismailis in Gorno-Badakhshan. Domullo refers to a learned 
person, a teacher of religion with respect and authority. The documents under study refer to the domullo in 
GBAO as the official figure responsible for conducting religious rites in the Sunni-populated districts. 
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between various actors in the religious field. In many parts of the Tajik SSR, state officials 
and most Communist Party members were not always bitter rivals or opposed to those in 
the strata of the population defined as veruiushii (believers) or the various Muslim 
religious figures referred to as dukhovenstvo (clergy). The clergy had a complex 
relationship with the party bureaucrats and local government officials due to existing 
networks of relationships, kinship and authority. There were cases when the clergy faced 
administrative pressures they had to appeal to some officials and party members for 
support. Like many of the Muslim clergy in other parts of Soviet Central Asia, the khalifas, 
mullos and okhons (teachers) in the Tajik SSR also adapted their religious worldview to 
that of Soviet secular ideology. The CARC representatives recorded these views, which 
gave reason to doubt the ‘double play’ of these religious figures with Soviet policy.  
Over the course of almost four decades from 1950 to 1985 and in the context of a legal but 
limited space for the practice of Islam, the religious figures did not remain marginalised 
social actors in the Tajik SSR. The archival documents of the office of the CARC 
commissioners and the information from oral interviews with religious figures provide 
evidence of the rise of the khalifas, domullos and imom-khatibs, as active social actors in 
their communities. Demographic and administrative changes meant that the official imom-
khatibs, khalifa and domullos were now in charge of larger congregations with expanded 
informal religious markets and enlarged territorial boundaries from one to several towns 
and villages. The increasing population of the towns and villages and the improvement in 
living conditions led the communities to offer more material rewards to the religious 
figures in return for conducting rites. These earnings, received from the community, 
ameliorated the economy of the households headed by the imom-khatibs, khalifas and 
mullos. 
In the years of moderate religious policy from the mid-1940s to the end of the 1950s the 
performance of religious rituals prompted disputes and rivalry among religious figures in 
Gorno-Badakhshan. These disputes and differences were vividly expressed, especially 
during funerals. However, with the renewed anti-religious policy from the late 1950s to the 
mid-1960s, and during the rest of the period, disputes over ritual performance came to a 
standstill.
38
 An intensified atheist campaign coupled with bureaucratic regulation from the 
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 From the mid-1960s onwards, the reports by the CRA commissioners in Gorno-Badakhshan do not provide 
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mid-1960s to the end of Soviet period further targeted religious activity. The way this 
atheist propaganda influenced the population in different parts of the Soviet Union 
depended on how the lecturers themselves understood and conveyed it to the audience. The 
bureaucratic and formal record in the documents points to the rising numbers of atheist 
lectures, seminars, articles in the media, radio broadcasts, and research in higher academic 
institutes up to the late 1980s.
39
 What did this intensified atheist campaign mean or achieve 
when the Soviet experts on religion, Communist Party propagandists and the authorities 
themselves realised that Islamic rituals prevailed on each of the important occasions of 
people’s lives?40 One of the failures of the atheist propaganda was considered to have been 
its low quality and the lack of knowledge of the atheist experts.
41
 The spread of informal 
religious teaching in many parts of Tajikistan attests not only to the persistence of the 
transmission of Islamic knowledge among the population but also to the failure of atheist-
oriented secular education in the upbringing of the new generation.  
Gorno-Badakhshan as a Research Site  
This thesis analyses state religious policy and Muslim practices in the Gorno-Badakhshan 
Autonomous Oblast of the Tajik SSR from 1950 to 1985. The years between 1950 and 
1985 mark the beginning and almost the end of the systematic study, institutionalization 
and control of religious activities in this province. In 1950, the first CARC commissioner 
was appointed in this region, which embarked on a regular study of religious situation. 
The Soviet policies of the registration and bureaucratization of religious activity were 
pursued from the early 1960s but were neither revised nor did they make radical impact 
on the religious situation until almost the mid-1980s. What however, appears from 1985 
onwards is that the extent of studying religious situation and ensuring the compliance of 
religious believer with the Soviet legislation was not stressed more, but seemed to have 
loosened.
42
 The perestroika and glasnost atmosphere under the leadership of Mikhail 
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 The Subtlest Battle, pp. 45-53. 
42
 It should be noted that the reports on the religious situation by the CRA commissioner in Gorno-
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difficult to provide a detailed analysis of the religious situation for the years from 1985 to 1991. In answer to 
my enquiry about these reports, the last Soviet CRA commissioner in Gorno-Badakhshan stated that he 
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Gorbachev from 1985 to 1991 seemed to have had some impact on increasing practice of 
some rituals. It was only in the beginning of 1990s that possibilities for contact emerged 
for religious communities in this province, in particular Ismailis, with their fellow 
believers in the world outside. 
The selection of this province as a particular case for the study of the history of Islam in 
the Tajik SSR in this period is important and interesting for a number of reasons. First of 
all, as mentioned above, the number of studies on the interconnectedness of Islam and 
politics, and on the various aspects of the performance of religious rituals among Muslim 
communities in Central Asia, is growing. Despite this increase in academic research on 
Islam in Central Asia, the history of religious life in the Soviet period, including the 
Muslim communities in the Tajik SSR in the years from 1943 to 1991, remains largely an 
understudied topic. Secondly, in-depth analysis of the religious situation in the specific 
location has revealed many interesting and important keys to understand the divergent 
case of the history of Islam in the Soviet Union. Thirdly, the selection of the Gorno-
Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast as a specific region within the Tajik SSR is due to its 
geographic location and demographic composition. Although thinly populated, the 
province has been home to various ethnic and religious groups since its establishment as 
an autonomous oblast in the Soviet Union in 1925. Divided into seven districts, Gorno-
Badakhshan houses Sunni and Shi’a Ismaili Muslim communities of different ethnicities. 
Unlike the other parts of Tajik SSR that are dominated by the mainstream Sunni 
population, Ismailis comprised 75% of the population of this province. The Ismaili 
population resided primarily in the central town of Khorog, the districts of Shugnan, 
Roshtqal’a, Rushan and Ishkashim. The Sunni Muslim population accounted for 25% of 
the population of the oblast.
43
 They were settled in the districts of Qal’a-i Khumb (present 
Darwoz), Wanj and Murgab.
44
 The religious situation in this province also differed from 
                                                                                                                                                                                
submitted the copies of his reports to the regional archival repository as his predecessors had done. 
(Interview with Parpishoev Akobirsho, the last Soviet CRA commissioner under the oblispolkom of Gorno-
Badakhshan. (15 July 2011). 
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 These proportions of the Sunni and Ismaili population in the oblast were defined in the reports of the 
CARC later the CRA for the years 1943 to 1985. According to the Soviet estimates, the GBAO’s population 
increased from 33,000 in 1910 to 148,500 in 1986. See sources quoted in Frank Bliss, Social and Economic 
Change in the Pamirs (Gorno-Badakhshan, Tajikistan) (London, 2006), p. 46. 
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 The majority of the Ismaili population speak various Eastern Iranian languages known as Pamiri 
languages. The Sunni population of Darwoz and Wanj districts speak Tajik and the population of the district 
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the rest of the Tajik SSR due to the absence of registered mosques and prayer houses. In 
this province, religious life evolved mainly around the activities of the khalifas and 
mullos who were not subordinated to any religious office and hierarchy. For the above-
mentioned reasons the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) of the Tajik SSR 
offers particularly interesting site for researching religious life in the Soviet period. 
Political and Administrative Map of the Tajik SSR 
45
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
of Murgab are predominantly Kyrgyz speaking. The inhabitants of Yazgulom valley in Wanj district are also 
Sunni Muslims but speak their own language, i.e., Yazgulomi, which belongs to the Pamiri language group. 
For more on the ethnic and demographic composition of the population of Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous 
Oblast (Province), see A. S. Davydov, Etnicheskaia prinadlezhnost' korennogo naseleniia Gornogo 
Badakhshana (Pamira) (Dushanbe, 2005). 
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Archives 
The CARC collections in the regional archival repositories in Gorno-Badakhshan, in the 
state archives in Dushanbe, and archives in Russian Federation have provided the main 
data for this thesis. The documents of the CARC commissioners in the Tajik SSR in the 
repository of the Boygonii Markazii Dawlatii Jumhurii Tojikiston (BMDJT) (The Central 
State Archive of the Republic of Tajikistan), contain reports for the years 1944 to 1966.
46
 
Reports by the republican upolnomochennyi from 1966 to 1991
 
are available in the CRA 
collection in the Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsiii (GARF) (The State 
Archive of the Russian Federation). The Communist Party reports from the Tajik SSR 
were obtained from the Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’no-Politicheskoi Istorii 
(RGASPI) (Russian State Archive of Social and Political History), and from the 
Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii (RGANI) (Russian State Archive of 
Contemporary History) in Moscow. It should be mentioned that the reports sent by 
commissioners to the council in Moscow were short and do not provide detailed 
information as do the internal documents preserved in the archives in Dushanbe, as well 
as in the regional archive located in Khorog, the centre of the Gorno-Badakhshan 
Autonomous Oblast. In his analysis of the CARC documents, Yaakov Ro’i has pointed to 
a pattern by which the various upolnomochennye often provided unverified information to 
the council in Moscow. In other words, these reporters on the ground were misleading the 
central CARC later CRA office. In its turn, the council was often upbraiding its 
commissioners in the republics and oblasts over deficiencies in their reports.
47
 The 
documents preserved in the regional archive of Gorno-Badakhshan provide more in-depth 
information about the activities of the CARC commissioners in the region. There are also 
copies of draft and hand-written reports, letters from the clergy to the commissioners and 
detailed record of the conversation between them. In addition to this, the files for the 
office of CARC in this province also contain reports from the district ispolkoms about the 
activity of social assistance commissions to led anti-religious propaganda and policy. 
                                                          
46
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Depiction of the Religious Situation in the Archives 
Since the documents prepared by the CARC (CRA) commissioners remain, the main 
source for the study, it is important to highlight the ways in which the religious situation 
was portrayed by the authors of these reports. The main analyses of the religious situation 
made by the CARC upolnomochennye were the detailed qualitative reports on the religious 
situation, especially the activity of religious figures and details of ritual performance. 
These were supplemented by statistical reports on the numbers of the registered and 
unregistered religious societies and religious figures; the numbers of the individuals 
attending mosques and visiting sacred places, as well as an estimate of donations made 
within the mosques of the Tajik SSR. These reports were submitted every three-months by 
the upolnomochennye from the oblasts to the office of the CARC in Moscow, to the 
obkoms (provincial party committees) and the oblispolkoms (provincial executive 
government committees). The CARC commissioners in the regions had also to report to 
the republican upolnomochennyi. Internal documents in the archives of the CARC office in 
Gorno-Badakhshan include the commissioners’ plan of activities, the correspondence 
between them and the council, and the party state provincial authorities with regard to 
implementing religious policy. In each of their reports the commissioners had to spell out 
how they had carried out their work in accordance with the decrees and decisions of the 
Communist Party and Soviet government in the field of religious policy. The 
commissioners were obliged to send reports to the Committee of State Security (KGB) on 
instances of the violation of Soviet legislation by the clergy and other group of citizens.  
The violations took various forms, including attempts by the clergy to discredit certain 
officials or conceal revenue. There were cases in which both the clergy and other citizens 
were brought to justice for the violations.
48
 It appears from an analysis of the qualitative 
reports that the CARC commissioners usually stressed their activities, when facing the 
challenges to ensure the believers’ compliance with the law. Accounts of the religious 
situation in the Tajik SSR therefore included details of the commissioners’ visits to the 
towns, districts and villages, their meeting with the clergy, as well as local party and 
government officials. In the mid-1960s special assistance commissions were organised 
under the ispolkom of the oblasts and districts to ensure the compliance of believers with 
the Soviet legislation. For this reason the members of these assistance commissions were 
required to hold regular seminars and meetings with the elders in each village, with the 
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members of the kolkhozes (collective farms) with teachers, doctors and other strata of the 
population. Monitoring and reporting on the activities of these assistance commissions 
increased the burden of the bureaucratic activities that were to be done by the CARC 
upolnomochennye. 
The celebration of Muslim religious festivals i.e., Id-i Qurbon and Id-i Ramazon increased 
the tasks of the surveying by the commissioners as these festivals served as a main means 
of increasing religiosity.
49
 In the course of describing the celebration of these holidays in 
the registered mosques, the representatives also needed to report on rites that were 
performed by itinerant clergy. Religious practices performed outside registered mosques 
were therefore described by the commissioners as the main type of illegal activity in 
almost every report. In comparison with illegal gatherings for prayer, a widespread 
phenomenon such as underground religious teaching was less covered in their reports. 
Shrine pilgrimage and worship in their own right appeared as the main forms of illegal, 
‘anti-social’ activity. It was for this reason that commissioners often indicated how 
itinerant clergy, ishans (respected religious figures) and mullos (individuals capable of 
conducting basic religious rites), organised group pilgrimages, and domullos and otuns 
(female religious teachers) were involved in clandestine religious teaching in the Tajik 
SSR. 
The commissioners also had to fill in special statistical forms for the council measuring 
religiosity among believers. As has been noted, religious life was measured by certain 
benchmarks starting from listing the clergy, people attending prayers and money collected 
and spent by the mosques. The commissioners collected statistics on the ages and 
educational level of the religious figures. Religiosity was not only defined simply by 
observing specific rites acknowledged as legal but also in terms of the influence of 
institutions which were regarded as unlawful but popular among the believers.
50
 In these 
statistical reports, the representatives had to provide estimates of the number of people 
attending mosques for prayer, especially on Friday, in each month of the year and on the 
eve of Id-i Qurbon and Id-i Ramazon. When describing the process of celebration, the 
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upolnomochennye were mainly concerned with ascertaining whether these celebrations 
contributed to promulgating a surge in religiosity among the believers. A religious revival 
or rising religiosity among the Muslim population was therefore measured by the numbers 
of believers attending registered the mosque for prayer throughout the year, but 
particularly on the eve and during the days of religious festivals. 
 One of the usual ways of portraying the peaceful observation of religious rituals was to 
indicate that believers from other areas where official mosques were not functioning had 
travelled to participate in collective prayer in registered mosques. This statistical report 
about Muslim participation in prayers at the 17 registered mosques revealed little about the 
fact that a significant proportion of believers in the Tajik SSR remained outside official 
estimates. The CARC commissioners were aware of the fact that hundreds of unregistered 
mosques functioned across the republic. In their reports however, they purposefully drew a 
portrait of their success in applying the religious policy. By this they reassured the central 
authorities that the religious situation was under control.  
The CARC commissioners in the Tajik SSR could also not ignore the fact that the lack of 
registered religious figures and mosques in many places triggered the activity of 
unregistered ishans and mullos. In their reports they pointed out instances when believers 
attempted to register a clergy or mosque. The commissioners however, did not consider the 
increasing number of people for assembling for prayer or the collection of money in the 
registered mosques as a sign of rising religiosity among the population. On the contrary, 
they praised the success of the anti-religious propaganda, as a result of which the 
population started to distrust the unregistered religious figures and turned away from 
illegal gatherings for prayer.
51
  
In each of their annual reports the commissioners indicate how religiosity had declined, 
and that only the elders participated in prayer but not the youth or children. To measure 
religiosity in this way was common but problematic because, in many instances, the 
number of youths aged 18-30, and even children, participating in prayers during holidays 
appeared significant.
52
 The problem also existed in the reports of the CARC 
commissioners in the Tajik SSR when a small increase, or decrease in practicing religion 
was generalised as the case for the whole republic. The CARC commissioners were also 
accountable for proving the success of anti-religious propaganda and explanatory work 
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among population. In their report to the council they had to highlight the fact that all 
explanatory work on the eve of the celebrations of religious festivals was completed in 
advance. For this reason, the commissioners in the Tajik SSR had to instruct their 
colleagues in the provinces to work closely with local ispolkoms in ensuring the 
compliance of the believers with Soviet law on religion. The above mentioned approaches 
and problems in reporting on religious situation were not only pertinent to the CARC 
commissioners in the Tajik SSR. Instances of reporting by the CARC commissioners in 
other oblasts and republics of the USSR revealed similar problems of misrepresenting 
religious situation.
53
  
Interviews 
Considering the fact that the years from 1950 to 1985 are not in the distant past but a living 
memory for the generation aged forty and over in Tajikistan, I embarked on gathering oral 
information from a selected number of individuals. I selected the informants for my thesis 
not only according to the criterion of having considerable living experience in the Soviet 
period under study but mainly due to their direct involvement in religious activity, as well 
as the implementation of state religious policy. To this extent it was necessary to interview 
individuals with lengthy and relevant experience of serving as a) religious figures among 
the Muslim community; b) Soviet state and Communist Party officials who were 
responsible for carrying out religious policy and forging anti-religious propaganda. 
The religious figures I interviewed include former and present khalifas among the Ismailis 
and imom-khatibs and domullos among the Sunni Muslims. As for former Soviet officials, 
I interviewed individuals who had worked as CAR commissioner, and as Communist Party 
secretaries. The other main group of respondents includes domullos okhons (teachers), and 
students of the informal schools of Islamic learning that ranged from the family schools to 
the wider informal learning circles, or hujra (cells), among the Muslims of the Tajik SSR. I 
also interviewed maddohkhons (performers of devotional poetry), who have been 
practicing this tradition since the Soviet period. The final groups of informant for this 
thesis are researchers on the history of religious life. In the following box, I provide 
information about the numbers, educational background, age range and gender of the 
individuals whom I interviewed during the field research for my thesis in 2010 and 2011.  
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Box. 1 Profession, Age Range and Gender of the Interviewees 
Type of Interviewees No Age range Gender 
Ismaili khalifas 8 50-90 Male 
Sunni imom-khatibs, domullos. 10 50-70 Male 
Bibi-otuns 4 50-60 Female 
Maddohkhons 5 50-70 Male 
Former Party Secretaries and Commissioner 5 70-80 Male 
Researchers 5 40-60 Male 
Total numbers of Interviewees 37 40-90  
 
In addition to the above-mentioned primary sources, I have utilised newspaper and journal 
articles, especially recent articles about religious life in the Soviet period, the biographies 
of religious figures among the Muslims in Tajikistan.
54
 I need to stress two important 
points about the main sources for my thesis. Firstly the archives of the CARC and later the 
CRA commissioners in Gorno-Badakhshan are analysed for the first time in this thesis. 
Secondly, in many instances I was able to clarify and cross-check the information provided 
in the CARC documents against the data supplied in interviews with informants living in 
this province. I applied the same method to the analysis of the CARC documents in the 
state archives in Dushanbe and the reports that were sent to the central office of the council 
in Moscow. However, the majority of my informants in other parts of Tajikistan were 
mainly former students and teachers in underground religious schools. As mentioned above 
religious education received little coverage in the reports of the CARC commissioners in 
Gorno-Badakhshan and other parts of the Tajik SSR. To construct a historical narrative 
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from the account of one informant therefore required crosschecking against the narratives 
provided by two or three other interviewees, as well as against the information recorded in 
recently published sources. 
Structure of the Thesis 
The exploration of the religious history of the Muslim population of Tajikistan in the 
above-mentioned period in this thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter one provides a 
brief background history of the major changes in Central Asia in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, and the first three decades of the twentieth century, that led to the 
formation of Soviet Tajikistan and its Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast. It discusses 
the influence of the major political and socio-economic changes on the religious situation 
in Gorno-Badakhshan prior to the 1940s. 
Any analysis of the history of religious life in Soviet Tajikistan has to be located within the 
context of Soviet religious policy and its implementation in the USSR. This is done in the 
second chapter of this thesis, which looks at how the changing rules and decrees of Soviet 
religious policy were implemented and enacted in the specific context of interactions 
between officials and religious figures in Gorno-Badakhshan.  
Religious life in this remote region of the Tajik SSR revolved mainly around the activities 
of numerous religious figures in the period under study. The third chapter of this thesis 
explores the relationship and interactions between religious figures and officials, their 
religious activity and role within the community. Chapter three reveals that the various 
religious figures were not only the passive objects of the state’s investigation and 
monitoring of their religious activity but they also became active agents in the evolution of 
religious life and social relations in their community.  
Chapter four explores the way in which the Muslim population practiced and understood 
their religious rituals in the context of continuous monitoring and pressure by the various 
state and Communist Party bureaucratic structures. In this period, the performance of 
religious rituals was formally confined to the occasions of birth, marriage, death and 
informal celebrations of religious festivals. Despite this limitation, the practice of religious 
rituals provided a space for expressing and transmitting religious views and knowledge to 
the next generation. During the relatively tolerant years of state policy towards believers in 
the mid-1950s, the performances of religious rituals become a source of contention 
between various khalifas, mullos and even officials in Gorno-Badakhshan. In the years of 
the renewed anti-religious campaign from 1959 to 1964, the performance of religious 
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rituals was not only limited, but also exposed the clergy and other participants to the risk of 
being fined and imprisoned. Rituals were celebrated in extravagant ways and gathered 
larger crowd in the years of the normalized state attitude towards religious believers from 
1970s till the end of Soviet rule in 1991. Extravagant spending on ritual performance on 
the occasion of life-cycle events and festivals indicated how the growing living standards 
increased families’ spending on religious rituals. This contradicted the prevailing view that 
religious rituals would gradually disappear under the weight of modernization, continuous 
atheist propaganda and administrative control in Soviet society. 
Chapter five explores the development of Islamic teaching in Soviet Tajikistan in this 
period, in both formal and informal milieus of learning. Formally, a limited number of 
Muslim students were enrolled in few official centres, where the curriculum was closely 
monitored by the state and supervised by the SADUM. This does not suggest that religious 
education ceased to flourish, but rather that it spread through an informal network of 
teachers and students from traditional family maktabs to the separate hujras. In turn, 
increasing migration from rural to urban settings, from remote mountainous villages to the 
densely populated cities and towns contributed to the spread of religious teaching. 
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Chapter 1: The Creation of Badakhshan as a Soviet Autonomous Province 
1.1 Socio-Political Changes in Badakhshan prior to the Establishment of the Soviet 
Government 
This chapter provides a brief background to the major socio-political, economic and 
cultural transformations at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth 
centuries that led to the creation of Badakhshan as an autonomous province in the USSR. 
1
 
It particularly focuses on examining how the major political changes in Central Asia 
affected the religious situation in this region. 
These crucial changes in Badakhshan like in other parts of Central Asia began with the 
annexation of these territories into the Russian Empire in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. This annexation led to the establishment of direct Russian administration in some 
parts of Central Asia and the incorporation of the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of 
Khiva as its protectorates until 1920. The parts of Central Asia which become subject to 
colonial administration from the 1860s were renamed as the Turkestan Governorate- 
General.
2
  
The territories of the region of Badakhshan, located on the right bank of the River Oxus, 
was annexed by the Russian empire in 1895 according to the frontier agreement between 
Russia and the emirate of Bukhara on one side and Great Britain and Afghanistan on the 
other. Prior to this agreement, the population of this region was subject to ruthless 
persecution, looting and murder by the armies of the Afghan ruler Abdur Rahman Khan 
(1880-1901). Due to these atrocities, large segments of the population from the Western 
part of the Pamirs (Wakhan, Shugnan and Rushan) fled to the territories of the Eastern 
Pamirs and Fergana province which lay within Russian Turkestan.
3
After the frontier 
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agreement, the emirate of Bukhara appointed a representative to the region. However, the 
population faced extreme poverty while also being exposed to harsh treatment by the 
Bukharan administrators.
4
 In 1905, the Governorate-General of the Russian Empire in 
Turkestan decided to place Shugnan and other parts of Western Pamir in the ‘temporary 
Russian administration’ in order to free the population of this area from further 
exploitation, as well as to consolidate Russia’s rule in the region.5 
Following their victory in the 1917 revolution, the Bolshevik government organised the 
Turkestan Governorate-general or krai (province) into the Turkestan Autonomous Socialist 
Republic within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. As for the protectorates 
of Khiva and Bukhara, they were turned respectively into the short-lived Khorezm 
People’s Soviet Socialist Republic and Bukhara People’s Soviet Socialist Republic. From 
the time of the national territorial division of Central Asia in 1924 to the late 1920s, the 
territories of these administrative structures were subsequently split up between the newly-
formed Soviet Socialist Republics of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan. It was in this period of territorial division and the creation of new political 
and administrative entities that young Central Asian Muslim Communists emerged as key 
players in the formation of the Soviet republics and the new political elites.
6
 
In 1924 a Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was formed within the Soviet 
Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan. The present Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Obast was 
formed out of Pamir province on 2 January 1925. This autonomous oblast was then 
merged with the Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (TASSR).
7
 It has been noted 
that the distinct geographic and strategic location of the Pamir which borders Afghanistan 
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and China, as well as the diverse cultural, religious and linguistic compositions of its 
population proved vital for forming an autonomous oblast in this area.
8
  
1.2 Religious Situation in Badakhshan Prior to the Establishment of the Soviet 
Government  
Religious life in Shugnan, Rushan, Wakhan and other parts of Badakhshan, was led by the 
network of pirs (spiritual masters) and their murids (followers) among the Ismaili 
population. The pirs were assisted by religious figures known as khalifas. Both of these 
religious ranks served as interlocutors between the murids and the Ismaili Imam who was 
the ultimate head of the Ismaili tariqa. At the beginning of the twentieth century there were 
dozens of Ismaili pirs in this mountainous region.
9
One of the distinguishing features of this 
network of pirs and murids was that it was not bound by the administrative divisions of the 
area. For instance, a pir living in Shugnan could have followers in other regions, even 
outside Badakhshan, in Darwoz, Kulob, Osh (a city now in Kyrgyzstan) or China. The 
same was the case for the Ismaili pirs living in Sariqol (China) and Chitral (present-day 
Northern Areas of Pakistan), who had followers in the villages in Badakhshan. The 
position of pir was hereditary, passing from father to son, but the appointment of a new pir 
had to be confirmed by a letter bearing the stamp of the Ismaili Imam. In addition to this, 
the new pir had to have the agreement of the murids of his predecessor in order to take 
over his duties. The various pirs were equal in status to each other since they were all 
appointed by the Ismaili Imam. Most pirs claimed to be from the families and descendants 
of sayyids i.e., the group of the population who could trace their lineage to the Prophet 
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Muhammad and to the Imams in the Shi’i form of Islam. There were, however, exceptions 
as the Ismaili Imam could appoint a new pir who was not the son of a previous pir or from 
an awlod (clan) of sayyids, but an educated mullo or ishan. According to Russian observers 
of the area, the pirs had a huge influence over the lives of their murids, controlling most 
aspects of their spiritual, family and civil life.
10
 That seemed to have been the case in the 
villages where pirs and murids were living together. In the far distance this would be 
generalisation to indicate that the pirs influence prevailed over each aspect of the lives of 
their followers. 
There were also cases when other figures, apart from pirs, temporarily dominated the 
religious landscape in these mountainous areas. The Russian scholar Zarubin provided an 
interesting story about the shaykhs who mobilised people around themselves, defying the 
pirs and other local religious and secular leaders.
11
 These shaykhs were also regarded as 
the custodians of the mazors (shrines), sometimes assisting or even acting as substitutes for 
the khalifas in religious affairs. Loyalty and the connection between the Ismaili Imam and 
pirs with their followers were also maintained by the collection and delivery of zakot 
(dues). These donations were generally collected by the khalifas then delivered to the pirs. 
The established or agreed amount of zakot was estimated at about 1/10 of the follower’s 
household income. For instance, it was reported that the amount of zakot sent in 1923 by 
the Ismailis in Pamir to the Imam consisted of 30,000 roubles of pure gold, and 9,090 
roubles of bronze. In 1930-31 the amount was approximately 3,850 roubles of gold and 
1,250 roubles of bronze.
12
  
Education in Badakhshan did not reach beyond the families of the various local rulers 
known as mirs and khans rulers, the religious leaders i.e., pirs and khalifas, and other 
wealthy strata of the population. A small stratum of the population received basic learning 
from their fathers or at school with separate teachers known as mullos and okhons. Some of 
these okhons and mullos came from outside the region. Those wishing to engage in further 
learning had to travel to other parts of Central Asia, or even India. It is stated that there 
were few maktabs (primary schools) in areas of the present-day Gorno-Badakhshan and 
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those that were there primarily attracted boys from the relatively comfortable families. 
Girls and children from poor families could not afford studying at these private maktabs. It 
was estimated that there were about ten literate and thirty semi-literate individuals living in 
the region by the end of nineteenth century.  
A Russian visitor to the area at the beginning of the twentieth century indicated that 
literacy was not widespread and only a few mullos were able to read. According to that 
visitor even qozi (judge) who occupied the second most important position in the country 
after the khan (ruler), could not read and write. Based on these observations and evidence 
the Soviet sources stated that over 90%, of the population of the region were illiterate.
13
 
Nevertheless, the situation of education is different when looking at the biographies of 
dozens of poets, writers and local scholars prior to the Soviet period. In his survey of the 
history of Tajik literature in Badakhshan, Abibov states that more than 60 poets were 
living in Badakhshan at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. 
As the biographies of these authors reveal, they were either taught by their fathers, by a 
hired okhon, or went to small maktabs that existed in their villages.
14
 Lessons in the 
maktabs started from learning the alifbe (alphabet) and the huruf (letters) reciting sections 
of religious books and progressing gradually to interpreting their meaning. Teaching in 
these schools focused primarily on religious subjects.
15
  
This kind of education prepared a new generation of religious leaders, pirs and khalifas, 
writers as well as scribes mirzos and kotibs (writers and scribers) qozis (judges) okhons and 
mullos. Students who acquired basic reading and writing skills then continued to learn 
different fields of knowledge and skills such as nujum (astronomy), tibb (medicine) and 
kotibi (the scribal traditions). The scribal tradition was widespread among the people of 
Badakhshan, as a result of which hundreds of manuscripts on various subjects were copied. 
As mentioned above, the small portion of the educated population received their schooling 
in the family schools of the mirs (secular rulers) and pirs. One of the educated 
representatives of the Ismaili clergy at the end of the 19
th
 century was pir Sayyid 
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Farrukhsho, who after primary schooling within his family, studied for seven years in 
India. Upon his return to Badakhshan he succeeded his uncle as an Ismaili pir, gained 
prominence as a political leader and also wrote poetry under the pen-name Zaifi. One of 
his poems was entitled Ta’rikhi Shohoni Shughnon (History of the Kings of Shugnan) 
which briefly describes the eight shahs or rulers of Shugnan and was dedicated to the mir 
of Shugnan Sayyid Yusuf Alikhon.
16
 His son Shohzodamuhammad (1868-1939) was an 
erudite scholar, praised by his local contemporaries and Russian visitors to the area.
17
 After 
receiving a basic education in the family he continued to learn other subjects with various 
teachers. He learned astronomy with Abdul Ghiyoskhon ibn Yusuf Alikhon, after which he 
completed editing and scribing the book of Nujum by Ghiyosiddin Ali Isfahoni.
18
 
Shohzodamuhammad also become known as a tabib (doctor) and produced a treatise 
named Tibbi Shohzodamuhammad.
19
 In 1909, the first Russian school was opened in 
Khorog, the present-day centre of Gorno-Badakhshan.  
The religious situation in Badakhshan, especially among its Ismaili population, began to 
change with increasing visits by the local clergy to the court of the Ismaili Imam in India 
and the dispatch of missionaries from there to the region. In early 1920s missionaries from 
the court of Ismaili Imam attempted to affect a reform in the leadership structure, in ritual 
performance and in the collection of zakot (dues) among the Ismailis in Badakhshan. These 
changes however resulted in disputes and rivalry between the missionaries sent from India 
and the local religious leadership i.e., the pirs. It has been noted that the idea of reform was 
proposed by the visit of a local clergy Sayyid Haydarsho in 1921 to the residence of the 
Ismaili Imam Sultan Muhammad Shah Aga Khan III (1877-1957.
20 
A document titled 
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glossary and Cyrillic edition by Umed Shohzodamuhammad (Khorog, 1995). 
19
 See Umed Shohzodamuhammad, ed., Tibbi Shohzodamuhammad (Khorog, 1993). 
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31 
 
‘Charter of the Panjabhai Movement’ was drafted by the missionaries in the residence of 
the Ismaili Imam.
21
  
The charter proposed several points for changing the religious hierarchy and ritual 
performance among the Ismailis of Badakhshan. One of points of this charter dealt with 
reducing the role of the local pirs in solving religious issues and their control over Ismaili 
believers. The charter proposed that religious issues should be solved by the anjomans 
(committees) within the jamo’at-khonas (prayer and community houses). Another 
important point of this charter was the replacement of the existing forms of prayer and 
funeral rites among the Ismailis of Badakhshan with new simplified prayer and rites. The 
other important point of the Panjabhai charter dealt with religious teaching and the 
establishment of schools for the Ismailis. According to this charter, religious books 
possessed by the Ismaili needed to be discussed by a waiz (preacher) in the jamo’at-khona. 
This suggestion itself was directed against the Ismaili pirs’ monopoly of religious 
knowledge.  
The missionaries appeared in the Pamirs at the same time as the Soviet government 
established itself there. Therefore, the Panjabhai missionaries came into contact with 
representatives of the Soviet government in Badakhshan. In 1922 the representative of the 
Panjabhai association made an agreement with the Chairman of the Soviet Political and 
Military Tripartite Commission; Shirinsho Shotemur (1898-1937), in the Pamir, to open a 
religious school. This agreement was viewed as a strategy by the Soviet leadership to 
eliminate illiteracy among the population of the western Pamir with the support of the 
Ismaili clergy. According to the agreement, the representative of the religious community 
was obliged to provide cloth, food, fuel and learning materials in Persian for the Soviet 
schools. These textbooks however, needed to be approved by the Political and Military 
Tripartite Commission. The representative of Ismaili community had also to provide salary 
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 Panjabhai: (literary denoting five brothers), originally emerged as a group advocating reform in the 
existing structure of the religious hierarchy, rituals and the payment of zakot among the Ismailis of India. For 
the activities of the Panjabhai councils and committees among the Ismailis of India, see Jonah Steinberg, 
Globalisation and Identity in a Muslim Community, pp. 49-51. For the Charter of the Panjabhais, see 
Document No. 54, ‘Zakon (Ustav) Pandzhabaev’, in A. B. Stanishevskii, ed., Sbornik arkhivnykh 
dokumentov po istorii Pamira i Ismailizmu (Moscow-Leningrad, 1933), p. 327-328; and unpublished article 
by T. G. Abaeva, ‘Ismaility pripamiria i sektantskoe dvizheniia Pandzhabaev v Pamirskom Ismailizme (20-
30-e gody XX veka)’, in Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Respublika Uzbekistana, f. 2464, op. 1, d. 3, 
(12 February 1997), pp. 1-13. 
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for the teacher of religious subjects. Any political influence on the students or interference 
in the activities of Soviet teachers was not allowed. Both sides agreed on these terms for 
ten years. This agreement was signed on 22 October 1922 by Shirinsho Shotemur 
representing the Soviet government and by Sayyid Munir Sayyid Qosim (1882-1957) a 
missionary representing the Ismaili community. The agreement was then sent for approval 
to Tashkent to the central office of Soviet government in Turkestan.
22
 The Soviet 
leadership in the region also agreed not to confiscate land belonging to the Ismaili clergy 
on the condition that they could provide support for the state school.
23
 To what extent this 
agreement was implemented remains unclear, but it was an attempt to reform the existing 
educational system that had been developed mainly within the pirs’ families. It was also a 
pragmatic approach by the representative of the Soviet government in the Pamir to use 
existing resources to establish new Soviet schools in the province. 
The most striking point in this charter was about the collecting, accurate counting and 
voluntary payment of zakot. All this would have to be carried out by members of the 
anjomans (committees).This method of collecting and counting zakot resulted in an 
increase in the amount of zakot to be delivered to the court of the Imam.The proposed 
reform was not successful as some of the pirs insisted on their right to collect zakot and 
lead their Ismaili followers. Some of the pirs turned against the Panjabhais’ proposal to 
reform the rituals of the Ismailis of Badakhshan and accused the missionaries of spreading 
the practices of Khodja Ismaili from India. Their dispute reached a climax that aroused the 
worst fears of the advisers at the court of the Aga Khan that the Ismailis of Badakhshan 
might distance themselves from his sphere of influence. After this dispute, the Aga Khan 
issued a number of farmons (instructions) dissolving the proposed anjomans and allowing 
the pirs to continue collecting zakot.  
In 1927 the Aga Khan issued a farmon banning the Panjebhais activities in Badakhshan. 
The Imam also ordered the Ismailis of Badakhshan to continue practicing their religious 
rituals in the old manner.
24
 Despite this ban, the Panjabhai reformers attracted groups of 
followers in a few villages in the Shugnan and the Rushan districts. These followers started 
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to perform the shorter ritual of tasbeh (a form of prayer uttered when counting rosary) 
instead of chanting the text of the charogh-noma (Book of Light) as part of the ritual of the 
charogh-i rawshan (the luminous lamp) on the final day of a funeral ceremony. 
Meanwhile the influence of the pirs and ishans among the Muslims community began to 
decrease with the election of new representatives to the Soviet government in each of the 
village in Pamir. A campaign to limit the power of landlords and other wealthy individuals 
including the Ismaili pirs had started in the region.
25
 In 1922 Ismaili clergy in Shugnan 
were accused of espionage, of links with the Aga Khan, and of having a plan to mobilise 
the masses against the Soviet government. On the basis of these accusations’ Ismaili pirs 
and their companion in Shugnan were arrested by the National Commissariat for Internal 
Affairs (NKVD) on 16 July 1922. Charges were directed principally against pir Sayyid 
Yusuf Alishoh, who allegedly planned to rise up against the Soviet government with the 
support of a certain Temurshohkhon (an ishan from the Qataghan region of Afghanistan). 
However, that year the local Soviet leadership of the Pamir threw its support behind an 
effort to save some of the Ismaili clergy from being purged.
26
  
In 1931 a certain Mirzo Qoim Ismoilzoda named as the representative of Panjabhai 
representative, wrote a letter to the ispolkom (executive committee) of the Autonomous 
Oblast of Badakhshan asking for a permit to open religious classes. In this letter Mirzo 
Qoim stated that he had been appointed as the representative of 150 households from 
which he collected zakot and delivered it to the court of the Aga Khan in Bombay. In 
return, the Aga Khan had instructed him to summon people and establish school for 
teaching religion for Ismaili children. The Panjabhai representative would provide a salary 
for the teachers and school if the Soviet government allowed them to teach religion. It is 
not mentioned in the documents what kind of immediate reply the Soviet government in 
Gorno-Badakhshan gave to this appeal by Mirzo Qoim.
27  
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 S. A. Radzhabov and M. Shergaziev, ‘Sozdanie i razvitie Sovetskoi gosudarstvennosti v Gorno-
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By 1930s the Soviet government had established itself firmly in the province and started to 
eliminate the religious clergy and their resources. The idea of opening religious schools by 
the Panjabbhai Ismaili missionaries therefore did not succeed in the Soviet territory of 
Badakhshan.
 
In the 1930s the Soviet government levelled new accusations and renewed the old ones 
against the clergy in this province. Pirs and khalifas and other individuals involved in 
religious activity were accused of delivering zakot to the Ismaili Imam, as well as of being 
spies for the foreign governments. Pir Sayyid Yusuf Alisho was arrested and was 
reportedly poisoned on his way to exile.
28
 As a result of this policy of repression 
significant numbers of religious figures, known individuals, and authorities, were 
imprisoned and some fled Soviet territory of Badakhshan in 1930s.  
The Sunni Muslim clergy in the region also faced the same situation in the region in the 
1930s. Significant numbers of mullos and ishans were persecuted, imprisoned or fled to 
Afghanistan from Sunni populated villages in the Wanj and the present Darwoz districts of 
Tajik SSR from the 1920s to the end of the 1930s. The Kyrgyz-speaking clergy in Murgab 
fled over the border into China and Afghanistan. Archival documents reveal that the 
delivery of zakot to the Aga Khan was one of the grounds for imprisoning and eliminating 
may individuals.
29
 There is no evidence of the payment of zakot to the court of the Imam in 
the archival documents from the 1940s to the end of Soviet rule. It is known, however, that 
some Ismaili believers kept aside their zakot and then delivered it to the office of the 
Ismaili tariqa in post-Soviet period.
30
 
With the consolidation of Soviet government in the Pamir the religious reform or 
modernisation to change rituals, establish new school by the Ismaili missionaries came to 
an end. The Soviet repressive policy towards religion in the 1930s had completely altered 
religious landscape that was to be turned into field of rivalry between the existing leaders 
the pirs and the missionaries advocating reform. In the years of repression in the 1930s a 
huge number of books deemed to be religious literature were destroyed. Many individuals 
and families hid their book collections in iron boxes in remote mountains, or buried in 
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 For more on this case of accusations, see Shohkhumorov, Razdelenie Badakhshana i sud'by Ismailizma, 
pp. 91-92. 
29
 There are dozens of personal files Kontrolnoe delo (supervised files) preserved in regional archive of 
GBAO which provide information about those individuals repressed in 1930s. 
30
 See Razdelenie Badakhshana i sud'by Ismailizma, p. 99.  
35 
 
wells. When some of these individuals were killed, jailed or fled to neighbouring countries, 
their families had no idea where the religious literature was hidden. In the late 1950s, when 
the religious milieu became freer, some families managed to retrieve their books, but some 
troves later found by locals led to disputes over their ownership.
31
What was more profound 
was that the Soviet anti-religious campaign antagonized the population against the 
established religious figures. Information from the archives and other sources which will 
be analysed in the subsequent chapters confirms this division and the struggle between the 
clergy and the new model Soviet citizen. 
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Chapter 2: Changing Soviet Religious Policy and Its Implementation among Muslim 
Communities (1950-1985) 
Introduction 
During the Second World War, relations between the Soviet state and its religious 
communities improved. On the part of the Soviet state, there were concessions to believers 
that allowed them to reopen churches, monasteries, seminaries, mosques and religious 
centres. The institutions that were allowed to function for the Muslim population as a result 
of this concession included the four spiritual directorates, a madrasa (religious school) in 
Bukhara (Uzbekistan) and a number of the mosques closed since the 1930s.
1
 
In turn believers, including Muslims, had to express their loyalty to the Soviet state by 
collecting donations to support the Soviet army in its fight against Nazi Germany. Soviet 
Muslim leaders also demonstrated their loyalty to the state and support for the Red Army 
through appeals at home and abroad to their fellow-believers. Apart from this much-
needed collaboration, during the war, it was felt that mass persecution of the various 
groups of population including the believers, would cause anti-Soviet sentiment. For 
instance, the concession to all believers was mainly made due to the 1939 annexation of 
the Polish territory which had an overwhelming Christian population.
2
 To start a new 
policy of persecution would have involved the Soviet state into a new wave of unrest. It 
has been indicated that the hardship of war exposed the masses to the influence of religious 
                                                          
1
 The four spiritual administration included the already established Central Spiritual Directorate of the 
Muslims of Inner Russia and Siberia (in Russian, TsDum), whose activity ceased in 1936 but resumed in 
1942. In 1943 a new centre, the Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan 
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 See Ro’i, Islam in the Soviet Union, p. 104; and John Anderson, Religion, State and Politics in the Soviet 
Union and Successor States, p. 8. 
37 
 
groups in the Soviet state.
3
 These changes in Soviet state policy towards religion paved the 
way for new policy of institutionalizing of religious activity. 
In the larger part of the Muslim-populated republics of the Soviet Union, this 
institutionalisation was mainly carried out with the collaboration of the CARC and later the 
CRA, with the spiritual directorates, the registered mosques and the clergy under their 
jurisdiction.
4
 In the regions, where these directorates and registered mosques did not 
function, the CARC commissioners and the local administration, i.e., the ispolkoms had to 
work directly with the individual clergy to implement religious policy.
5
The Muslim 
populations in the Tajik SSR were connected to SADUM through the office of the qoziyot 
6
 and the registered mosques. In this republic, the areas that remained out of SADUM’s 
reach were the Ismaili-populated Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast and other 
districts where registered mosques did not function. Nevertheless, it should be noted the 
local government did not lose their control of the religious situation in the territories where 
SADUM representatives, the qoziyot and registered mosques were not functioning. 
This chapter analyses the implementation of Soviet religious policy in the Gorno-
Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast of Tajik SSR in the years from 1950 to 1985. As in other 
provinces of the former Soviet Union, the CARC commissioners in Gorno-Badakhshan 
had to deal both with instructions from the top and work in close collaborating with other 
bureaucratic party state offices under the obkom and oblispolkom.
7
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 Qoziyot - an office of the representative of SADUM headed by a qozi in each of the republics of Central 
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 The provincial partiinoe biuro (Communist Party Bureau) was established in 1925 with the formation of the 
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organizatsionnogo ukrepleniia Gorno-Badakhshanskoi oblastnoi partiinoi organizatsii’, in R. M. Masov, ed., 
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The CARC commissioner under the oblispolkom of the province therefore had to work 
with the raikoms (district party committees), and raiispolkoms (the district executive 
government committees) and the chairmen of sel'sovets (the village councils), as well as 
the management of the kolkhozes (collective farms). The analysis of the activity of the 
CARC commissioners and the local officials and institutions in implementing religious 
policy in this particular province, however, needs to be situated within the larger context of 
the changing religious policy and institutionalisation of religious life in the Soviet Union in 
this period.  
Analysing CARC documents, this chapter argues that the implementation of Soviet 
religious policy in this province did not strictly follow the rules, decrees and decisions of 
the central state authorities. In the context of Gorno-Badakhshan, populated by Sunni and 
Ismaili Muslims of different ethnicities, assessment of the religious situation and ensuring 
compliance with Soviet legislation on religion took a distinct form. Despite often 
remaining reluctant to deal with decisions and decrees from the centre, the local party and 
state officials in this province managed to present reports on the religious situation which 
confirmed that the population was complying with the Soviet legislation on religion. 
The chapter proceeds with a brief analysis of how the Ismaili Muslim clergy in Gorno-
Badakhshan responded to the Soviet state’s concession to believers during the Great 
Patriotic War (1941-1945). It will then discuss the main rules and decrees of the Soviet 
state indicating shifts in the field of religious policy. This will be followed by an analysis 
of the activities of the CARC commissioners in studying and ensuring the compliance of 
the believers with Soviet state legislation from the 1950s to the mid-1980s in this province. 
The next section will examine the activities of the local government officials in 
implementing the decrees and decisions in the field of religious policy, through the 
bureaucratic commissions. The final section looks into the way by which atheist 
propaganda was conducted by the local party and state bureaucratic officials and structures 
in this province. 
2.1. Expressions of Loyalty to the Soviet State  
As mentioned above, the Muslims of Central Asia, like most of the religious believers in 
the former Soviet Union, provided overwhelming support to the Soviet Army during the 
war against Germany. This support and loyalty ranged from propaganda speeches by the 
SADUM-appointed clergy, to calls for mass support for the Soviet Army, condemnation of 
the atrocities of German troops, prayers for a Soviet victory, and the collection of 
39 
 
donations in cash and kind from the Muslim population.
8
 The Ismaili population in Gorno-
Badakhshan did not remain aside from this campaign for supporting Soviet Army, even if 
they were not connected to SADUM which was managing the religious affairs among the 
Sunni Muslim population in Central Asia.  
The Ismaili clergy and believers in Soviet Central Asia also echoed the support given by 
their fellow Muslim citizens for the Red Army during the war. Examples of these kinds of 
supports include preaching for the victory of the Red Army and the collection of 
contributions by the leading Ismaili ishans such as Sayyidkozum Sayyidfarukhshoev 
(about 75,350 rubles) and Shonom Sayyidmursalov (about 31,134 rubles) for the fund to 
defend the Soviet Union.
9
 Together with other religious figures in Gorno-Badakhshan, 
these ishans also signed an appeal on behalf of the Ismailis in this province to their fellow-
believers around the world.
10
 In 1944, the People’s Commissariate for State Security 
recommended to the Central Committee of the Communist Party to instruct SADUM to 
distribute 2,000 examples of this appeal through the network of Ismaili clergy in the Tajik 
SSR and neighboring countries where Ismailis resided.
11
 
To sum up, the appeal on behalf of the Ismailis of Soviet Union to their co-religionists in 
the world stressed the case that Muslims of the Soviet Union supported their homeland. It 
also highlighted the point that the true quality of a Muslim believer is to display love for 
his or her homeland. Furthermore, it indicated that the aim of the German army was to 
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 This general information about Central Asian Muslim population’s support for the Red Army is indicated in 
the appeal that was made of behalf of SADUM to Muslims of all over the world. See the copy of SADUM 
appeal in RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 261, (21 January 1944), pp. 1-7. 
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Sayyid Kozum Sayyid Farrukhshozoda (Sayyidfarrukhshoev) was the son of an Ismaili pir from Shugnan. 
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40 
 
destroy the lives of the Soviet people and to insult Muslims in the Soviet Union by turning 
them into slaves. The atrocities perpetrated by the Germans in the Ukraine and North 
Caucasus, including the killing of the Muslim population, were highlighted to demonstrate 
this threat.
12
Similar themes with identical wording were included in an appeal on behalf of 
the Sunni Muslim clergy in SADUM to the Muslims of the world.
13
 The involvement of 
the State Security Committee in the distribution of these appeals raises questions about 
their authorship. Indeed, the similarity of the political propaganda, polemic and semi-
academic discourse, and the actual wording of the paragraphs in these two appeals, 
suggests that they were actually drafted by the state propaganda and security experts. 
It was matters related to the war, and Soviet state’s concessions to believers that prompted 
similar appeals and expressions of patriotism by the Sunni and Ismaili clergy in Central 
Asia. Prior to these appeals the religious figures in the Tajik SSR, including the Ismailis, 
were regarded as anti-Soviet and disloyal, reactionary groups waiting for an opportunity to 
interfere in state policy. A report submitted to Moscow by the propaganda unit of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan stated that: 
With the outbreak of war in 1941, the Ismaili dukhovenstvo (clergy) in certain parts of Gorno-
Badakhshan revived their activities through secret religious gatherings in which they led anti-Soviet 
agitation. In this respect the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan paid special 
attention to strengthening political work among the masses in the districts of Gorno-Badakhshan 
Autonomous Oblast. Lecturers and agitators of the Communist Party in Tajikistan, the provincial 
party committee in Gorno-Badakhshan and the district party committees all led anti-religious 
propaganda among the population in the Pamir. As a result of this strengthened agitation and 
propaganda, a number of ‘Living Gods’, who were preaching among the Ismailis in this province, 
had disappeared by 1943.
14
 However, there are still serious deficiencies in the mass agitation and 
propaganda work among the population 
15
 
This revival of religious activity by the Ismaili pirs in Gorno-Badakhshan was also pointed 
out in a pamphlet published by the Propaganda Unit of the Central Committee of the 
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Communist Party of the Tajik SSR.
16
 This pamphlet called for a strengthening of the 
policy of atheism among the population of Gorno-Badakhshan, a strategy that was in line 
with the shift from a physical struggle to an ideological one against clergy and other 
believers in the Soviet state. Interestingly, it compared religious policy in the Soviet Union 
with those in the USA and Germany by noting that the Nazi state had first co-opted various 
religious sects and then destroyed each of them. While acknowledging the support of 
religious communities for the Red Army, it also warned Communist Party members and 
local authorities of the existence of some ‘reactionary elements’ among religious figures in 
the Soviet territory. The pamphlet provided a detailed polemical account of the history and 
beliefs of the Ismailis and warned state officials to be alert to possible provocation by 
German agents operating in Soviet territory. Some of these agents were assumed to be the 
local Ismaili clerics who were guided and supported by Aga Khan in Gorno-Badakhshan. 
The pamphlet went on to list a number of instances when Ismaili leaders had supposedly 
undermined the establishment of the Soviet government in the Gorno-Badakhshan 
Autonomous Oblast. These instances included a conspiracy by Ismaili pirs against the 
Soviet government in 1922. They were also involved in collecting various forms of zakot 
that were delivered to the residence of Aga Khan III, until 1936. Another accusation was 
that emigrant Ismaili clerics were assembling in Afghanistan and attempting to foment a 
revolt against the Soviet state. They were also accused of preaching against cultural, 
developmental and educational reforms in the territory of the Soviet Union. The Ismaili 
religious leaders were also blamed for being duplicitous i.e., they were speaking in public 
about loyalty to the Soviet government, but in private preaching against it. 
The pamphlet also lists the names of several individuals who emerged as preacher among 
the Ismaili population of Pamir in the early 1940s. These individuals pretended to be 
deputies of the Living God in order to exploit the member so of the kolkhozes in the Soviet 
Pamir. These clerics were allegedly agitating against the Soviet government at religious 
gatherings, especially during funerals. The Soviet government succeeded in closing the 
border with Afghanistan, improving the quality of life by constructing good roads, 
establishing collective farms and opening schools in this province. All of these 
developments should have destroyed the social roots of religion, but significant numbers of 
people were said to have blindly followed the ‘reactionary Ismaili clergy’. The pamphlet 
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stated that the Stalinist Constitution guaranteed freedom for all Soviet citizens to practice 
religion and also for those who did not follow it. Nevertheless, it called on Communist 
Party members to ‘give the ultimate rebuff to the Ismaili clergy who had attempted to 
undermine the defensive capacity of the Soviet lands by using the believers for their hostile 
aims against the state.’ With this warning, the pamphlet called for an intensified 
propaganda campaign against the remaining Ismaili clergy who sought to sabotage state 
policy and who were allies of the German agents and spies in the Soviet territory.
17
 
The examples provided in the pamphlet concerning ties between the Ismailis of Gorno-
Badakhshan, and their leadership, and fellow believers in Afghanistan, British India and 
China, their disagreements with Soviet policy, and their preaching activities, all seemed to 
have established a sufficient basis for the Soviet ideological and security apparatus to 
launch new accusations against them. Nor can it be ignored that anonymous informants 
used the accusations against the Ismaili clergy as a way of advancing their careers. In the 
Soviet state, many atheist and anti-religious propagandists and researchers sought to 
bolster their career prospects with alarmist reports.
18
 
A similar call to strengthen state policy and revise anti-religious propaganda was issued by 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Tajik SSR to the local officials in the 
border districts. For instance, the central party committee in this republic revealed that in 
the early 1940s religious figures in the border districts of Farkhor, Danghara, Shuroobod, 
Dashtijum and Khowaling, had increased their anti-Soviet activities. The bulk of these 
clergy then fled to Afghanistan.
19
 What was interesting, and at the same time confusing, 
was the use of the label of ‘agent’ applied both to individuals working for the Soviet state, 
especially the security service and to individuals labelled as anti-Soviet and disloyal, i.e., 
agents of foreign imperialist powers. In his study on Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia 
and the Ismailis, Leonid Khariukov referred to the possibility that Soviet state considered 
deporting the population of Gorno-Badakhshan during the Second World War.
20
 In his 
general study on Islam, Klimovich remarks about the Ismailis of the Pamir: 
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The steady implementation of the principle of freedom of conscience in our country, for the Ismailis as for 
the members other religious cults, obviates the need for them to hide their religious affiliation. In the absence 
of religion being a dominant factor in the state the very concept of sectarianism in our environment is a relic 
and an anachronism. Indeed Ismailis have ceased being secretive. This change in their behaviour is 
characterised in their motivation, which I observed in the Pamir in the summer of 1944. I have heard them 
saying: ‘The Soviet Constitution allows us freely to practice religion and not to hide our faith.’21 
With the war-time concessions, the Ismaili clergy seem to have realized the necessity of 
seizing the opportunity to express their loyalty and material support for the Soviet 
government. By rallying support for the Soviet army, the Ismaili clergy, particular those 
related to the families of persecuted pirs, presumably hoped that the state would remove 
the pejorative label of ‘agent’ and the threatening accusations against them made in the 
1930s and early 1940s. In its turn, the Soviet government in the province acknowledged 
the service rendered by the religious figures, allowing them to conduct religious rituals 
freely among the population. Most of the Ismaili khalifas had reportedly either stopped 
their activities or were performing rituals such as funerals clandestinely due to the fear of 
repression that existed in the 1930s.
22
 
2.2. Changes in Soviet Religious Policy 
The concessions to believers in the years of the Second World War only lasted for a short 
time as there was no change to the 1929 Soviet law on religious societies. By the end of the 
1940s the Soviet government returned to strictly controlling revived religious activity by 
closing down religious societies and renewing anti-religious propaganda.
23
 Contradictory 
resolutions on religious policy appeared in 1954 concerning the increase in religious 
activity and the growing Muslim population.
24
 The initial years of Nikita Khrushchev’s 
rule from 1955 to 1957 were considered the easiest for religious believers to revive the 
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practice of their religion.
25
 Between 1958 and 1964, several decrees and resolutions were 
issued with the aim of renewing the anti-religious campaign, preventing visitations to 
shrines, enhancing atheist propaganda and putting an end to the ‘anti-social activities of 
religious figures’. The 1961 decree ‘On the Strict Observance of the Laws on Religious 
Cults’ reinforced the 1929 law on religious societies, limiting the activities of believers 
outside religious buildings and obliging religious societies to change their internal 
procedures. As a result of this campaign, large numbers of mosques lost their registration. 
One of the reasons for the closure of large numbers of mosques in the Tajik SSR and the 
Uzbek SSR was the fact that the local authorities appeared to be more active in 
implementing Khrushchev’s anti-religious policy.26 The CARC commissioner in the Tajik 
SSR viewed the closure of mosques as the outcome of good propaganda among the 
believers who then went on to use the buildings for other practical purposes.
27
 It remains 
unclear what SADUM did to prevent this happening in the Tajik SSR. 
In 1975, in the era of Leonid Brezhnev (1964-1982) the existing law on religion was 
revised and all legal regulatory powers were placed in the hands of the Council for 
Religious Affairs (CRA). This rule made it more difficult for a religious society to be 
registered, a situation that lasted until 1990. In that year a new law on religious 
organisations was passed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. In contrast to all previous 
rules and decrees, this new legislation provided full legal status for religious societies to 
function, own their places of worship and property, permitted religious teaching and 
removed all obstacles to charity and publishing, and banned the tax imposed on the 
clergy.
28
 The law also allowed religious societies to expand their relations with other 
registered organizations and with communities abroad. What made this law different from 
previous ones was its practical implication. The previous law granted equal rights to 
believers and atheists, but in practice the former were deprived of their rights, while the 
latter were protected. This law, ratified in 1991, also permitted the teaching of religion in 
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public schools after regular hours and put an end to decades of anti-religious propaganda in 
the Soviet Union. 
29
 
The general rules and regulations of the Soviet state towards religion were passed through 
the centralised Communist Party and government hierarchy from union level to the 
republics and oblasts. On the ground, the local organs of government and party units 
implemented the numerous decisions, decrees and instructions on religion. It was the 
action of various local officials which defined the success and limits of the central state 
policy to ensure the compliance of believers with Soviet legislation. 
2.3. Implementation of Soviet Religious Policy in Gorno-Badakhshan  
In 1944 by decision of the Council of the People’s Commissars (SNK) of the Soviet Union 
the office of the CARC commissioner to study and regulate the religious situation was 
established in the Tajik SSR.
30
 The first commissioner under the oblispolkom of Gorno-
Badakhshan was appointed at the end of 1949 and began to report on the religious situation 
from 1950. The government of each union republic and the oblispolkom of each province 
had to appoint these upolnomochennye. Therefore, the bureaucratic system of the local 
government had an impact on the activities of these commissioners. It was often the case 
that due to a lack of financial and logistic support, the CARC commissioners in Gorno-
Badakhshan were not able to submit the complete report as demanded by the council in 
Moscow. Similar cases existed in other republics and provinces of the USSR, when the 
council in Moscow often criticized its commissioners for the delay and even incorrect 
information on the ground.
31
 
In his report, Mirzobek Bodurov, the first CARC commissioner in Gorno-Badakhshan, 
pointed out the specific features of the religious situation in this province, which were the 
presence of the two different Muslim (Ismaili and Sunni) communities and the absence of 
mosques and prayer rooms in Gorno-Badakhshan. These features were repeatedly pointed 
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out in reports by all of the commissioners in this province from 1950 to the late 1980s.
32
 
This being the case, the commissioner in the Tajik SSR, seems to have remained unaware 
of the distinct features of the religious situation in Gorno-Badakhshan. For instance, years 
later the CARC commissioner in Dushanbe demanded from his colleague in Gorno-
Badakhshan detailed descriptions and even statistics about the mosques and prayer houses. 
Initially, Bodurov also complained to the chairman of the CARC in Moscow that he did 
not know what tasks he was supposed to perform.
33
 Having perhaps realised the need for a 
detailed study of the religious situation or the need to work with local religious figures, 
Bodurov requested the council in Moscow to allow him to hire one of the Ismaili khalifas 
as an assistant. The council categorically rejected this request, stating that the 
commissioner was a state worker, but the dukhovenstvo represented religious societies. As 
a state official, the CARC commissioner only had to deal with the religious issues that 
were raised by believers, clerics and local authorities and which had to be solved with 
reference to the Soviet legislation on religion. The provincial commissioner was allowed to 
receive support from the CARC commissioner in the Tajik SSR, but not from religious 
personnel.
34
 This refusal clearly defined the legal boundaries between the CARC 
commissioner as a Soviet state official, and the khalifas as the representative of religious 
society. 
The correspondence between the CARC and its first commissioner in Gorno-Badakhshan, 
Mirzobek Bodurov further reveals the continuous demands from the former to the latter for 
a detailed study of the activity of religious figures and ritual performance, in particular 
among the Ismaili population in this province. In the beginning, lacking specific 
instructions from the CARC, the commissioner was not able to deal with issues such as 
recording the number of people selected as khalifas or dealing with disputes that rose 
among the Ismailis over conducting certain religious rites. Gradually, however, the council 
replied to Bodurov that in all matters related to the appointment of religious figures and the 
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conducting of rites he had to act according to the legislation that recognized the rights of 
religious societies to select their own religious leaders and perform a practice that was 
permitted. Ironically, recognizing these rights by no means afforded the clergy the right to 
promote their religious activity or involve officials in it. The CARC representative in the 
republic, i.e., the Tajik SSR, made it clear to Bodurov what the main task of provincial 
commissioner was: 
Regarding your role as upolnomochennyi in the field of religious affairs, I advise you to maintain a 
close relationship mainly with the local party and government officials. As for the professional 
relationship in solving certain issues with the local clergy and believers, I warn you of the necessity 
to comply with the maximum degree of caution, being tactical and having a delicate approach to 
them, which is very important in the context of Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast.
35
 
According to the general principle of the council, its commissioners were supposed to 
report on the activities of every religious group in the republics and provinces. 
Nevertheless, it appears that the CARC continuously demanded more details on the Ismaili 
believers from its commissioners in Gorno-Badakhshan. For instance in 1954, Polanskii, 
the CARC chairman, wrote to commissioner Bodurov that the council knew very little 
about the Ismailis and that the commissioner had to remedy this situation by providing 
material that characterised this sect in as much detail as possible.
36
 
As a Soviet official and party bureaucrat, the commissioner had to participate in various 
activities by the local government such as conducting propaganda among the believers, 
who were at the same time members of the kolkhozes. The propaganda lectures and 
seminars conducted by the CARC commissioners during their visit to the kolkhozes 
included that of maintaining work discipline and raising productivity. The kolkhozes were 
the main organisation providing employment and space for social relations, and also 
guaranteeing a relatively free milieu for religious activity. Instances of religious figures 
influencing the members of the kolkhoz to make khudoi (sacrifices) during heavy rainfall 
were reported in the 1950s.
37
 Hence, the first targets of anti-religious propaganda were the 
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rituals that were considered detrimental to individual well-being and health, and the 
economy of households and kolkhozes. The commissioner Bodurov, immediately described 
khudoi as the practice of a feudal stratum from the pre-Soviet period, which was mainly 
conducted on the occasion of a death and during times of natural calamity. He noted that in 
the past the pirs and khalifas themselves encouraged sacrifice in order to maintain their 
influence among the population.
38
 Therefore, the CARC commissioner criticised the 
gatherings for communal prayers and khudoi particularly on the occasion of natural 
calamities such as heavy rainfall or avalanche that decimated livestock and productivity in 
the kolkhozes. He often noted that the practice of these rituals contributed to an increase in 
religious sentiment among the members of the kolkhozes.
39
  
The commissioner Bodurov was initially compelled to complain about the financial and 
administrative barriers to his work in the province. For example, the lack of a typewriter 
often led to delays in submitting his reports. Most of the time he had to rely on the 
information provided by various informants on the ground as without sufficient travel 
expenses he was not able to check the accuracy of this information. He complained to the 
council that, despite working in harsh conditions in the remote and border province, he had 
not received adequate logistical support. He noted that party and state officials in the 
districts provided little support to help uncover information about the infringements of the 
law by the clergy. The commissioner also requested the council to provide him with a clear 
procedure for registering religious figures.
40
 Similar problems of working without an office 
or the provincial authorities often ignoring the newly-appointed CARC commissioners 
existed in other parts of the USSR.
41
 The problems between the commissioners and local 
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officials also had their roots in officialdom’s support for the hard-line approach that 
categorically rejected the presence of religion in Soviet society.
42
  
In Gorno-Badakhshan, another challenge to the work of the CARC commissioner in 
studying the religious situation was the unclear classification of which religious rituals 
needed to be conducted by officially recognized religious figures. Regular and holiday 
collective prayers and other rituals, conducted in registered mosques in other parts of the 
Tajik SSR and Central Asia, were deemed legitimate and approved by SADUM.
43
 One of 
the reasons for the vagueness in evaluating religious rituals as either legitimate or illegal 
was related to the absence of prayer rooms and mosques in Gorno-Badakhshan. The 
statistics show that there were 47 mosques and prayer houses, in Gorno-Badakhshan prior 
to the 1936. Most of these buildings were destroyed or closed down, and in 1954 the 
commissioner listed 14 buildings of mosques and six prayer rooms. Most of these 
buildings were used as storage for the kolkhozes, and were turned into schools and other 
offices for state use. Three of mosques two in Wanj and one in Qal’a-i khumb (Sunni-
populated districts) were still used for collective prayers. The commissioner pointed out 
that the local government in these districts did not have clear policy to prevent people from 
using these buildings as mosques.
44
  
By 1954 the council in Moscow had instructed the commissioner in Gorno-Badakhshan 
that even in the absence of mosques and prayer houses in places where religiosity was 
high, it was not correct to use administrative measures to prevent believers from 
conducting rites. In some cases, this would create an unhealthy atmosphere among 
believers. The commissioner therefore had to confine his observations to record the 
activities of individual religious figures from the Ismaili and Sunni populations in the 
province. Moreover, the council stressed that there was no need to list life-cycle rituals, but 
instead it wanted a detailed description of how these rituals were practiced by the 
community and each family.
45
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In 1958, a request was submitted by the population of Qal’a-i Khumb district to open a 
mosque in its centre. This mosque’s building had been turned into storage for the kolkhoz 
during collectivization and then handed over to the district raipotrebsoiuz (consumers’ 
union). The community appealed for it to be given back from the raipotrebsoiuz and used 
as mosque. The commissioner, however, did not favour the opening of a mosque in this 
border district. However, he did not have the authority to agree to this petition, and 
considered the request to be illegal since believers were supposed to appeal to the local 
government and then to the republican religious administration, i.e., the office of the 
qoziyot of the Tajik SSR. Hence neither the local government nor the office of the qoziyot 
responded to the request of the group of believers to open a mosque in the district of Qal’a-
i Khumb.
46
 
Between 1958 and 1960 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union issued special decrees, included ‘measures to stop pilgrimage to the so-called sacred 
places’ and to prevent violations of Soviet legislation by the dukhovenstvo. Other decrees 
called for a curb on the ‘anti-social activity’ of the clergy, especially those who received 
material benefit from their practices. The local party units and government officials in 
Gorno-Badakhshan, as in other parts of Soviet Union, were instructed to monitor the 
compliance of the believers with the legislation on religion, and to enforce the ban on 
religious societies and on religious figures, who preached among children, the youth and 
women. Alongside these measures, CARC also instructed its commissioners not to monitor 
any administrative interference by the local bureaucracy in the activity of religious figures 
and believers.  
The renewed anti-religious campaign also called for an improvement in the quality of the 
assessment of the religious situation, and an intensification of the anti-religious propaganda 
campaign by local officials.
47
 The reports by CARC commissioner in Gorno-Badakhshan 
provided contradictory accounts of the implementation of these decrees aimed at curbing 
and limiting religious activity from 1959 to 1964. In this province, the main religious 
activities such as collective prayer were still taking place even during the years of the 
renewed anti-religious campaign by the Soviet leader, Khrushchev. In 1959, the 
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commissioner Bodurov listed dozens of religious figures who were practicing faith-
healing, and called upon the financial authorities to impose a tax on them.
48
  
In the years of the renewed anti-religious campaign almost every annual report by the 
CARC commissioner included several instances in which religious figures were accused of 
extracting personal benefit from performing religious rituals on the occasion of life-cycle 
events, religious festivals, as well as practicing faith-healing. For instance, between 1959 
and 1964 there were cases when mullos were fined or sentenced for carrying out illegal 
healing activity in Gorno-Badakhshan. It was reported that in other parts of the Tajik SSR, 
more individuals were sentenced for illegal activities such as organising religious classes 
for teenagers and youth, and for polygamy.
49
 While cases of mullos and khalifas being 
sentenced for underground religious teaching were not reported in Gorno-Badakhshan, 
some practices such as making a living out khairiyot (charity) by the mullos prompted the 
authorities to respond with strict measures.
50
 
The second CARC commissioner in Gorno-Badakhshan, Arifov highlighted the success of 
Soviet religious policy in diminishing the influence of unregistered religious figures in the 
relatively developed areas. He revealed that the itinerant mullos changed tactics and 
discreetly performed rituals in remote areas where the population did not have access to 
education, health and other state-provided services. The Alay valley in the Murgab district 
on the border of the Tajik SSR and the Kyrgyz SSR, with its 370 Ismaili Tajik and Sunni 
Kyrgyz households was one of the places where Islam was reported to have a strong 
influence among population. In this valley, it was reported that the itinerant mullos lived 
well, based on their faith-healing and amulet-making activities. The kolkhoz built a hospital 
there, but the shortage of medical personnel meant that the population had to appeal to the 
services of the mullos. For this reason, Arifov recommended that the local authorities send 
medical personnel to this valley to serve the population. The kolkhoz built a club (centre 
for cultural activities), but no events were held there to strengthen atheist propaganda 
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amongst the youth.
51
 This view of religion having a stronger influence among the 
population of the remote Allay valley resembled that of the account of religiosity that was 
provided by Soviet scholars and media. In their account religious activity became stronger 
in areas that modern health care and education had not yet reached. Islam was therefore 
considered a mainly rural phenomenon.
52
 
From 1959 to 1964, the nature of the work of the CARC commissioners in this province 
also changed from one of spreading propaganda to one with a greater emphasis on 
demanding that believers and local officials should comply with Soviet legislation on 
religion. As the evidence in the annual and quarterly reports for 1959 and 1964 
demonstrates, the CARC commissioner often warned the khalifas and mullos that they 
would be held responsible if they violated the legislation on religion. This warning itself 
had little effect and between 1959 and 1961 dozens of mullos in villages were 
assembling people for collective prayer in private mehmon-khonas (guesthouses). The 
itinerant mullos were reportedly even preaching about ruza (fasting) to children, the 
youth, and even the members of the Communist Party. They also visited households to 
pray and collect fitri ruza.
53
 
The continuous demand from the CARC for detailed analyses of religious situation in 
Gorno-Badakhshan, and the commissioners’ need for instructions to deal with specific 
religious issues cannot be seen as a purely bureaucratic exercise. It was rather a pragmatic 
strategy that resulted in registering limited numbers of religious figures and pressurising 
the rest. Formally this registration of a limited numbers of religious figures appeared a 
success, but in fact, it resulted in creating a targeted group for the bureaucratic monitoring 
of the religious situation by the komissii sodeistviia (assistance commissions) under the 
ispolkoms of the districts. The CARC commissioner noted that instances of violation of the 
law had decreased among the registered Ismaili khalifas. However, illegal activity was 
noted to be widespread among the Sunni mullos in the Qal’a-i Khumb and Murgab 
districts. In these districts the itinerant mullos challenged the registration process by 
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preventing the registered clergy from conducting religious rituals during wedding and 
funerals. Local officials in these two districts remained reluctant to proceed with the 
registration of domullos.
54
  
2.4. Local Officials and Central State Religious Policy 
The following section will explore in more detail the activity of local government officials 
in executing Soviet religious policy in Gorno-Badakhshan. In the period under study, the 
implementation of Soviet religious policy at the local level took different forms and varied 
over time due to the appearance of new resolutions and decisions. From 1950 to the end of 
Soviet period in 1991, the CARC commissioners in Gorno-Badakhshan remained the 
principal party state agent dealing with religious issues among the Muslim community, 
according to Soviet legislation. However, despite being authorised to carry out this task, 
the commissioners were often unable to solve the problems raised by the believers, but 
instructed the religious figures to appeal first to sel’skii aktivy (rural activists) and 
raiiaktivy (the district activists). Often the commissioners had to call on local officials to 
respond in an adequate and positive manner to the issues raised by the religious figures. 
They also had to stress to the local officials the rights granted to the believers under Soviet 
law. In those cases when local officials mistreated the religious figures, the commissioners 
did not stand apart but called for religious figures to be treated with respect as elders in the 
community. 
The various local officials, including the head and the staff of the KGB unit in the province 
had often pressured religious figures. The last Soviet CRA commissioner in this province 
for instance, recounted that in several occasions he had to complain to the obkom party 
about administrative interference in the activity of religious figures. He had also severely 
criticized the misinformation about religious situation that the provincial KGB unit was 
providing to the central Soviet authorities in Moscow.
55
  
One of the issues that led religious figures to complain about the local government officials 
was the tax imposed by the Soviet government on the income of clergy from performing 
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rituals. The issues of taxation seemed to have been confused and unclear throughout the 
period as the commissioners do not provide accurate statistics on the tax paid by registered 
and unregistered religious figures. It appears that in most of the cases many of the religious 
figures in the province did not report their income from performing rituals. With the 
registration of the clergy, the financial authorities in each district were obliged to tax them. 
However, this created confusion among the registered religious figures who at the same 
time were members of the kolkhozes. The registered khalifas and domullos complained to 
the commissioner that the financial authorities were only imposing tax on them when they 
conducted religious rituals. The clergy deemed it wrong and argued that they should be 
taxed on their work in the kolkhozes. In many instances, the registered clergy complained 
that the fiscal authorities did not impose tax on the unregistered religious figures. These 
unregistered mullos were also making income from performing rituals in wedding, 
funerals, as well from selling amulet and talisman for the people who requested them to do 
so. 
The provincial government often had to order to the finance departments in the districts to 
take strict measures and impose tax on the income which the khalifas and domullos earned 
from conducting religious rites during wedding and funerals. This kind of taxation was 
legal under a decree of the USSR Council of the Ministers in March 1946: ‘On the 
procedure of imposing tax on religious clergy.’ What however, remained unclear regarding 
taxation was the way the local financial authorities actually collected tax and whether the 
clergy were fully aware of the relevant decree? The issue of taxation was complicated by 
a) an incomplete record of the numbers of clergy and the amounts of tax paid; b) 
complaints from the official khalifas and domullos that it was inappropriately imposed on 
them; and c) the disagreements, and differences in the policy of taxation pursued by the 
fiscal units in the districts. 
The interaction between various social actors blurred the dividing lines between the 
opposing categories of believers and religious figures on the one hand and state officials, 
party members, propagandists and activists on the other. For instance, in the district of 
Murgab, an unregistered Sunni mullo named Nizom, who was notoriously greedy but 
influential, ridiculed the official religious figures and prevented them from carrying out 
their duties. However, he was invited by the secretary of the district unit of the Komsomol 
to perform religious rites at his house, something for which the secretary was punished by 
the raikom (district party committee). In this complicated situation, the CARC 
55 
 
representative preferred to call on the financial authorities in the district to levy heavy 
taxes on the itinerant mullos.
56
 
With the renewed pressure on religious activity, the CARC commissioners often criticized 
local officials for neither preventing nor prosecuting those who instigated violations of the 
religious legislation. This indicates the ambiguous and changing position of the CARC 
commissioners in their interaction with religious figures and local authorities. In the mid-
1950s, the commissioner Bodurov often called on local officials to protect the rights of 
religious figures within the confines of the Soviet legislation. From 1962 to 1964, however, 
Arifov, the new CARC commissioner in Gorno-Badakhshan appeared more active in 
criticizing the inabilities of officials to curb religious activity. In the early 1960s Arifov, 
often complained to the provincial authorities that the local ispolkoms neither charged 
religious figures over their illegal activity nor discouraged the population from practicing 
religious rituals.
57
  
The officials’ ability to dissuade the clergy from conducting rites became especially 
limited as party members themselves participated in the life-cycle related religious 
ceremonies. This was considered to be the worst scenario in the context of atheist 
propaganda. In this situation, it was difficult for the commissioner to identify those 
officials who were practicing religion, for instance fasting during the month of Ramazon or 
those who were appealing to the mullos for tumors (talismans) and tishtobs (amulets). This 
difficulty in identifying those officials and party members who practiced religion 
suggested that the focus of loyalty to the Soviet state or to local community and religious 
tradition was unclear. It also revealed how social status and religious identity were 
negotiated in the context of state pressure on the one hand and the influence of religious 
authorities on the other. Even during the times of renewed pressure some of the itinerant 
mullos had an influence over the activities of registered religious figures. For instance, 
when the registered religious figures in the Murgab district prevented the itinerant mullos 
from conducting religious rites, the latter responded by stating that people should not seek 
the service of the official religious figures. In this case, the state’s strategy of registering 
some clerics and pitting them against the rest of the unregistered clergy backfired when the 
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unregistered ones effectively removed the official domullos from their positions.
58
 For this 
reason the local party and government in this district organised a meeting to warn religious 
figures against such violations of the legislation on religion.
59
  
Instances in which both officials and party members were practicing religion complicated 
the local government’s implementation of the state’s religious policy to segregate a stratum 
of the population as the dukhovenstvo, from the new Soviet citizens. In the remote and 
thinly populated villages of Gorno-Badakhshan, officials such as the chairmen of the 
kolkhozes and sel'sovets, and other party members, as well as religious figures, were 
related to each other. These religious figures and officials often had to interact especially 
when they participated in religious rituals on the occasion of funeral and weddings, as well 
as other life-cycle rites. On these occasions, they emerged as local actors to negotiate their 
role between what the state demanded and what was required by tradition, religion and 
community. Hence, the role of the state, with its anti-religious policy and ideology, cannot 
be seen as having triumphed over religion in this specific regional context. State and 
religion despite being proclaimed separate, remained in the process of continuous 
engagement and evolution in this province. 
The problems created by the ispolkoms of the districts were delaying the appointment and 
processing of applications for registering formal khalifas and domullos. In 1960 the 
provincial authorities agreed to register one religious figure in each sel'sovet of Gorno-
Badakhshan. From that time the commissioner urged the oblispolkom to put pressure on 
the district authorities to provide all the necessary documents odnovremennyi uchiot 
(registration) for the official clergy.
60
 Apparently the registration situation did not go 
smoothly as the ispolkoms of the districts and sel'sovets were unable to extend full control 
over the widespread activity of the itinerant mullos. Ultimately, the influence of the 
itinerant clergy prevailed, especially in places where the local authorities ignored the 
activities of aged believers, especially women visiting shrines and mullos who practiced 
faith-ealing and teaching. In 1961, for instance, it was reported that a seventy year old bibi-
otun (female religious teacher) from the village of Gumun in the district of Qal’a-i Khumb 
continued to ‘fool’ visitors to come to her house by revering the grave of her father saying 
he was saint. The local authorities knew about the activities of this bibi-otun but did not 
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take any measures, considering that she was old and would die soon. It was also revealed 
that three shrines were open for pilgrimage even if they no longer had shaykhs to maintain 
them.
61
 This pointed to the fact that shrine visitation had not completely ceased but 
continued throughout the period.  
The territories of the itinerant mullos were not limited to the villages where they lived. The 
itinerant mullos from the districts of Qal’a-i Khumb, Wanj, and even from the Ismaili-
populated districts of Gorno-Badakhshan reportedly travelled to the densely-populated 
areas near Dushanbe and Orjonikidzeobod (present the city of Wahdat) for a few months 
and returned with substantial material gains.
62
 It was usual for religious figures to move to 
different places to practice faith-healing. More instances of this activity were uncovered by 
the authorities in the early 1960s. However, the local authorities in many cases remained 
reluctant to take administrative and legal measures to limit the activity of the itinerant 
mullos. For instance, the administration of a kolkhoz in the district of Qal’a-i Khumb 
provided a false record saying that a mullo named Khoja from Rizway village was present 
at his work, while in fact he was travelling to the city of Dushanbe and its surrounding 
areas to make money from healing practices. This mullo was also accused of having five 
wives, each with a few children, living in different villages. Upon receiving this 
information, the commissioner questioned the district authorities about how this mullo was 
able to maintain those five wives, and about his attendance at his work in the kolkhoz. It 
was noted that the district party unit knew about this mullo and had summoned him several 
times to meet with the second secretary of the district party committee. Despite this, the 
mullo continued ‘fooling’ people. The commissioner further questioned whether the 
raiispolkom had made the right decision to free this ‘parasite’ from taxation.63 
A similar case of an itinerant religious figure defying the local authorities was reported in 
the Wanj district where an Ismaili mullo named Zinatshoev Qalandar successfully 
practiced faith-healing among the Sunni population. The local authorities uncovered his 
activity, and the mullo acknowledged that he was unemployed and needed to make a 
living. He testified to the authorities that he would stop his religious activity, but then he 
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resumed it. Arifov called on the authorities to suppress the activity of these itinerant 
mullos: 
Zinatshoev himself is an Ismaili, but has great popularity among the Sunni believers. It is so sad, but 
this parasite continues to deceive the members of the Communist Party. For the benefit of the state’s 
policy, it is necessary to take measures against Zinatshoev in Wanj and against mullo Khoja in 
Qala’-i Khumb as the direct violators of Soviet legislation on religious cults.64 
Arifov further contended that in these districts the ispolkoms were fundamentally unable to 
judge and limit the activity of the mullos who worked openly, let alone deal with those 
who worked clandestinely.
65
 It was not, however, so simple a matter as blaming the 
authorities for not speeding up the process of registration and controlling other religious 
activities. In most instances, in districts such as Qal’a-i Khumb, the mullos did not wish to 
register as they would become liable for tax or charges that would put an end to their 
‘parasitic’ activity.66 
It seems to have been the case that the local authorities were often criticized for their poor 
work in assuring the compliance of religious figures with the legislation in the years 1959-
1964. For instance, when registered khalifas in the Ishkashim district did not assemble for 
a meeting with the commissioner, he criticized the district authorities for paying 
insufficient attention to spread atheist propaganda among the population. The 
commissioner wrote that in some sel'sovets of this district the mullos and khalifas, 
especially those who were not registered, were functioning very well, conducting rites and 
systematically organising gatherings of believers. However, the district authorities neither 
punished nor taxed the clergy and were simply not willing to offend the religious figures.  
The local authorities neglected the implementation of new Soviet civil life-cycle rituals and 
other decisions by the oblispolkom, such as arranging a special area to be set aside for 
burials.
67
 For the commissioner, all the aforementioned instances constituted sufficient 
reason to conclude that the population remained unaware of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party decrees banning shrine pilgrimage taken in 1959 and to enforce ‘strict 
observance of the 1961 laws on religious cults’, as well as the decisions of the oblispolkom 
to re-register religious figures and reduce their numbers. These criticisms of the work of 
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those in government, their reluctance to register clerics in time, to intercept illegal religious 
activity or to improve the quality of atheist propaganda, were not only pertinent to Gorno-
Badakhshan but also found in other parts of the Soviet Union.
68
 Reports from this province 
also hint at the underlying reasons behind the reluctance and passivity of local officials 
when it came to working according to the instructions from central policy-makers. Factors 
such as kinship ties, community bonds, respect for the authority of religious figures as 
elders, in the Muslim context all influenced the ways in which the local authorities 
responded to the demands from above. As commissioner Arifov reported in 1964: 
For many years up to the present time in the sel'sovet of Nud of (the district of Ishkashim), the 
itinerant clergy who are not controlled by anyone perform all kinds of religious rituals. In complete 
freedom, the itinerant clergy systematically gather believers through all sorts of fraudulent ways. The 
vice chair of the raiispolkom, Bakhtiyorov, whose duty is to control all this, does not want to offend 
the clergy. The social assistance commission for monitoring the violation of the legislation on 
religion does not function in this district.
69
 
For all of these reasons, local actors in the field of religious policy played an ambiguous 
and risky role in not exposing the activity of religious figures, including the itinerant 
mullos. These examples also reveal the complexity of the interactions between various 
structures and actors: the CARC commissioner in Gorno-Badakhshan, local party and 
government officials, as well as registered khalifas, domullos, and unregistered mullos.  
2.5. Bureaucratization of Religious Policy  
By the mid-1960s, new bureaucratic structures, such as a) the assistance commission under 
the ispolkoms of each districts of Gorno-Badakhshan to control believers’ compliance with 
the legislation on religion; b) social commissions to implement the new Soviet rituals and 
spread atheist propaganda, were formed in this province. The new Soviet rituals were a set 
of secular rituals ranging from the occasion of life-cycle events to that of seasonal 
celebrations and the major events and achievements of the Soviet government. The CARC 
commissioner therefore needed to work directly with these commissions under each 
ispolkom to instruct and guide them in dealing with religious issues. 
The assistance commissions were formed under the ispolkom of each districts of the 
province from 1962 onwards. Initially, despite the special procedure laid out by the 
Council of the Ministers of the Tajik SSR to set up these commissions, the ispolkoms of 
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the districts considered them a mere formality. According to the procedure, in each district, 
the deputy chairman of the ispolkom had to chair these commissions at the district level 
and the chairman of the sel'sovet headed the sub-commissions in their village councils. 
When the first commissions in the districts of Gorno-Badakhshan were formed they were 
headed by accountants and school directors. The CARC commissioner criticized the 
appointment of some officials, who were not aware of their tasks and duties in these 
commissions. In most districts these commissions were just a list of names, without a plan, 
guidance or specific tasks allocated to them by the ispolkoms. The commissioner 
complained that it was for this reason that the commissions failed to ensure the compliance 
of citizens with the legislation. These commissions failed to protect the constitutional 
rights of believers and were reluctant to spearhead anti-religious propaganda.
70
 
In the Qal’a-i Khumb district, where the directors of the schools headed the commissions, 
unregistered mullos spread their faith-healing and preaching activity, especially after the 
deaths of the formally-appointed religious figures. These mullos did not report their 
earnings from conducting nikoh (Islamic matrimony contract and ceremony) and 
conducting prayers during funerals. This contradicted the demands of state legislation, 
according to which the clergy had to report their income from ritual performance on the 
occasion of births, marriages or deaths. According to the civil law, a wedding first needed 
to be registered with the ZAGS service.
71
 In practice, however, without the nikoh a 
marriage was not recognized by the Muslim community.
72
 In observing the relationship 
between marriage and ZAGS among the population of Gorno-Badakhshan, the Soviet 
ethnographer, Monogarova pointed out that Ismaili khalifas would not conduct a nikoh 
(religious matrimonial ceremony) for a bride and groom if the couple did not registered 
their marriage with ZAGS office.
73
 Her observation about the religious wedding ceremony, 
and ZAGS registration, however cannot be generalised to the whole province. In the 
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remote villages the ritual of nikoh was performed in advance in most, if not all, of the cases 
before the ZAGS in that period. As these rituals were conducted by itinerant mullos who 
kept no records, it was difficult for the financial organs to estimate the income of the 
religious figures and to impose tax on them accordingly.
74
 Hence the population continued 
to use both the service of itinerant mullos to conduct nikoh and also later to register the 
wedding with the ZAGS.  
In order to eliminate the shortcomings of these commissions the CARC commissioner in 
the province raised their problems directly with the secretary of the party committees and 
the chairmen of each districts. If the situation was not resolved on the ground, he had to 
refer the matter to the provincial authorities.
75
 By the 1970s, it was noted that the 
ispolkoms had appointed appropriate officials as the chairmen for these assistance 
commissions. Special files were created to record the activity of these commissions in 
ensuring the compliance of religious figures. The members of the commissions had to 
monitor the instances of religious rites conducted by the official khalifas and domullos. At 
that time, most of these commissions were comprised of 11 members in each district with a 
total of 232 members in the 38 sel'sovets of the province.
76
 
While the formal demands, structure and tasks of these commissions were similar; their 
activity in implementing religious policy differed from place to place. A chairman of a 
commission in a sel'sovet in the Murgab district himself joined the group of believers in 
fasting, while not reporting how mullos attempted to organise collective prayers in private 
houses in several villages. It appeared that the district ispolkom did not monitor the activity 
of the assistance commissions.
77
 Instances like these were widespread, but seem not to 
have been reported by members of the commissions, or by district ispolkoms to the 
provincial authorities. Apart from the assistance commissions there were public and 
administrative commissions that were supposed to complement each other but actually 
complicated the process of administering religious policy in this period. In this process, 
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some of the primary tasks of the CARC representative, especially monitoring the activity 
of religious figures, were transferred to these commissions.
78
 
The bureaucratisation of all spheres of activity under Brezhnev from 1965 to 1982 also 
engulfed the activities of the Council of Religious Affairs (CRA) on the ground. Most of 
the reports by the ispolkom of the districts, only listed the planned tasks and measures of 
the assistance commissions. The progress of the work of these commissions at least 
featured in the formal reports, in line with new decisions, decrees and instructions from the 
central government, the republic’s party committee and the provincial authorities. New 
decrees were issued, especially from 1965 onwards, pointing to the excesses of the anti-
religious campaign between 1959 and 1964. Implementing new decisions and decrees 
became a bureaucratic tradition in itself, to the point that a specific case of violating a law 
in one province needed to be discussed by the party bureau in other provinces.
79
 
By assessing the activities of the social assistance commissions in the districts, the CRA 
commissioners had to carry out bureaucratic tasks. They become responsible for reporting 
on the activities of the local officials and members of the commissions who had to lead 
explanatory work among the clergy. This, however, did not mean that the CRA 
commissioners became completely dependent on the information provided by the 
commissions. The commissioners continued to update their study of religious life through 
meetings, interviews and discussions, especially with the official khalifas and domullos. 
The CRA commissioner in the centre of the province, members of the assistance 
commissions in each district and anonymous informants of the State Security Committee in 
each location formed a triangle of surveillance to report on religious activity in Gorno-
Badakhshan. Hence, the official khalifas and dommullos inside this system of monitoring 
acted as informants to the local officials, to the commissioner and to the security agents.
80
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2.6. Spread of Atheist Propaganda  
While Soviet officialdom was engaging with the Muslim clergy and institutions on a 
widespread basis, it nevertheless continued to pursue an official anti-religious policy. With 
the all-union call to strengthen the atheist campaign in 1954, and the pressure on religious 
activity from 1959 to 1964, atheist policies spread to remote areas such as Gorno-
Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast of the Tajik SSR. The Soviet regime persistently 
promoted atheism as a policy propagated through education, the media, academic research 
and public writing, in order to combat the influence of religion. The other main means of 
spreading atheist propaganda was via regular and occasional lectures, seminars and 
conferences by the Znanie (Knowledge) society and members of Komsomol, by teachers in 
extra-curricular lessons in secondary and higher academic establishments, labour unions, 
women’s councils and youth clubs. 81  The cinema was another powerful vehicle for 
spreading anti-religious propaganda. 
The Znanie society regularly organised atheist propaganda campaigns sending brigades of 
lecturers to the kolkhozes and sel'sovets. The members of this society also lectured on 
atheist themes over the radio. However, it was noted that these lectures were mainly held 
among the intelligentsia, as the kolkhoz members did not attend them very often. The 
quality of the lectures was very poor, lacking any visual aids. Films on atheist themes were 
rarely shown in remote villages. The CARC commissioner Arifov proposed opening 
atheist clubs in the central town of the province and district centres where lectures on the 
atheist themes would be conducted. The atheist policy was especially weak in the districts 
where the itinerant mullos remained active, especially in the districts of Murgab, Qal’a-i 
Khumb and Wanj.
82
 From the mid-1960s onwards, the atheist policy received more 
attention due to criticism of the excessive administrative pressures on religious activity 
during Khrushchev’s period in power. Nevertheless, in Gorno-Badakhshan it was reported 
in the early 1960s that atheist propaganda was considered poor and was not spread due to 
the lack of visual aids, films, atheist rooms, clubs and youth centres, even in the main 
towns. 
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The success and improvement of atheist propaganda were measured each year based on the 
increase in the numbers of lectures and seminars, especially those held on the eve of 
religious festivals among the Muslims of the Soviet Union.
83
 In Gorno-Badakhshan for 
instance, in 1968 it was estimated that 805 experts, including 50 from the Znanie society, 
party and Komsomol members, were sent to each district and village for atheist campaigns 
during religious festivals. “Atheist week” was a special event organised by the obkom and 
raikom propagandists; it tackled various themes such as ‘the origin and content of the 
Qur’an’ and ‘Religion: its origin and essence’. It was continuously reported and believed 
that due to the increase of these measures, certain religious practices, such as ruza 
(fasting), had disappeared among children and the youth and were only observed in 
individuals aged forty and above in the Sunni-populated districts of Gorno-Badakhshan.
84
 
The numbers of lectures on scientific and atheist themes by the Znanie society and other 
cultural and enlightenment organisations increased, especially on the eves of religious 
holidays. For instance, between 1969 and 1970 the 54 experts from this society conducted 
284 lectures on scientific and atheist themes among the members of the kolkhozes in the 
districts. In 1970 the Znanie society conducted 3,357 presentations on atheist themes in 85 
rural clubs, 9 domkulturs (cultural houses) and 64 atheist classes in the province. The 
number of atheist lectures conducted by the Znanie society was shown as 313, in which 
28,069 individuals participated.
85
 All these measures were highlighted by the CARC 
commissioner as the outcome of a successful collaboration between the social assistance 
commissions and the Znanie society. 
The figures indicating the progress of atheist propaganda by cultural and enlightenment 
organizations also dramatically increased. By 1974, about 5,279 lectures had been 
conducted in 128 clubs, 135 libraries and 23 mobile clubs. In 1975, it was estimated that 
the Znanie society had conducted 302 lectures on scientific-atheism themes; 310 on 
chemistry; 190 on astronomy and 534 on medicine. Hundreds of meetings, including 
question-and-answer sessions and discussions, were held with youth to implement the new 
Soviet rituals in each of the educational and cultural organisations.
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It appears that the atheist campaigns were reinvigorated in the light of each decision or 
decree of the congresses, plenums of the party or government at the union level. When new 
decrees appeared, the obkom and oblispolkom authorities ordered the ispolkoms of the 
districts and the Znanie society to systematically organise seminars and furnish lecturers 
for the population on atheist themes. Gradually, by the 1970s and 1980s, atheist 
propaganda even reached remote areas and kolkhozes, with regular visits by team of 
lecturers and showing films to kolkhoz members. From 1970 to the late 1980, the CRA 
commissioners highlighted the success of atheist propaganda and the administrative 
measures for controlling the religious situation among the population of the region. Yet 
they also regularly called for an increase in propaganda to combat the remaining religious 
rites, to remove religious views from the minds of the Soviet peoples and to suppress the 
activity of some of the religious figures. 
Conclusion 
Over the course of almost five decades, a complex set of interactions between party state 
officials, believers and ordinary Soviet citizens emerged that had to go beyond the confines 
of the legalised but limited space for religious activity. As a result of these instructions a 
space was provided for informal and formal religious activity among the population, 
thereby enabling religious practice to be transmitted to the next generation. 
The religious situation from the mid-1960s onwards was not seen to be as problematic as 
was the case in the 1950s when the increasing numbers of religious figures and their 
rivalry over conducting rites and influence among the population had worried the Soviet 
authorities. By the end of the 1960s, it appeared that the local party and government 
authorities had more or less succeeded in ensuring the compliance of the population with 
the legislation on religion and in spreading atheist propaganda in the region. This success 
specifically meant that official registration of the khalifas and domullos to conduct the 
basic religious rituals required for marriage and funerals. This success was also measured 
by the fact that the majority of the registered khalifas were reported to have a poor 
knowledge of religion. They learned some excerpts of the Qur’an that were required during 
janoza (burials) and funerals.
87
 In 1969 a commission was sent from the CRA office in 
Moscow to study the religious situation among the Ismaili population of Gorno-
Badakhshan. The findings of the CRA commission from Moscow did not reveal significant 
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differences with the information usually provided in the reports of its commissioners on 
the religious situation in this province.
88
  
By early 1980s the CRA recognized that the religious situation was out of its control in the 
Muslim context and was in fact managed by the numerous ‘itinerant mullos.’ In Gorno-
Badakhshan the commissioners had often criticized the local ispolkoms for their inadequate 
monitoring of the religious situation. There were many occasions in the context of Gorno-
Badakhshan when local officials remained passive in the face of decisions of the central 
government in the field of religious policy. Nevertheless, in the period under study these 
criticisms never reached a point when the party and state officials in Moscow, or 
Dushanbe, were entirely suspicious about the activity of the local government in 
implementing religious policies in Gorno-Badakhshan.  
The cases of local officials and religious figures negotiating their common understanding 
of religious views, the practice of Islam and that of the state anti-religious policy reveal 
how the implementation of the same rules and decrees of Soviet religious policy differed 
from one place to another and from time to time. It has been pointed out by Ro’i that by 
cooperating with religious figures in the Muslim context, the local officials thwarted the 
attempts of Soviet central authorities to institutionalize religious life.
89
 By 1983 the 
authorities in Moscow were alarmed by the local officials in the Tajik SSR who were still 
undermining Soviet state legislation and decrees. In his report to the Unit of Propapaganda 
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, the chairman of the CRA, 
V. A. Kuroedov, stated that the religious situation in the Tajik SSR was causing serious 
concern as the constitutional principles of freedom of belief were being violated. He noted 
that the ‘activities regarding the implementation of decisions of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party about the “Islamic factor” were not being conducted satisfactorily in 
the Tajik SSR.’ 90 This message of the CRA about the “Islamic factor” implied a dramatic 
increase in religious activity, such as mosque attendance, organising illegal shrine 
pilgrimages, religious schools, unlawful constructions of mosques, turning choi-khonas 
                                                          
88
 See notes on Ismailism in the GBAO in a report by A. Barmenkov , the first deputy of the CRA chairman 
to the Unit of the Propaganda of Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR in RGANI, f. 5, 
op. 62, d. 38, (22 May, 1970), pp. 16-17. 
89
  Islam in the Soviet Union, pp. 680-681.  
90
 V. A. Kuroedov to the Unit of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR 
on the ‘Serious Mistakes in Implementing the Principle of the Freedom of Belief and Legislation of Religious 
Cults in the Tajik SSR’, see RGANI, f. 5, op. 89, (16 September 1983), pp. 58-63.  
67 
 
(tea-houses) into mosques, as well as spreading religious literature. The report criticized 
the local officials for having turned a blind eye to the fact that hundreds of illegal mosques 
were functioning in the Tajik SSR. Local officials were also blamed for having refused to 
register religious societies and places of worship. 
Traditional structure and local realities changed the local perception and dedication to 
central Soviet policy. For instance, in the larger context of Central Asia, it was the 
connection inside the mahallas (neighbourhoods) that determined the success and limits of 
implementing of central state policy by the local authorities.
91
 There were many occasions 
in the context of Gorno-Badakhshan when local officials remained passive in the face of 
decisions of the central government in the field of religious policy. Formally, in their 
reports the commissioner had to stress the distinction between state officials and those 
defined as believers and clergy. Nevertheless, cases when local officials, party members, 
participated in a religious ceremony together gives doubt to consider them often as two 
opposed or distinct category of Soviet citizens. That seems to have led the appearance of a 
discrete way of assessing and ensuring the compliance of religious believers with Soviet 
state legislation in Gorno- Badakhshan, which seemed to satisfy the central state 
authorities and the local actors: officials and religious figures. 
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Chapter 3: Religious Figures between Concession and Accommodation (1950-1985)  
Introduction 
This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the religious life that evolved around the 
activity of religious figures in Gorno-Badakhshan. It highlights the immediate impact of 
the changes in Soviet religious policy on the revival of religious activity by the clergy in 
the 1950s, the pressures and limitations on them in the 1960s and finally their 
accommodation and integration into Soviet society. While the impact of these changes 
cannot be ignored, this chapter also seeks to demonstrate that religious figures had not 
always remained passive recipients of Soviet religious policy, but actively sought to 
negotiate and adjust their social and religious position when interacting with state officials, 
including the CARC commissioners. Ultimately, it was these interactions and negotiations 
of social and religious positions by religious figures against the agents of the state, the 
local officials, which defined the limits and success of Soviet religious policy in this 
province. 
The chapter is divided into six sections. The first section provides an overview of the 
profiles of religious figures who emerged in the religious landscape of Gorno-Badakhshan 
in the decade after the Second World War. The second section explores the relationships 
and interactions between party bureaucrats, officials and religious figures in the light of 
shifts in Soviet religious policy. The third and fourth sections respectively look into the 
rivalry among religious figures for position and their integration into Soviet society. The 
fifth and sixth sections of the chapter examine the views of the religious figures about 
Islam and Soviet state ideology, as well as their rise as a prominent social agent within 
various localities. 
3.1. Changing Religious Situation and the Religious Figures 
In the period under study, the religious situation was marked by the absence of a religious 
administration and hierarchy among both Sunni and Ismaili Muslim communities in 
Gorno-Badakhshan. Prior to the establishment of the Soviet government, the religious 
leaders in the Sunni-populated districts of this province were appointed by the 
representatives of the Emirate of Bukhara that had controlled the region since 1895.
1
 
                                                          
1
 For more on the administration of Emirate of Bukhara in present parts of the Gorno-Badakhshan 
Autonomous Oblast, see B. Iskandarov, Vostochnaia Bukhara i Pamir vo vtoroi polovine XIX veka 
(Dushanbe, 1963). 
69 
 
Among the Ismailis the religious affairs was managed by the network of the pirs. In 1950, 
the CARC commissioner reported that ‘with the class struggle against the exploiters’, the 
collection and delivery of zakot to the Ismaili Imam ceased in the 1930s when the pirs fled 
from Soviet territory into Afghanistan.
2
 In the past, attending communal prayers on 
religious festivals was reportedly compulsory and enforced by the rulers and clergy among 
the Sunni population, but this had become a voluntary activity by the Soviet period. A 
change in the religious situation was also indicated by the decrease in the numbers of 
people celebrating religious festivals and attending funeral rituals, for instance the 
ceremony of the da‘wat among the Ismaili population of the region. The Ismaili population 
mainly prayed in their houses, and only gathered for communal prayers during funerals.
3
  
In spite of these radical changes, religion maintained its influence through the practice of 
rituals. The first CARC commissioner in Gorno-Badakhshan considered some of the 
religious rituals, such as the slaughter of livestock for the preparation of extravagant meals, 
and funerals, especially at times of natural calamity, as patriarchal and feudal. 
Nevertheless, they were still widespread in Soviet society. Therefore, his immediate task 
was to urge the religious figures and community to reduce the practice of any customs that 
decreased productivity and the numbers of livestock in the kolkhozes. Like the sacrifices, 
shrine pilgrimage and worship were considered expressions of fanaticism, which had been 
widespread in the past but were reported to be obsolescent by the 1950s. With the ban on 
religious teaching put in place by the Soviet government since its establishment, this 
phenomenon was also absent from the public sphere in this period. Despite the opening of 
two official centres for the Muslims of the Soviet Union, not a single cleric from Gorno-
Badakhshan studied in these centres. 
The relatively free milieu of religious activity that emerged in the aftermath of the Stalinist 
concession to believers, in turn allowed a surge in the numbers and activities of the various 
kinds of religious personnel throughout the country. In his first year of work in 1950, the 
CARC commissioner in Gorno-Badakhshan, Mirzobek Bodurov, provided a tentative 
number of 148 individuals, comprising 42 khalifas and 106 mullos who were conducting 
religious rituals among the population. Bodurov stated that this estimate of the numbers of 
khalifas and mullos was important for controlling their activities. This statement by the 
commissioner Bodurov indicated the beginning of the new period for the khalifas, mullos 
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and other religious personnel in this remote province.
4
 This period, which lasted for four 
decades, placed religious figures under scrutiny by the CARC commissioners on the one 
hand, and the local organs of government on the other in order to ensure the compliance of 
the clergy with the Soviet legislation on religion. 
Most of the religious figures who resumed their activity among the population of Gorno-
Badakhshan from the mid-1940s to the late 1950s were not new actors on the religious 
landscape, but experienced ones. Many came from the families of former pirs, khalifas and 
ishans. Some other religious figures were serving as assistants to the previous pirs. In his 
report in 1950s commissioner Bodurov indicated that some religious figures still had some 
influence among the population due to the emphasis on their descent from the families of 
former pirs and ishans. However, the importance of lineage diminished with the re-
registration of religious figures and institutionalisation of religious activity in the 1960s.  
This stress on lineage was not the only motivation for the different kinds of religious 
personnel, who resumed their activity in the post-war period in this province. As in other 
parts of the Soviet Union, prior to being appointed official khalifas or domullos, some of 
these individuals had worked in various non-religious professions in their localities. A few 
even served as chairmen of the kolkhozes, as well as of the sel'sovets. Significant numbers 
had previously worked in the trade system, others as drivers, teachers and in other 
professions.
5
 Many had been in the past teachers of religion and many more were known as 
tabibs (faith-healers) and qoris (reciters of the Qur’an) or maddohkhons (performers of 
devotion religious poetry among the Ismailis.  
The birthdates of these various categories of religious figures reveal that a majority of them 
were born between 1875 and 1900.
6
 Aged fifty and above, a significant numbers of the 
religious figures defined as khalifas, ishans, mullos, the maddohkhons, sufis and tabibs had 
received training in traditional Islamic schools i.e., maktabs and madrasas prior to the 
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1950s.
7
 In the period under study, they continued to teach secretly at the family level and 
some were called mu‘allimi ilmi din (teachers of religious knowledge) as opposed to 
mu‘allimi Soveti (Soviet schoolteachers).8 The local commissioners knew the background 
of religious figures, as both the officials and religious figures had grown up in the same 
milieu, the same kolkhozes and villages.  
The fact that some of these various religious personnel were formally selected as khalifas, 
mullo-imoms or dommullos did not mean that those categorised as unregistered or 
brodiachii dukhovenstvo (itinerant clergy) had less knowledge or expertise in religious 
affairs. On the contrary, statistics about the level of education of the itinerant clergy reveal 
that in some cases they were even better trained than the registered khalifas and domullos. 
At times in this period, they appeared more influential and active in preaching than the 
formally appointed clergy. These itinerant mullos also assisted and substituted for those 
who recited the Qur’an i.e., the qoris and the imonguis, those who recited prayers at the 
deathbed or during funerals and other religious occasions in the absence of registered 
khalifas. Subsequently, however, the official khalifas and mullos registered between 1960s 
and 1980s in this province were categorised as those who had a basic familiarity with the 
Arabic scripts, reading prayers and conducting rites.
9
 The influence of the tabibs and 
mullos also prevailed among the population, especially on the occasions of sickness, as 
people continuously appealed to them for healing through prayers rather than taking 
themselves off to see the Soviet-trained medical staff. Nevertheless, the CARC 
commissioner pointed out to that with health care provision, the opening of new medical 
centres and trained expertise throughout the region, the popularity of these religious figures 
decreased.
10
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In 1951, the commissioner reported that there were 174 khalifas and mullos serving the 
17,714 individuals defined as ‘believers’ in Gorno-Badakhshan.11  
These numbers of ‘believers’ were neither accurate nor relevant in defining the rest of the 
Muslim population in this province as ‘unbelievers’. First of all the definition of what 
constituted a believer was not clear. Was a believer someone reported to have been 
regularly praying or above forty years old or retired? The CARC commissioner, though, 
indicated that believers were those who reportedly prayed at home. But the paradox was 
that in the absence of a prayer house or mosque in the province, that local population had 
nowhere to pray except for private homes and occasionally in an open field or near a 
sacred place. Furthermore, the CARC commissioner identified several groups of the 
population in this province as the ‘most fanatical believers’.  
These ‘fanatical believers’ included the population of the villages such as: a) Qozideh, 
Darshai, Vrang and Zung in the district of Ishkashim; b) the villages of Suchon, 
Darmorakht and Porshnev in the district of Shugnan; c) the villages of Khuf and Barzud in 
the district of Rushan; d) the population of the village of Rawmed in the district of 
Bartang; and e) the whole population of the district of Roshtqal'a. In the Sunni-populated 
Wanj district, the populations of the villages of Wodkhud and Rokharv fell under this 
category of ‘fanatical and dangerous believers’. 12 Why did the CARC commissioner 
consider the population of the aforementioned location as ‘the most fanatical believers’? It 
appears that the population of these locations were strongly influenced by the preaching 
and healing activities of well-established religious figures, the khalifas okhons, mullos and 
tabibs. In these villages the clergy also preserved huge amount of religious literature. 
Regarding the economic and social position of the religious figures, Bodurov indicated that 
most of the khalifas were law-abiding citizens and did not travel to perform religious rites 
outside the territory of their kolkhozes. In their turn, the kolkhozes provided material 
support, textiles and food at the funerals of its members. Some of these religious figures, 
for instance, encouraged the members of their kolkhozes to work harder. Bodurov noted 
that ‘the educated Muslim clergy tried to prove that they were praying to Allah to grant 
strength to the Soviet government.’ 13  Despite stressing his initial assessment of the 
religious situation, Bodurov wrote to the council in Moscow that he had not received any 
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specific instructions on how to deal with the religious personnel and rituals of the Ismailis 
in this province. This made it difficult to regulate the activity of numerous mullos and to 
identity those who had been formally selected by the population to conduct religious rites. 
In the case of receiving khodataistva (application) from the believers, the CARC 
commissioner had to refer them to the council, his senior colleague in the republic and the 
provincial party and government heads. The issue of appointing official khalifas in the 
Ismaili-populated districts, and official domullos in the Sunni-populated districts, became 
more difficult when the local government remained reluctant to do it. For instance, it was 
reported in the sel'sovet of Porshnev in the Shugnan district that four individuals 
voluntarily started to conduct religious rites in their respective villages after the death of a 
registered khalifa. The same situation prevailed in other places where groups of believer 
did not appeal to the local government to appoint new khalifas and domullos. In their turn 
the officials also remained reluctant to inform the CARC commissioner about the absence 
of registered clergy in some villages. Bodurov therefore requested instructions from the 
council and his senior colleague, the CARC commissioner in the Tajik SSR.
14
 
Being mandated with guaranteeing legal protection to the registered religious figures, the 
commissioner also needed to help them in the case of administrative pressure from 
officials. The greatest numbers of complaints from religious figures in the early 1950s 
were about the problems resulting from their service as formal khalifas and mullos while at 
the same time working in the work in the kolkhozes. For instance, the fiscal authorities in 
the districts of Rushan and Shugnan imposed a tax on the khalifas for conducting essential 
religious rites. These khalifas complained that they should not be taxed for conducting rites 
for which they did not receive any income, but rather on their working income in the 
kolkhozes.
15
 
This kind of situation prompted rivalry between the various religious figures, mainly the 
informal mullos, in attracting followers. In their turn the flexible state policy towards 
religious believers and the demand by the masses to observe religious rites allowed various 
mullos, duokhons (those reciting prayers), shaykhs, folbins (fortune tellers) and ishans, 
estimated to number about 170 in 1958, to function in various parts of the province. To 
avoid these individuals gaining excessive influence, it was deemed necessary to involve 
the more formal representatives of the community, the registered khalifas and domullos. 
                                                          
14
 GA GBAO, f. 110, op. 3, d. 2, (19 July 1958), p. 41. 
15
 GA GBAO, f. 110, op. 1, d. 9, (20 July 1954), p. 25. 
74 
 
Therefore, the CARC commissioner suggested to the council and provincial authorities to 
proceed with registering the numbers of individuals required to conduct of religious rites 
among the population of the province.
16
 By the end of the 1950s, the commissioner 
Bodurov revealed cases where a leading clergy would denounce his activity, something 
that was deemed a success for applying religious policy by the local party and state 
officials. This denunciation, however, concealed the latent rivalry between the khalifas and 
mullos. Some of these religious figures waited to seize an opportunity to collaborate with 
the officials, while others continued their underground religious activities. The success and 
failure of the clergy was therefore dependent on their relationship with the local Soviet 
government and party members, and the various agents defined as aktivs in the reports. 
Statistics provided in the reports show that there was no significant increase or decrease in 
the numbers of religious personnel in the years between 1950 and 1955. However, from 
1957 to 1960 their numbers increased. The differences in the numbers of estimated 
religious figures even from one year to the next point to the kind of difficulties that the 
commissioner had in terms of defining who could be considered religious personnel or 
believer. An example of the challenge of identifying people as religious figure can be 
found in the statistical reports for the years 1957 and 1958. In these years the number of 
religious figures identified as maddohs had increased.
17
 The number of clergy defined as 
maddohs was indicated mostly for the Ismaili populated districts of Shugnan, Rushan, 
Ishkashim, and Roshtqal’a. Presumably, maddohs referred to the maddohkhons 
(performers of panegyric poetry).
18
 It should also be noted that, apart from some brief 
information on the khalifas and mullos for each village, the documents under study do not 
reveal much information about duokhons, shaykhs, maddohkhons and scores of other 
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religious figures. A brief summary of the themes of some of the devotional poetry recited 
by the maddohkhons was, however, provided.  
In 1958, the CARC commissioner in Gorno-Badakhshan, Bodurov, provided an estimate of 
297 religious figures in the province. The total numbers of the believing Ismaili population 
was estimated to 37,274. The statistical report also provided confusing numbers for the 
male and female members of the kolkhozes and workers in the other sectors of economy 
who were considered as worshippers. For instance, among the Ismailis 3,899 members of 
the kolkhozes were estimated as actual worshippers, including 1,536 women. The number 
of workers identified as believers was approximately 4,521 of whom 123 were actual 
worshippers including 41 women. The believing Sunni population of the oblast was 
estimated to have been 14,128. Among the Sunni population, the numbers of worshippers 
were estimated 730, including 180 women. Of 108 workers in other fields and officials, 30 
were defined as worshippers including six women, were classified as bogomoltsi 
(pilgrims).
19
 
In 1959, the CARC commissioner reported that only 25 individuals were registered to 
conduct religious rites for the whole population of the province. This was less than what 
was required to be certified, 24 khalifas for the Ismailis and 18 official domullos in the 
Sunni-populated districts, where both the authority and the community reportedly 
remained indifferent to the registration issue. It was estimated that there were 400 religious 
figures functioning in the oblast by the beginning of 1960, of whom 47 were supposed to 
be registered. However, by 1961, only 35 were listed for registration and 225 were 
reported to have stopped their religious activity for various reasons.
20
 While the report for 
1960 did not point to administrative interference in the affairs of religious figures, the huge 
decrease suggests how the recent anti-religious campaign by the Soviet government had 
influenced them. In the years of the renewed anti-religious campaign under Khrushchev 
from 1959 to 1964, the numbers of shaykhs, ishans, tabibs, maddohkhons and other 
individuals were dramatically reduced. Those continuing their activity experienced an 
intensified atheist campaign and administrative pressures by the party propaganda units, 
lecturers, media, local officials and the State Security Committee (KGB) in the province. 
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This did not mean that those defined as official khalifas and domullos in this region were 
unaffected by the new anti-religious campaign. Those officially appointed clergy also 
remained subject to continuous surveillance and could have been tried if they violated the 
Soviet legislation on religion. 
The registration of the official khalifas and domullos was prolonged and led to confusion, 
especially with regard to taxation, the issue that was considered one of the main measures 
for limiting their activity. For instance, in the 1960s there were five complaints from the 
Sunni mullos in Qala-i Khumb district to the CARC commissioner about taxes imposed on 
them by the finance office in the district. These mullos were not registered but had been 
selected to perform janozas (funeral prayers). The CARC commissioner found through the 
oblast authorities that since these mullos were members of the kolkhoz they would be 
exempt from additional taxes. It was revealed that in the same district, when the fiscal 
authorities imposed tax on the ‘household of the blatant clergy’, the district ispolkom 
cancelled it on the basis of information that they worked more than 85 days in the kolkhoz. 
The staff from the finance committee of the oblispolkom checked this information and 
revealed that none of these mullos was working in the kolkhozes. The district ispolkom had 
exempted these clerics from taxation with false certificates provided by the administration 
of the kolkhoz. The CARC commissioner pointed out that this act of the district ispolkom 
went against the decision of the oblispolkom of 17
 
of March 1961, which obliged the fiscal 
units in the districts to impose tax on the clergy immediately. This situation pointed to the 
loose control of local government over the mullos, who reportedly feared that registration 
would make them liable to the payment of taxes.
21
 
The second CARC commissioner in Gorno-Badakhshan, Arifov, followed the instructions 
of the council and reported to the obkom, oblispolkom and KGB office that registration had 
to be conducted without publicity to avoid unnecessary rumblings, and rumours among the 
clergy and ordinary believers. According to the instruction from the council, official 
religious personnel needed to be selected by groups of believers of both genders aged 
above 18 years, appointed by the local ispolkom and registered by the CARC 
commissioner under the oblispolkom. This registration would enable the officially 
appointed khalifas and domullos to prevent any illegal and itinerant mullo from operating 
in their territories i.e., the sel'sovets. Registration was reportedly carried out successfully 
among the Ismailis and the commissioner stated that the registered clergy were interested 
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in obtaining material benefits and securing control over the religious situation in their 
territory. 22  Therefore, the commissioner Arifov called on the provincial authorities to 
exercise stricter control over the activity of the mullos in the Sunni-populated districts. 
What were the reasons that registration was successful in the Ismaili-populated districts but 
drawn out in the Sunni-populated ones? One reason, as pointed out, was that the authorities 
in the Sunni-populated districts did not take the issue of registration seriously. The other 
reason for the delay in registration was that the itinerant clerics had a profound influence 
among the population who did not wish to collaborate with the local ispolkoms. For 
instance, in the Kyrgyz-speaking Murgab district, the situation was exacerbated when the 
itinerant mullos railed against inviting the registered mullos to conduct religious rituals in 
private houses and replaced some of them. It was not likely that the Ismaili khalifas had a 
weaker influence among the community, but there might have been more pressure on them 
from the authorities. It seem to had been also the case that the authorities in the Ismaili-
populated districts, including the CARC commissioner worked more easily with the 
khalifas and mullos regarding the issue of registration. 
In the years of the strengthened anti-religious campaign from 1959 to 1964, incomplete 
processes such as registration prompted strict measures against religious figures but not 
against officials. Unlike in previous years, the CARC commissioner needed to promote 
stronger collaboration with the local government in order to prevent the violations of 
legislation by religious figures in the 1960s.
23
 In Gorno-Badakhshan, the commissioner 
called for stricter measures to be taken against the religious figures among the Sunni 
community, but not against the officials who remained indifferent to the issue of 
registration: 
It is necessary to conduct some work among the Sunni community, in order to fit the clergy within 
the framework of the legislation on religious cults. There is another option, actually, it is crude, but if 
the clergy do not want to be officially registered to conduct rites among the believers, and the 
believers themselves do not want it, one must strictly prohibit any itinerant clergy from conducting 
illegal and unofficial activity among the believers. If we continue as we are, we will not get rid of 
this terrible infection of the ideology of Islam for a long time.
24
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In 1963, the number of individuals applying for registration was reduced to approximately 
a third with the provincial authorities only agreeing to register 35 khalifas and domullos. 
This process was completed by 1964 with 37 individuals, one for each sel'sovet registered 
as official khalifas and domullos.
25
 This list was more or less complete apart from allowing 
some khalifas and domullos to select assistants for themselves in the remote villages. These 
assistants were needed to conduct rites at funerals in case the registered clergy did not 
arrive on time. In a case where there was a serious violation of the state legislation on 
religion, the registered clergy had to bear responsibility for their assistants. This new 
registration process was different from that previously attempted due to requirements such 
as a) documentation i.e., biographical details, a photograph of the khalifa or domullo, and 
an appeal from a religious society; and b) the stipulation to follow strict procedures for 
conducting the life-cycle rites; and c) the prohibition on the registered clergy involving 
themselves in the illegal practices of faith-healing, preaching and teaching. 
The fact that religious figures collaborated with each other, however, did not prevent their 
jostling for influence and position, gathering supporters or interfering in each other’s duties 
and spheres of activity. Their increasing visibility and rivalry were, therefore, not 
conditioned by the moderate religious policy in that period but had their roots in existing 
tensions between them. The itinerant mullos waited for the moment to assume the position 
of the registered khalifas and dommullos. In their turn, those khalifas and domullos 
resigning from their formal positions joined the ranks of itinerant mullos. This shifting of 
positions, and the mutual interference among the clergy in Gorno-Badakhshan, suggest that 
the CARC categorisation of Islamic figures as either official or unofficial was not static. 
From the CARC position it was pragmatic to divide the clergy into registered and 
unregistered in order to lessen their influence. As for the religious figures, their 
interference in each other’s spheres of activity and the personal rivalry between them was 
not only motivated by their interest in becoming official religious figures. It was also an 
attempt to control the religious community. 
3.2. Relations with Local Government  
By and large the boundaries between functioning religious figures, both formal and 
informal or those categorised as itinerant mullos, remained fluid until the re-registration 
process of the official clergy instituted by Arifov, the second CARC commissioner in 
Gorno-Badakhshan in 1963. It also appears that in the years of the moderate religious 
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policy, relations between clergy and officials were ambiguous. The increase in religious 
activity and religiosity alerted the Communist Party members and Soviet officials to the 
need for further strict surveillance and control. Due to the changing state policy towards 
believers, the party and state officials needed to change their previous method of attacking 
religious figures. It was in this confusing situation in the 1950s that the CARC 
commissioner in Gorno-Badakhshan needed to implement a policy that would ensure the 
compliance of sides, the religious figures and the officials, with the Soviet legislation on 
religion. The implementation of this policy in the localities depended more on the existing 
cultural and personal ties between clergy and officials, their views and actions, than on the 
general regulations and decrees confirming the believer’s right to practice religion within 
the confines of state legislation. 
The local authorities did not always follow a clear policy towards religious figures. 
Sometimes, as indicated above, they wrongly imposed tax on the officially registered 
khalifas but not on the illegal mullos. This in turn emboldened the itinerant mullos to 
increase their activity. In terms of propaganda, the local authorities did not provide 
sufficient information on their activities to the authorities in the oblispolkom. This, 
however, did not mean that all of the local authorities were ignoring religious activity; 
indeed certain officials and rural aktivs were struggling hard against religious rites.
26
 For 
instance, it was reported that a chairman of a kolkhoz in the Ishkashim district did not 
allow a khalifa to leave his work repairing a road when the cleric was needed to lead the 
funeral of a fellow villager. The corpse reportedly remained for two days in the house and 
the relatives had to bring another khalifa from the nearby kolkhoz to conduct the janoza. 
Having received a complaint Bodurov did not hesitate to report this case as an 
irresponsible act by the local authorities towards religious figures and believers. A similar 
case was reported in the Shugnan district when a brigadier (head of a unit composed of the 
members of the kolkhoz) banned the khalifa from conducting funerals for members of his 
own kolkhoz on working days. The khalifa also complained to the commissioner that when 
the son of the brigadier died he allowed another person to conduct the funeral, even on 
working days.
27
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Another case reported to the commissioner demonstrated a different reason why the local 
authorities forbad the khalifa from performing the religious rites. Mirzoqandov 
Sulaimonsho, a khalifa in the village of Barzud of the Rushan district, complained to the 
CARC commissioner that the kolkhoz management did not allow him to conduct funeral 
rites. As a khalifa Mirzoqandov was supposed to conduct the ritual of tasbeh on the final 
night of funerals. However, there were a group of itinerant clergy who interfered in the 
activity of this khalifa. Mirzoqandov therefore complained that he was an officially 
appointed khalifa and the itinerant mullos had no right to interfere in his activities. The 
problem, however was that the chairman, the brigadier and a group of mullos in this village 
themselves wanted to perform the ritual of charogh-i rawshan on the final night of the 
funerals instead of the ritual of tasbeh. Mirzoqandov did not only serve as khalifa but also 
an ordinary kolkhoz worker. He was therefore concerned that if he did not follow the 
wishes of the kolkhoz management and perform the ritual of tasbeh instead of charogh-i 
rawshan, they would reduce the amount of his working hours as a member of kolkhoz and 
therefore his salary would be less.  
The commissioner Bodurov noted that he forwarded this complaint to the secretary of the 
obkom party.
28
 Whether Mirzoqandov had grounds for complaint or not, there is no 
indication that the kolkhoz management put pressure on him for overstepping his duties as 
an appointed khalifa. There was another reason that behind the pressure of the kolkhoz 
management on this khalifa, which was related to the disagreements over performing the 
two different kinds of funeral rites. In this case, if Mirzoqandov’s complaints were well 
founded, the authorities used ritual and itinerant mullos as tools to pressurise the official 
clergy rejecting their decisions. As for the khalifa Mirzoqandov, he subsequently appeared 
as a dissident and rebellious in the eyes of local authorities due to his complaints about 
them. This further illustrates the argument stated at the beginning of this chapter that 
increasing rivalry between religious figures on one hand and their relationship with 
officials on the other blurred the divisions between officialdom and religious figures as two 
opposing strata of Soviet society.  
Interference by officials in the activities of religious figures took various forms and was 
dependent on a complex network of relations in the workplace and society. Solving work-
related problems demanded that the commissioner act more as a party and local 
government official implementing a policy that protected the rights of religious figures as 
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Soviet citizens and called upon officials not to violate the law in terms of what it allowed 
believers to practice. However, as was the case everywhere else in the Soviet Union, the 
CARC commissioners had to act within the state rules of governance and the Soviet law on 
religious societies.
29
 He therefore often instructed the clergy to act in the way the local 
officials required. Thus, when religious figures complained to him about how the kolkhoz 
authorities would send them to work outside its territory at a time when they were needed 
to conduct rites such as funerals, Bodurov suggested solving the matter through the local 
government and appealing to the law. On one occasion, a group of believers from the 
sel'sovet of Qozideh (Ishkashim district) complained to Bodurov about the sel'skii aktiv 
(rural activist) who always used to send their khalifa to work outside the kolkhoz, but did 
not confirm his working hours. This khalifa complained several times to the raiaktiv 
(district activist), but he was reluctant to respond. However, Bodurov suspected that the 
khalifa might not have been working well in his kolkhoz, and needed to establish a good 
relationship with the administration. With this recommendation, he encouraged the khalifa, 
saying that if he worked well and simultaneously performed his religious duty, the officials 
would take this into account. Even though the commissioner did not solve this issue in 
favour of the khalifa, in his report he pointed out the fact that the believers were aware of 
the rights granted to them by Soviet law.
30
  
These instances show that the CARC commissioner had only a limited opportunity to work 
within a party state bureaucratic system that remained hostile to religious activity. While 
collaborating with the local Communist Party and government offices he also had to 
explain the council’s general policy to officials, namely that they should not force believers 
to stop practicing their religious rituals. In their turn, the clerics did not remain passive in 
seeking opportunities to have more privileges. This evidence of encounters between 
khalifas and mullos on the one hand, and the local authorities on the other, referred to the 
changing position and cautious activity of religious personnel in this period. Their religious 
activity was closely monitored by the party and government who had numerous aktivs on 
the ground. Nevertheless, this surveillance did not prevent their rivalry. It appears that the 
relatively lax religious policy in the mid-1950s boosted the morale among some religious 
figures into thinking that appealing to the commissioner was the only way to solve their 
problems. In his turn, the CARC commissioner often took an arbitrary position to deal with 
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the disputed issues between religious figures themselves, and between them and the 
administration of the kolkhozes, the local government, and party units. 
In the decade between 1950 and 1960, many of these religious figures were denounced and 
stopped their activity, but many more established close ties with the local authorities in the 
kolkhozes and turned from being religious figures into agents of local government. A 
number of the formally-appointed khalifas even appealed for more rights and privileges. 
The reports for this decade indicate that mass propaganda was a significant factor in 
encouraging religious figures to cease their activity; however, the cases of administrative 
pressure on the part of the authorities forcing some leading clergy to withdraw from their 
position are rarely mentioned. Neither can pressure from fellow clergy be ruled out as a 
reason for the decrease in the numbers of khalifas and mullos. There were also isolated 
cases when religious figures deliberately compromised their position in order to free the 
way for their children to be brought up within the new education and career system.
31
  
Similarly, some party members also felt they had to end their ties with religious figures and 
activity, due to pressure from the Soviet system and because of rivalry, accusations and 
animosity between its various members. For instance, a party official Sayyidkhusraw 
Shojonov (1912-1970) from the Bartang district, asked Bodurov to delist Shojonov’s own 
father from his position of khalifa. The commissioner responded that he had not appointed 
this khalifa; rather it had been the group of believers from the village of Emts of the 
Rushan district, who had selected his father for the position. Therefore, it was up to the 
believers to select a khalifa and it was the local government that was responsible for 
appointing and removing him. This case revealed the kind of negotiation that both religious 
figures and officials needed to engage in with regard to their personal position, identity and 
career within the Soviet system. Well-educated officials such as Sayyidkhusraw were 
perhaps aware of the rights granted to believers to select clerics for conducting their 
religious rites. However, his official career remained at risk due to his father serving as 
khalifa.
32
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The career of many individuals was at stake due to rivalry and enmity among the party 
members and officials. Anonymous accusations seem easily to have jeopardized the 
lifelong career of officials if they supported religious activity, observed rites or if they 
were related to any religious figures. The commissioner also reported on many occasions 
when officials themselves observed religious rites or collaborated with the religious 
personnel. Accusations and the exercise of strict control on the activity of officials, 
religious personnel and any other active individuals were widespread in the Soviet state. In 
the small and less populated areas, it was therefore easy to reveal any religious activity, 
which would in turn put at risk the position of religious figures, as well as various other 
social actors in Soviet society: the party members, ordinary workers, teachers, doctors and 
other strata of population. 
Religious personnel in Soviet Central Asia experienced unease and tense relations and 
were not immune from various forms of pressure and punishment despite the euphoria of 
the moderate policy in the aftermath of the Second World War. The reports for the early 
1950s indicate that, due to administrative pressures and interference, several religious 
personnel were forced to migrate from their rural villages to the plains of the Tajik SSR, 
including the capital city. Some of these religious figures realised that migration would 
bring them more benefit by conducting rites, healing and offering prayer in these densely-
populated areas. While this was the case to a certain extent, the fact cannot be ignored that 
each of these religious figures had his own particular experience of interaction with the 
local administration in each of the districts and villages. 
Although widespread, administrative pressure also differed in nature and varied from place 
to place in the USSR. The Muslim communities in Gorno-Badakhshan were not living in 
an isolated region but were aware of how the religious policy was implemented in other 
parts of the Soviet Union. In a discussion with Bodurov, one of the former khalifas, 
Turonshoev Imronsho from the village of Tawdem of the Roshtqal’a district who had spent 
time in prison in Kazakhstan, compared the ban on religious activity in the Kazakh SSR 
with that of religious situation in Gorno-Badakhshan. He complained to the commissioner 
that he had not heard of or witnessed such a strict prohibition of religious activities in the 
Kazakh SSR where he had lived after being released from prison. According to him, the 
atheist struggle and propaganda were stronger in Gorno-Badakhshan. Bodurov, however, 
stressed the same general rules of Soviet legislation that were applied in each of the 
republics and oblasts: 
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‘Citizen Turonshoev! The Soviet government and Communist Party protect the Soviet people from 
every reactionary activity conducted illegally against Soviet society. As for the struggle against 
religion, it is not just the case in the GBAO, but the same law works throughout the whole of the 
country (the USSR). You must have acted against the law.’ Turonshoev then reportedly revealed that 
his witnesses lied to him, but he was satisfied with the Soviet government. In this way, our 
discussion finished and he left my office.
33
 
This stress on the supremacy of Soviet legislation concerning religion, however, did not 
mean that in all instances the commissioner remained indifferent when believers faced 
administrative pressure. Bodurov, for instance, promised support to the registered clergy 
on the issues of taxation and to those facing pressure because their sons were working as 
Soviet officials. A khalifa complained to him that his son forbad him to conduct rites 
because the authorities were threatening to dismiss the son from his job. The khalifa was 
obviously in an awkward situation because he had been asked to conduct rites for a group 
of believers in a kolkhoz in the Rushan district. Bodurov assured this khalifa of his support 
against the interference of the raiaktiv and stated that it would be inappropriate to remove 
the son from his post.
34
 
Thus, the commissioner’s position changed from being more neutral at the beginning of his 
work to one of levering pressure on both groups in the light of changing situations, party 
decisions and decrees. This was reflected in the nature of his contradictory decisions, as on 
one occasion mentioned above the commissioner advised a khalifa to migrate with his 
community. A khalifa in the Roshtqal’a district, for instance, asked Bodurov whether he 
could remove his name among the people of the village who had agreed to be transferred to 
the capital city of Stalinobod (present Dushanbe). Bodurov advised that as a person 
representing the group of believers in his kolkhoz this khalifa needed to migrate with his 
community. In another instance, however, another khalifa approached the commissioner 
saying that he wanted to migrate but the community needed him to conduct rites. Bodurov, 
however, advised him to migrate even if the community needed a khalifa. He assured the 
khalifa that conducting rites was a voluntary job, that no one could stop him from 
migrating, and that the believers would themselves select a new person to replace him.
35
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When responding to the complaints from religious figures the commissioner had to 
consider his links to the community, especially to the tradition of respect and honouring 
the elder members of society. These two factors i. e., the commissioner’s position and links 
to the community, proved vital for solving the various problems of the elders, which 
generally related to pensions, working hours and the kolkhoz management’s attitude 
towards religious figures.  
On occasions when the local authorities did not respond to complaints from the religious 
figures, the CARC commissioner had to intervene directly, visit the districts and the 
kolkhozes and deal with the matter on the ground. For instance, a khalifa from the village 
of Wer of the Shugnan district, Sayyidmamadov Nurmamadsho, complained to Bodurov 
about a head of work brigade from the kolkhoz. The khalifa Sayyidmamadov had been 
working in the kolkhoz but the brigadier Kurbonmamadov treated him as someone who 
was only engaged in performing rituals. For this reason the brigadier ordered the khalifa to 
work overtime in the kolkhoz. When the khalifa raised the matter with the administration, 
another member of the kolkhoz, Alinazarov, insulted him for lodging the complaint. Upon 
hearing this complaint, the commissioner Bodurov had to travel to the village of Wer and 
resolve the issue in the meeting of the kolkhoz.  
The commissioner believed that the appeal by religious figures to him for an explanation 
itself suggested their weakening influence among the believers. This enabled him not only 
to explain the Soviet legislation on religion to the clergy and believers while on his journey 
to Wer, but also to propagate state policy aimed at improving living standards and raising 
productivity among the members of the kolkhozes. The commissioner stressed his success 
in ensuring the compliance of believers with legislation and reducing the influence of 
dukhovenstvo due to the ‘daily care of the Communist Party and Soviet government’.36 
3.3. Rivalry and the Denounciation of Religious Activity 
The religious landscape in Tajik SSR presented a favourable context for increasing activity 
and rivalry between religious figures, especially those without any link to the officially 
functioning mosques under the jurisdiction of SADUM. In a remote, mountainous and 
sparsely populated region like the Gorno-Badakhshan this confusion and rivalry increased, 
especially during funerals, natural calamities, and religious festivals. In this context the 
religious figures appeared not as mere ispolniteli (performers) of the rites but strove for 
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official recognition, for authority among the believers and last, but not least, to control the 
emerging religious market. Similar developments in other parts of the USSR prompted the 
Soviet leadership to renew the anti-religious struggle to not lose grip on the rising 
influence of religion.
37
 It was in this context of a renewed anti-religious campaign on the 
one hand, and increasing rivalry between religious figures on the other, that some of them 
ceased their religious activity. With the new phase of the anti-religious policy from 1959 to 
1964, the numbers of religious figures denouncing their previous religious activity in the 
mass media, radio and newspapers increased.
38
 In turn the instances of rivalry between the 
various religious figures over ritual performance put an end to their authority and career as 
khalifas and mullos.  
From the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, the CARC representative for the Tajik SSR reported 
that dozens of religious figures had openly denounced their activity. In the early 1950s 
Bodurov indicated several cases such as when a leading mullo, Abdulloev Dawlat from the 
Wanj district, stopped functioning as a prayer leader. This mullo reportedly considered 
religion a temporary phenomenon and believed that according to Islamic books people 
would be separated from the religion in a certain period. In his view, this period 
corresponded to Soviet rule. However, Bodurov reported that this mullo also had personal 
reasons for making such a statement about religion and the Soviet state. The commissioner 
stated that in the 1930s state authorities repressed the brother of this mullo who was 
working as a qozi. It may be for this reason that the mullo stopped his religious activity 
fearing to not be suppressed by the state authorities.
39
 
On the 4
th
 of February 1960 an open letter from Dawlat Abdullozoda was published in the 
provincial newspaper Badakhshoni Soveti.
40
 The author stated that he had studied in 
madrasas in Bukhara prior to the establishment of the Soviet government and had served 
as a leading imom in the collective holiday prayers and funerals, practiced faith-healing, 
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teaching and advising those individuals that he considered as nimcha mullos.
41
 
Abdullozoda expressed his regret that he had continued religious activity while living in a 
Socialist society. In his view there were some individuals who regarded themselves as 
olimi ilmi din, but were not aware of modern science, medicine or economic 
developments.
42
 These individuals deceived people with preaching, and belief in the power 
of healing through prayers and fasting. He then referred to several individuals acting as 
nimcha-mullos, who in reality were making money by offering prayers during funerals, by 
visiting people’s houses during religious festivals, and by selling tumors and tashtobs 
(amulets and talismans). In addition to this, he complained that itinerant mullos had been 
coming from the neighbouring district of Rushan to the Wanj district in order to earn 
money in exchange for conducting faith-ealing sessions. At the end, the author denounced 
religious activity and called on the authorities to ban the nimcha-mullos from travelling.
43
 
Abdullozoda’s article not only stressed the use of science and technology in atheist 
propaganda but also revealed the movement of the mullos from one district to another. 
Although the general moderate religious policy in the 1950s allowed mullos to travel to 
different areas to offer prayers and carry out faith-healing, it resulted in increased rivalry 
between them over territory. What is important to note about this complaint from 
Abdullozoda is that the itinerant mullos were coming from Rushan, the Ismaili-populated 
district, to conduct faith-healing among the Sunni population in the Wanj district. This 
suggested that the forms and content of healing prayer, and its performance, were common 
to the Ismaili and Sunni populations, who follow different schools of interpretation in 
Islam. 
This rivalry between religious figures over faith-healing, prayers and the religious control 
of territory itself, led to a call for the authorities to exercise more pressure in order to limit 
their activities. Therefore, the end of religious activity was caused primarily by the 
increasing rivalry between various mullos. This reason was different from what officially 
cited as the impact of atheist propaganda on religious figures who ended their activity. In 
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the years of the renewed assault on religion from 1959 to 1964 the publication of such 
letter was an appropriate strategy for the Soviet agitators to stress the influence of the 
redoubled atheist propaganda campaign among believers. Paradoxically, publishing a letter 
on behalf of the religious figures who denounced religious activity diminished their 
authority among the believers, even if they were freed from pressure by the hard-line 
officials. 
Another article in the same newspaper revealed more details of the on-going rivalry and 
disputes between Ismaili religious figures. Ghulomnabi Sobirov, an official khalifa of the 
sel'sovet of Porshnev in the Shugnan district, complained about a group of mullos who 
were spreading religious views, especially among the young members of the kolkhoz.
44
  
These groups consisted mainly of the relatives of former Ismaili pirs from Shugnan and 
claimed that an official khalifa in their village should be appointed from the awlod (clan) 
of sayyids and pirs. Since the appointed khalifa, Sobirov, was not from their awlod, they 
attempted to bring in a neutral person from the city of Khorog or the district of Roshtqal’a 
to serve as khalifa in Porshnev. Sobirov further stated that the representatives of this group 
composed a letter on behalf of the believers with the forged signatures of individuals who 
were not resident in this village council. This letter was sent to the relevant authorities in 
the oblast, as a result of which a group of dindoron (religious individuals) held a meeting 
with Arifov, the CARC commissioner.  
This khalifa further complained that in this meeting, a person incited by the group of his 
rival clerics even decided to physically attack him. He further explained that the basic 
function of this group of itinerant mullos to spread religious prejudice, thereby poisoning 
the minds of Soviet people in order to discourage honest and industrious people from 
working, and to promote idle and unproductive ways of life. These activities were directed 
against the Communist Party’s and the Soviet government’s efforts to improve living 
conditions in the region. Sobirov noted that this was not an accident because most of those 
individuals spreading rumours against him ‘were living at the expense of others’ by 
preaching religion, God and the Prophet. The main point of the claim of this group was to 
support the ritual of charogh-i rawshan which was based on the tales of ‘lighting the road 
to paradise for the dead person’, as the author states: 
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Under the veil of religious bigotry, these clergy wanted on one hand to extend religious propaganda 
on the night of charogh-i rawshan, and on the other to organise animal slaughter. By this action they 
would separate people from their productive work, even though this ritual i.e. the da‘wat was banned 
by the representative of the Aga Khan in 1924, who recommended conducting the rite of tasbeh 
instead. This ritual was therefore for the benefit of the clergy, who were living at other people’s 
expense, and it robs the family that organise the funeral. According to that prejudice, the family of 
the dead is obliged to offer a meal twice on the days of funeral and twice on the night of da‘wati 
fano. In addition to this the family is obliged to slaughter a sheep and offer it to the khalifa as pesh-
charogh.
45
 In this way the expenses of the family dip to a level from which they may not recover for 
two to three years. The people call this action murdatowoni (payment for the dead). Is this what 
religious justice is about? I am fed up with religion and its teaching.’46 
Sobirov also rejected the view that a khalifa was supposed to be from the awlod of sayyids 
and ishans by saying that he had witnessed how some ishans exploited believers by 
keeping the largest share of zakot for themselves. In this case he may have been referring 
to the Ismaili pirs who were accused of keeping zakot for themselves rather than delivering 
it to the court of the Ismaili Imam. He further described being told ‘religious fantasies’ and 
studying under his grandfather and father who had themselves been khalifas. The meaning 
and content of these ‘stories and books’ were all to deceive and exploit someone. Sobirov 
wrote that he had been forced to accept the role of khalifa under the influence of his milieu.  
The article ends by stressing the waning role of religion under the influence of scientific 
views, progress and discoveries. Sobirov concludes that before becoming khalifa he had 
worked as an ordinary member of the kolkhoz and would prefer to return to his honest and 
decent job rather than deceiving people. Sobirov’s profile in the CARC archive indicates 
that he had served as the official khalifa in the sel'sovet of Porshnev from 1957 and was 
officially registered by the CARC commissioner Arifov in 1964.
47
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In his report for 1960, the CARC commissioner, Arifov noted that five articles were 
published in the local press that discussed scientific and atheist themes. Two of these 
articles were by leading religious figures who criticized the reactionary essence of religion 
and denounced religious activity. However, Arifov did not mention the names of the 
clerics and his participation in the meeting regarding the complaint about the religious 
figures from Porshnev. Neither did he reveal much about the rivalry between the khalifas 
and mullos and the pressure on them as depicted in these articles, but instead stressed their 
appearance as part of the promotion of atheist propaganda in the mass media.
48
 It is 
possible that the propaganda experts wrote these articles in order promote the atheist 
campaign. 
This rivalry between the various kinds of religious figures over conducting rites also made 
it easy for the authorities to control them. When the limited numbers of religious figures 
were registered in Gorno-Badakhshan, the commissioner instructed them to prevent the 
interference of itinerant and unregistered religious figures, and limit their activity.
49
 While 
a Sunni mullo like Dawlat Abdulloev (Abdullozoda) stands out because of his background 
in formal religious education, it cannot be said that most of those considered itinerant 
mullos or tabibs had lower levels of education than those selected for the position of 
official khalifas and domullos. In fact, by the mid-1960s and 1970s, the reports show that 
most of the Ismaili khalifas in this oblast had a basic knowledge of religion and were able 
to read prayers and conduct rites. This description of the level of religious knowledge of 
the official khalifas and mullos seems to have served the interest of the local authorities by 
showing the supposed weakening influence of religion in the society. 
The situation with the official imom-khatibs and other clergy serving in the 17 officially 
registered mosques in the Tajik SSR was different because most of them were students of 
the Mir Arab madrasa in Bukhara. The appeal to open a mosque and register was more 
difficult and complex than that of registering religious figures in Gorno-Badakhshan and 
other parts of the Soviet Union where mosques or prayer rooms did not exist. The reports 
to the CARC central office from its commissioners in the Tajik SSR for these years 
provide a confusing estimate of the number of mosques, varying between 26 and 34. It was 
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only by 1963 that their number became clear when eighteen mosques with 62 ‘servants of 
cults’ were officially registered.50 These registered mosques and their staff represented a 
tiny part of the religious figures in the Muslim-populated areas of the former Soviet Union. 
The former Tajik SSR contained one of the largest numbers of religious figures whose 
activity fell outside the registered mosques. Figures suggest that their numbers rose from 
3,500 at the end of 1949 to 4,000 in the early 1960s, and then decreased to 1,000 after 
being re-checked in 1964; the possible reasons for this change are somewhat confusing.
51
 
From the 1940s to the end of the 1950s, various categories of clergy dominated the 
religious landscape in Gorno-Badakhshan. None of these clergy, even those officially 
selected as mullo-imoms or domullos among the Sunni population in this oblast, had any 
contact with the SADUM office i.e., the qoziyot in the Tajik SSR. The CARC 
commissioner in the Tajik SSR pointed out the absence of a central religious office and 
stated that the Ismaili clergy, in accordance with their belief, did not recognize the 
SADUM. Thus each khalifa acted independently in conducting religious rites.
52
 
Nevertheless, in the context of Soviet anti-religious policy, this autonomy of a section of 
the clergy, i.e., the Ismaili khalifas; was limited to conducting the requisite religious and 
life-cycle rites. In reality, even in the absence of any centralised religious leadership, the 
khalifas were subject to control and appointment by the local ispolkoms. The commissioner 
therefore had to receive documents on the khalifas from the ispolkoms, which after 
considering the khodataistva (application) submitted by groups of believers would appoint 
khalifas.
53
 In the past, the khalifas acted as the deputies of the pirs in the religious 
hierarchy of the Ismaili tariqa headed by the Ismaili Imam. In the period under study, the 
khalifas were selected, appointed and registered in the new triangulated and secular system 
of control that involved the community in the kolkhozes and sel'sovets, the local ispolkoms, 
and the commissioners. 
In the 1960 the CARC commissioner in the Tajik SSR suggested to the council in Moscow 
about opening a religious centre for the Ismailis, headed by a senior khalifa. The 
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commissioner was of the opinion that this would help prevent violations of religious 
legislation by the various clerics.
54
 The CARC office in Moscow and in the union republics 
had pushed for more autonomy for the spiritual directorates in the Muslim-populated 
republics of the USSR. This enabled the spiritual directorates, including SADUM to extend 
its control over the registered religious figures and to use them for the Soviet mission of 
propaganda, preaching and promoting friendship abroad.
55
 Considering this support 
provided to the SADUM-supervised clergy, the CARC commissioner in the Tajik SSR 
suggested using the Ismaili clergy for propaganda in a similar role to that of SADUM in 
the Soviet international mission.  
This suggestion was proposed due to the presence of Ismailis in a number of foreign 
countries. Had the proposal been put into action, this would have put the Ismaili clergy in 
the Soviet Union in contact with their fellow-believers in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and 
East Africa. Inside the Tajik SSR, Ismaili religious personnel would have had a centralised 
office and management which could have made it easier for them to be accommodated 
within the Soviet bureaucratic system. The idea of using Ismailis for the Soviet 
international mission was also implied in a letter of a former party official who turned into 
khalifa from the village of Padrud in the district of Rushan, Sayyidkhusraw Shojonov. It 
was reported that Sayyidkhusraw initially intended to send his letter to the Soviet leader 
Khrushchev in Moscow. Sayyidkhusraw’s letter states: 
In the name of Merciful God! Greetings to you! Comrade N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. After 
sending you greetings on behalf of the khalifas and Ismailis of the GBAO (Pamir), which is also 
considered the roof of the world, I appeal to you, the supreme head of the Soviet state, and to all the 
countries of the world with affection and hope. I hope you overlook the shortcomings of this appeal 
sent to you, and deliver this to all those who consider themselves Ismaili Muslims and faithful. 
‘There is One God and Muhammad is His Prophet’.  
I appeal to the Ismaili faithful of all countries to unite and listen to the statements of the great 
Communist Party. Let the state, which leads all people of the globe on the way to the new world of 
Communist society, develop and strengthen. All the noble and best qualities of the Ismaili faith are 
embodied in the teachings of the programme of the Communist Party and the great Soviet state. 
Hence, the truth is on the side of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Communist Party is 
a powerful weapon for the Ismaili faith. Through this mighty weapon we will achieve our aim insho 
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alloh (if God wishes)… I am one of the people of the Soviet Union and the slave of Mawlono, (the 
Lord), Zhivoi Bog who is the only king of the world and afterlife.
 56
 I invite all people of the world to 
walk in the unique path of the Communist Party and hope that they will achieve their aims, because 
the Communist party will be a powerful weapon for the Muslim world.
57
 
At the end of this letter it was noted that the government and party authorities had been 
informed in detail about Sayyidkhusraw’s message. However, it seems that this suggestion 
was considered neither by the council nor by the local party and state officials, as there was 
no response to it. Sayyidkhusraw become a khalifa after the death of his father Farukhov 
Shojon.
58
 Coming from a family of sayyids and former Ismaili pirs, Shojon himself studied 
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in the traditional maktab prior to the establishment of Soviet government in Gorno-
Badakhshan. He served as the khalifa for the villages of Yemts Bagu and Padrud in the 
Bartang district from 1936 until his death around 1956. At the invitation of a group of 
believers this khalifa also conducted funeral rites for the followers of the tasbeh ritual.
59
 
According to the information provided by the former chairman of the Committee of 
Religious Affairs in Gorno-Badakhshan, the provincial officials could not reveal to the 
central party authorities in Moscow any information about the involvement of Soviet 
intelligentsia such as Sayyidkhusraw, in religious activity. If the republican or central 
authorities in Moscow had found out about this case, the provincial and district party 
secretaries would have been chastised for losing control over the religious situation, failing 
to implement atheist propaganda and allowing a well-educated Soviet cadre to turn into a 
vociferous religious figure.
60
 
3.4. Adaptation Strategies and Integration 
By the mid-1960s, reports sent to the central government by the local authorities in Gorno-
Badakhshan stated that most khalifas were working as ordinary members of the kolkhozes, 
which enabled them to be better informed about the thoughts and views of the believers in 
their community. The commissioner Arifov, also indicated that the khalifas could not earn 
sufficient income from conducting rites and were therefore involved in other works that 
were deemed ‘socially beneficial’.61 This portrait of the official khalifas was important for 
two main reasons, firstly to show that the influence of religious figures in Soviet society 
was limited and secondly to indicate their level of integration into the Soviet order. What 
was not novel about this portrait of the religious situation in this province was that official 
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khalifas and domullos from the mid-1960s to the late 1980s had grown up in the Soviet 
period and were familiar with the kolkhoz, and later sovkhoz order in their localities.  
More importantly, in this statement about the khalifas the local authorities of the province 
assured Moscow and Dushanbe that the religious figures were no longer a powerful and 
influential religious group to be reckoned with. The latter generation of khalifas were also 
not seen as disloyal or as violators of the state legislation on religion, but appeared to 
collaborate with the local organs. For some individuals it was the economic consideration 
that prompted them to learn the requisite skills for conducting prayer, faith-healing and as 
maddohkhons among the Ismailis.
62
 A few individuals later stopped serving as official 
religious figures due to an improvement in their household economy.
63
 This led the CRA 
commissioners to highlight how an improved lifestyle motivated many religious figures to 
denounce their earlier religious activity. Paradoxically, improved living standards enabled 
the community members to offer greater revenue to the religious figures.
64
 The offer of 
more revenue in money and kind enabled the registered khalifas, domullos and the 
unregistered itinerant mullos to become relatively more prosperous than the ordinary 
kolkhoz members. The improved economic situation also suggests that the informal 
religious market did not disappear or shrink but thrived instead. 
The reports by the CRA commissioners in Gorno-Badakhshan reveal that by the 1970s and 
into 1980s, officially registered khalifas and domullos in the Gorno-Badakhshan were 
relatively well-established individuals in comparison to ordinary members of the kolkhozes 
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and other workers in their community.
65
 It appears that religious activity improved the 
clergy’s household economy, even in the context of continuous monitoring and ideological 
pressure. The clergy’s economic well-being therefore was not always related to their good 
relations or ties with local party state officials. It was more related to religious needs such 
as conducting the rites of nikoh, prayers, and funerals for the Muslim community including 
the family of the officials.  
The example that someone could serve as chairman of a kolkhoz, be a respected member of 
the Communist Party and a local official, and then turn into a religious leader, also 
indicates the flexibility and a degree of social mobility in Soviet society, despite its 
apparent hostility to religious views, practices and figures. Evidence such as this example 
suggests that there was far greater complexity and negotiation in Soviet society than that 
suggested by earlier essentialist approaches and general interpretations. These 
interpretations sharply divided Soviet society into traditional and religious-sacred on the 
one hand and modern-secular on the other, and assumed that religious leaders were not 
only ideologically hostile to the secular atheist sphere but also socially separated from it.
66
 
3.5. Soviet State and Islam in the View of the Clergy 
The CARC commissioners often described the majority of the religious figures as people 
who were politically loyal and full of praise for the Soviet state. Nevertheless, they also 
stressed that the post-war generation of religious figures could not be considered to be 
progressive Soviet citizens, but rather individuals playing a ‘double game’ in order to raise 
their authority among the people. Bodurov, recorded examples of their sayings such as 
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‘God was on the side of the government which was ra‘iyiat-parwar (taking care of the 
people) and that ‘signs of the coming of the Soviet state are to be found in the religious 
books’. This commissioner then stated that the religious figures interpreted the 
establishment of the Soviet government as the kind of just rule that would prevail at the 
end of the world. The struggle by the imperialist powers against the Soviet state was 
interpreted in terms of the conflict engendered by the evil angel, Satan, and described in 
the holy books.  
According to Bodurov, the majority of the population of Gorno-Badakhshan were 
unaware of these religious teachings and views, but blindly followed the ‘prejudicial 
ideas and fanatical rituals’ that were spread by the mullos and khalifas through secret 
discussions and preaching. The commissioner Bodurov often reported on the cases of 
preaching and religious gatherings, especially in the 1950s. For instance, he noted how, 
on one occasion, a leading ishan had visited Ismaili families in Khorog and collected 
about 1000 roubles by showing them a photo of the Aga Khan (the Ismaili Imam). The 
commissioner considered this ishan a ‘dualist’, and noted that some people rejected the 
ideas of this cleric and considered him mad.
67
 Despite this criticism, however, Bodurov 
as the CARC commissioner could not take a harsh line against religious figures, but had 
to promote the legalised religious activity in this period. Like many of his colleagues in 
the former Soviet Union, he represented the ‘moderate line’ of the Communist party 
bureaucrats.
68
 It should be noted though that the position and attitudes of the Soviet 
officials and bureaucrats were not always the same but changed under the influence of 
the milieu and community where they lived. This is how the commissioner K. 
Dawlatshoev described the preaching activities and views of the Muslim clergy about 
religion and Soviet state: 
Some registered and unregistered clergy preach dubious alternative tendencies. They are telling believers 
that the Islam and the Communist Party ideology both have the same goals. Many believers also make 
modernist propaganda in a similar way. They say that the achievements of the state in the field of science 
were taken from the religious books. For example, they say that: ‘it was mentioned in our Islamic books 
that in the future the life of the people will be improved and the distant roads would be shorter. The 
Soviet regime was given to us by God; the doctors were also given to us by God, and therefore we need to 
be treated by them.’ As a result of these conversations the clergy influence their surroundings, and not 
just older believers, but even some youth and children. The majority of the population in the oblast have 
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become atheists, but there are still some ‘backward people’ who believe in the tradition of their 
grandfathers and fathers. Atheist propaganda among them was not conducted sufficiently by the party, 
Komsomol and profsoiuz (trade union associations).
69
  
In October 1969 a commission from the CRA headed by the T. S. Saidbaev, and the 
commissioner for the Tajik SSR, Yuldoshev, visited several districts in Gorno-Badakhshan 
to assess the religious situation. According to their observations, the Ismaili khalifas 
appeared loyal to the Soviet socialist order and did not interfere in the lifestyle chosen by 
the youth. Moreover, the Ismaili khalifas spoke to the members of the CRA commission of 
the common aims of Ismailism and Communism. In the observation of this commission, a 
khalifa mainly influenced believers during funerals, when he remained in the house of the 
deceased for 2-3 days to meet all of the visitors, recite prayers and lead controlled religious 
propaganda.
70
 
The registered religious figures sought to consolidate their authority and role among the 
community. In their discussions with the commissioners they also engaged in debating the 
role of religion and state, noting the values common to both religion (Islam) and the Soviet 
state policy, and interpreting the signs of change seen in the Soviet period according to the 
prophesies of the holy books. Analysing the discourse of SADUM’s representatives, Mark 
Saroyan states that the Muslim clergy attempted to subvert the Soviet interpretation of 
Islam, which considered it as anti-social and anti-progressive.
71
 The Muslim clergy 
stressed the shared progressive values found both in Islam and Socialism. These views of 
SADUM’s clergy were regularly published in its journal and expressed in speeches by 
imom-khatibs in registered mosques across Central Asia, as well as in accounts given by 
Soviet Muslim delegations during on visits abroad.
72
 Unlike the SADUM’s official clergy, 
the registered khalifas in Gorno-Badakhshan had no organisation or media in which they 
could publicly reflect on differences or similarities between the values of Islam and Soviet 
socialism or the ideology of Communism. The views of the Ismaili religious figures from 
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Gorno-Badakhshan were therefore expressed in a rather brief and sporadic way.
73
 
Although SADUM condemned some of practices of the Muslim community, the registered 
religious figures in Gorno-Badakhshan province remained almost silent about the 
veneration of saints, the visitation of the various ostons (sacred places) and mazors 
(shrines) that were scattered throughout the province.  
3.6. Social Role of the Religious Figures 
Once registered and recognised, the official khalifas and mullos seem to have understood 
their role not merely as performers of religious rites but also as active social figures in their 
kolkhozes. Inside the kolkhozes these registered figures were therefore not ordinary 
members, but informal authorities, leaders who could mobilise people for collective work 
such as cleaning the irrigation channels in the spring, cultivating land, mowing grass, 
harvesting or constructing roads to the pastures. Some displayed their loyalty to the 
government and strengthened their position and authority among their co-villagers and 
communities, thereby gaining the respect of the local authorities through actively 
participating in collective work. Cases were reported when, in addition to conducting 
ceremonies, khalifas and mullos had expertise in local know-how, for instance animal 
husbandry and gardening, as craftsmen and faith-healers.
74
 Although these skills were 
inherited through traditions of learning under a usto (master), mostly in a family milieu or 
in a limited circle, the existing classical Islamic literature often served as a manual, 
especially for healing, astrology, identifying the appropriate soat (hour) for an event 
according to nujum (traditional astrology), which was widely used for weddings, building 
new houses, embarking on travel or initiating new jobs. 
Between the 1960s and 1980s, the CRA commissioners reported on instances where 
religious figures fell into dispute with local authorities. In these disputes with the 
authorities some clergy stressed their important role in conducting religious rites and 
showed that they were aware of the constitutional rights granted to them by the Soviet 
state. As revealed by the examples of the Soviet-educated khalifa Sayyidkhusraw, the 
                                                          
73
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debates between khalifa Mirzoqandov Sulaimonsho and the CRA commissioner Nayimov 
Shohyoqub, and the views expressed by the khalifa Sobirov Ghulomnabi, these individuals 
attempted to promote the role of the official khalifas. 
Referring to this evidence, the commissioner Nayimov concluded that the activity of the 
khalifas and their method of influencing the population had not been studied in-depth to 
date; especially now they were regularly visiting the houses of the believers to discuss 
religious topics, although the content of such discussions remained unknown. The CRA 
commission visiting the region from Moscow reported that in one instance in the village of 
Yapshorv in the district of Rushan, after criticism of the work of a kolkhoz by the chairman 
of the ispolkom, the khalifa suggested that the kolkhozes be liquidated.
75
 Examples like 
these suggest the growing role of the religious figures, in this case khalifas, as an informal 
authority and community leader in a remote rural area in the USSR.  
Religious figures were empowered and had more prestige to speak in the kolkhoz meetings 
on behalf of the members, a status related to the respect accorded them by the rest of 
population. This kind of authority, informal power and officially acknowledged status, 
especially as the khalifas could mobilise people even for collective work on subtonics 
(community workday) made them reliable collaborators and partners with the 
administration of the kolkhozes and the sel'sovets. However, this was not always to be the 
case because, with the gradual development of living standards, demand and competition 
for the allocation of resources within the kolkhoz and sovkhozes (state owned farms) also 
increased.  
Like each member of the collective and state farms, the religious figures also had their 
personal reasons for either agreeing or disagreeing with the decisions of the directors or 
chairmen of state and collective farms about resource-distribution, employment and 
members’ wages. They had the right to express their views, and freely approve or 
disapprove the decisions of the local officials on the ground. In this case, khalifas and other 
religious figures did not remain an isolated social stratum but were active members of the 
working collective in addition to their informal authority as elders and official clergy. It 
seemed to have been on the basis of three amalgamated sources of authority and power, 
i.e., as respected elder figures, as head of a relatively well-established household in the 
kolkhoz and as an official religious figure, that emboldened them to raise various issues 
with the authorities.  
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The case of the khalifa Mirzoqandov Sulaimonsho is one of several examples of khalifas in 
continuous dispute with the kolkhoz, the local ispolkom and even the commissioner, not 
only on the issues of employment and resource distribution but also the practice of 
religion. The khalifa Mirzoqandov Sulaymonsho from the village of Derzud in Rushan 
district reportedly spoke out against the heads of the kolkhoz and sel'sovet several times. 
His disputes with local officials, as well as with the CRA commissioner, reached a climax 
in a pre-election meeting with the candidate for deputy of the Supreme Council for 
Nationalities of the USSR, Guljahon Bobosodiqova. In this meeting he raised the issue that 
the kolkhoz had rejected his demand for allocating land to a group of families, requesting 
the opening of a club and shop in his village and the provision of woollen and silk clothes 
for women.  
All of these demands and complaints according to the local officials were baseless, as the 
kolkhoz could not allocate arable land for house construction, and the shop and club could 
not be opened as the village was close to the district centre. The women who were present 
in this meeting were wearing woollen and silk cloth, therefore the authorities considered 
this demand to be unjustified. The other demand made by this khalifa was about reopening 
the former jamo’at-khona (prayer-house) in his village.76 Subsequently the khalifa was 
invited to a meeting with the CRA commissioner and the chairman of the ispolkom. The 
commissioner Nayimov recorded a detailed transcript of this meeting with Mirzoqandov, 
stating that the khalifa considered himself knowledgeable about legislation on religion. For 
this reason the commissioner Nayimov engaged in debate with this khalifa by questioning 
him about the issues he raised: 
Nayimov: Were there Ismaili mosques in the Pamir region prior to the October Revolution? 
Mirzoqandov: Yes, we Ismailis had mosques. With the instruction from the Mawlono, the Aga Khan, 
in 1922 and with his message Hoji Sabzali Mashnari changed our mosques into jamo’at-khona. 
These jamo’at-khonas existed till 1937, as I remember myself that we with our mullos would meet 
for prayer there each morning and evening. However, in the period of class struggle and the cult of 
personality these were destroyed and closed. 
Nayimov: Suppose that the government will allow you to build a jamo’at-khona. By which means 
and with what materials are you going to build it? Where will you obtain construction materials and 
guidance for technical maintenance? 
Mirzoqandov: We will gather one beam from each of the dindoron (religious person) to cover the 
roof of the building; the wall can be laid through collective work. The rest of the required materials 
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for construction will be collected from the believers in our village. As for the technical maintenance 
the kolkhoz should support us. 
Nayimov: Is this your personal initiative to build a prayer room in the village of Derzud and Barzud 
or is it demanded by the believers? 
Mirzoqandov: I am an ispolnitel' (performer) of religious rites in the Ismaili sect. In other words as a 
khalifa, I am authorised to represent the believers in these two villages. I myself raised the question 
of building mosques, so that all of the Ismaili believers every day in the morning and evening, 
especially during religious festivals should be able to gather for collective prayer. We should obey 
the farmon of our Imam of the Time Sultan Muhammad Shah Aga Khan. He sent this farmon to us 
from India through Hoji Sabzali Mashnari (missionary) 
Nayimov: This meant the missionary Sabziali banned the teachings of Sayyid Nosir Khisraw.
77
 
 Mirzoqandov: We Ismailis should carry out the latest instructions of our Imam of the Time, which 
he sent to us through Mashnari Sabzali. 
Nayimov: Suppose you have a prayer house. If during the performance of the Ismaili prayer of Pir-i 
Shoh, a Sunni Muslim entered the prayer house, how would you react to it? 
Mirzoqandov: Since our Ismaili teachings and prayers are regarded as secret from the Sunnis, we 
would request him to leave our prayer room. We would not allow him to enter. 
Nayimov: Has anyone from the local authorities ever interfered during your performance of funeral 
rites for the deceased or other rituals and customs? 
Mirzoqandov: No one has ever interfered. 
Nayimov: Are you demanding that the 17 farmers should be provided a separate plot from the 
collective resource. According to the act of the Soviet legislation specialists of the sel'lkhozarteli 
(agricultural cooperative) should deal with the individual use of priusadebnyi (plots of land 
adjoining one’s house).  
Why do you think that the collective farm and the local government do not care about improving the 
living conditions of farmers? Do you not think that you are interfering in the affairs of the local 
government and the village council? 
Mirzoqandov: As khalifa I put forward suggestions and engage with religious matters among the 
believers. To raise the issue of constructing a jamo’at-khona in fact I have a registratsionnyi 
(certificate of registration) as a khalifa that gives me the right to take care of the believers, citizens. 
Also, as a member of the collective farm, I attended its meeting and spoke about the ways of 
improving the living conditions of farmers, and the allocation of land for the common use by all. I 
                                                          
77
 Refers to the ceremony of da‘wat during the funeral ceremony also known among the Ismailis of Central 
Asia as the da‘wat-i Nosiri Khusraw (summon of Nasir Khusraw).  
103 
 
also pointed out the difficulties of engaging the farmers in social labour. This right and freedom of 
speech are granted to me by the Constitution of the USSR.
78
 
At the end of this meeting the chairman of the district explained to the khalifa that the 
Ismaili believers did not need a mosque and that the local Soviet government could not 
force the believers to build a mosque with their own means. Based on this meeting and 
discussions, the CRA commissioner suggested that such a khalifa did not have authority 
among the believers and the rest of the population, who considered him dewona (mad). It 
appears that Mirzoqandov provided sound and appropriate replies to Nayimov’s questions 
and justified his answers with appropriate examples. In this question-and-answer debate 
Mirzoqandov emerges as a khalifa standing up for his rights and demands, boldly 
challenging the local authorities, and fully aware of the relevant legislation.
79
 
Mirzoqandov’s case reveals the tension between a khalifa, acting as an ordinary kolkhoz 
member with the local leadership on the ground, and his position as a religious leader 
allowing him to speak for a group of believers, being aware of the rights that were formally 
declared for believers, but that in practice were not implemented. 
What the debate also revealed was that Mirzoqandov represented the group of believers 
who practiced a ritual of tasbeh. Mirzoqandov was also reportedly blamed for having 
considered himself superior to the kolkhoz management, completely ignoring the 
chairwoman of the kolkhoz, and stating that it would be inappropriate for clergy to discuss 
issues related to religion with women. His demand for the timely payment of wages to the 
members of the kolkhoz and the provision of high-quality fabrics for women was viewed 
differently by the authorities. They blamed the khalifa for making a show of taking care of 
the workers, but in reality undermining the authority of the kolkhoz management and 
village council and trying to influence the youth. Mirzoqandov was also blamed by the 
commissioner for having created animosity between Sunnis and Ismailis, strengthened 
prejudice through his preaching and created an unhealthy mood and disagreement among 
the population of this village. Although Mirzoqandov resisted this interpretation, 
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 Nayimov Shohyoqub was from the village of Andarob of the Ishkashim district where neither the 
Panjabhai movement nor its teaching succeeded in replacing the existing rituals among the Ismailis. It seems 
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considering himself right in all aspects, the commissioner noted that the khalifa realised the 
errors of his ways. Mirzoqandov accused the district party apparatchiks of not listening to 
him and ignoring him, treating him as an enemy, and therefore he complained to the 
provincial party authorities. After this meeting and debate, the district party committee and 
ispolkom considered replacing Mirzoqandov with a more ‘progressive khalifa’ which the 
CRA commissioner requested.
80
  
Conclusion 
Over more than four decades, several developments led the religious figures of the 
province to appear loyal to the Soviet state and to integrate themselves into a secular 
society by stressing the common views of their religious teaching and Soviet ideology. At 
the same time, evidence from their activity as presented in this chapter indicates their 
attempt to have a distinct religious role and authority among the Soviet Muslim 
community. The role and activity of religious figures in the period under study can be 
explained within the framework of continuity and change in religious life. The first group 
of clergy received their first religious education and experience of serving community prior 
to the establishment of Soviet government. They had also survived the years of repression 
in the 1930s, witnessed the state concessions, and revived their activity. The second 
generation were however, born during the years of the early Soviet era and had no chance 
to serve as religious figures prior to the 1950s. 
Continuity in the activity of religious figures at this period was explained by the fact that 
they remained as religious figures, conducting rituals among the community and 
representing a category defined as dukhovensto despite having limited authority, power and 
status. Changes in their social and religious activities were more profound and radical in 
the context of the unionwide policy of institutionalisation to contain the influence of 
religion in Soviet society. While the demands from the central policy makers remained the 
same, they were varied in their consequences for each religious figure and community. In 
Gorno-Badakhshan, the commissioners and state officials had to embrace the challenges of 
adapting and adjusting a single and union-wide Soviet policy into a distinct religious 
context. 
The consequences of these changes were both positive and negative for the khalifas and 
mullos as well as for other Muslim figures in Gorno-Badakhshan. On the positive side, as 
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examples in the chapter indicate, the official khalifas and mullos in Gorno-Badakhshan did 
not remain minor figures but turned to be the sole religious leader in their locales. By the 
end the period under study, they were leading religious affairs in a larger territory over 
greater congregations, i.e., the population of several villages within a sel'sovet, the district 
centre and the city of Khorog. They turned into ambiguous social actors connecting state, 
community and religion in Soviet society. On the negative side as in other parts of Soviet 
Central Asia, their activity was formally limited to that of praying and performing religious 
rituals at life-cycle events within the defined territories. Their religious life like that of the 
rest of the Muslim population in Gorno-Badakhshan, evolved in isolation without contact 
with religious figures and fellow Ismaili believers abroad. A more distinct impact of the 
Soviet religious policy for the Muslim figures in Gorno-Badakhshan was that they even 
lacked the experience of being part of institutions such as spiritual directorates, which 
provided religious education for limited numbers of students at home and abroad in Islamic 
institutes. The spiritual directorates and their trained cadres i.e., the imom-khatibs for each 
republic emerged as a new state-controlled religious hierarchy. As the examples in the 
chapter reveal, the attempt to open a mosque or prayer house, to form a central office for 
the senior Ismaili khalifa in the province, or the possibility of establishing contact with the 
Ismaili Imam were never accepted by the central party state authorities. All these examples 
point to the negative consequences of Soviet religious policy on the Ismaili and Sunni 
religious figures in this province.  
The fact that khalifas and mullos remained under the strict control of local government did 
not mean that their social role in Soviet society diminished. What was more important 
about the changing role and relationships of the religious figures is that they used different 
strategies in response to state regulation and control of their activities. The continuous 
analysis of religious situation in Gorno-Badakhshan by the commissioners reveals the need 
that the CRA had for authentic information in order to inform its policy. Beyond this 
expedience, it seemed that the presence of the Ismailis as the majority in this region, their 
practice of distinct rituals and the absence of a centralised religious leadership, was a 
matter of concern for both local authorities and the council.  
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Chapter 4: Religious Festivals and Rituals  
Introduction  
Religious rituals and festivals, like many other aspects of religious life in the Soviet Union, 
remained subject to continuous ideological and administrative pressure in the period under 
study. They also served as the main benchmark for delineating the influence and extent of 
religion in Soviet society. Soviet ethnographers analysed the various kinds of religious 
rites through the prism of the survival of traditional ways of life in modern society.
1
 
Ethnographic studies focusing on the socio-cultural and economic transformations in 
Gorno-Badakhshan in the Soviet period also contributed to this concept of ‘survival’ with 
specific empirical findings. It should be also noted that religious rites and Muslim festivals 
were not studied on their own terms. Sporadic information on the religious rituals was, 
however, provided in the ethnographic studies on life-cycle events (birth, wedding and 
funerals), family relations and agricultural practices.
2
 What is also important to note is that 
the chronological frame of most of the Soviet ethnographic studies conducted among the 
population of Gorno-Badakhshan was limited to the period from the end of 19
th
 century to 
the beginning of the 20
th
 century. Late Soviet and post-Soviet researchers therefore relied 
heavily on the data provided by the pre-Revolutionary Russian researchers on the 
performance of religious rituals among the population of Pamir.
3
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The reports by the CARC commissioners from Gorno-Badakhshan stressed the continuous 
measures of surveillance and atheist propaganda intended to limit and gradually eliminate 
the presence of religious rituals and festivals among the Muslim communities in this 
province. As a result of the anti-religious campaign, the instances of performing rites 
dramatically decreased, the space of celebration became marginalized and the relationship 
with sacred religious customs changed. Nevertheless a critical analysis of the archives also 
reveals that despite all these changes essential rites and festivals still provided space for 
symbolizing and expressing a distinct worldview by the religious figures and the 
community. In the context of Soviet anti-religious propaganda and pressure, Muslim 
practices, including rites, especially ones performed on the occasion of life-cycle events, 
also emerged as distinct markers of traditional identity for the community members, as a 
cause of dispute between religious figures, and created a market which generated income.  
This chapter examines the ways in which religious rites and festivals were observed in the 
context of the changing Soviet religious policy in Gorno-Badakhshan. The CARC archives 
provide a record of instances of the continuous investigation and monitoring of religious 
rites and festivals to ensure their compliance with legislation. The analysis of data on 
religious rites and festivals in this chapter proceeds in the following way. The first two 
sections explore the context of monitoring, study and the practice of the two major annual 
festivals, Id-i Ramazon and Id-i Qurbon, and their related rites. The third section analyses 
the specific case of the performance of the ritual of charogh-i rawshan among the Ismaili 
population of Gorno-Badakhshan. The final section of the chapter looks at changes in the 
social and cultural milieu, and especially the implementation of new non-religious Soviet 
rituals intended to supplant the religious ones. This chapter does not attempt to provide a 
comprehensive account of each of the major rituals and festivals, but rather to examine 
how they were observed in the light of the changing context of Soviet policy in the period 
under study. 
Religious rituals, including those performed on the occasions of marriage and death, 
according to Soviet legislation had to be carried out by registered domullos and khalifas. In 
                                                                                                                                                                                
dissertation (Moscow, 2007) and A. Shoinbekov, ‘Traditsionnaia pogrebal'no-pominal'naia obriiadnost' 
Ismailitov zapadnogo Pamira (konets XIX-nachalo XXI vv)’, unpublished candidate dissertation (St. 
Petersburg, 2007) both provided a detailed analysis of the rites of burial and funeral among the Ismailis of 
Gorno-Badakhshan. Nevertheless, the extent of the Soviet policy of regulation, monitoring and surveillance 
of religious rites at funerals has not been thoroughly analysed yet. 
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the wider Muslim context in Soviet Central Asia, the officially recognised rituals ranged 
from collective prayer on the eve of and during the religious festivals, the Friday prayer, 
the recitation of the Qur’an, the celebration of the birthday of the Prophet, and funeral 
prayers.
4
 The documents under analysis from Gorno-Badakhshan do not make it explicitly 
clear which kind of rituals were legitimate in contexts where mosques did not exist. It 
appears that gathering for communal prayer during festivals and funerals was often deemed 
illegal, and even interrupted by officials, especially prior to the registration of the official 
religious figures in each village council. 
The two main Muslim festivals of the year during which the council instructed its 
representatives to study and monitor the religious situation were Id-i Ramazon and Id-i 
Qurbon. Another immediate task for the commissioners was to inform the local 
Communist Party and government organs so that they might take measures to intercept and 
prevent any violations and control the religious activities of the clergy and believers during 
these festivals.
5
 What these instructions specifically meant was that the CARC and later the 
CRA commissioners had to call upon the organs of the local government to take preventive 
measures against violations of the law on religious cults prior to the months of the 
festivals. On the occasions of festivals, the commissioners were required immediately to 
record and report cases when mullos and khalifas illegally organised communal prayer, and 
disseminated religious views among the people.  
In other parts of the Tajik SSR, religious activity among Muslims was supervised through 
SADUM representatives in the registered mosques. From the mid-1960s to late 1980s there 
were 17 registered mosques functioning in n the Tajik SSR that could only serve a small 
portion of the Muslim population. These registered mosques were located mainly in the 
capital city of Dushanbe and its surrounding districts, in the city of Leninobod (present-day 
Khujand), in Kulob and Qurghonteppa. For the rest of the Tajik SSR, including the 
territory of Gorno-Badakhshan, there were no registered mosques. The absence of 
registered mosques in these areas inevitably exposed large numbers of religious figures and 
ordinary believers to the risk of violating the laws on religion as merely the act of 
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 GA GBAO, f. 110, op. 1, d. 1, Instructions from the CARC chairman Polianskii to Mirzobek Bodurov for 
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assembling for communal prayer in places other than registered buildings of worship was 
considered an illegal activity.
6
 
In the context of Gorno-Badakhshan the legality of a practice was very much dependent on 
its being performed by a registered khalifa (for the Ismailis) and a domullo (for the 
Sunnis). The status of these officially registered clergy in Gorno-Badakhshan was similar 
to that of the imom-khatibs serving within official mosques in the Tajik SSR and other 
Muslim-populated areas of Soviet Union. By 1985 there were 42 registered khalifas and 
mullos in Gorno-Badakhshan, which had a population of approximately 148, 500. In other 
parts of the Tajik SSR there were 17 registered mosques which were supposed to serve a 
population of more than 4 million. This means that the number of registered or official 
clergy was greater in Gorno-Badakhshan, which population accounted for 3% of 
population of the whole of the Tajik SSR. Nevertheless the numbers of 17 mosques with 
their registered clergy serving the rest of the population of the Tajik SSR did not represent 
the real religious situation among the Muslim population. Sergei Poliakov’s study reveals 
that in the 1980s hundreds of unregistered mosques and religious figures were functioning 
in this republic, as each village had its own unregistered mosque. 
7
 That however, did not 
mean that apart from official khalifas and domullos any other itinerant mullos could lead 
collective prayer on the occasion of funerals or foster further religious activity during 
religious festivals and life-cycle events. The authorities were immediately informed and 
dealt on time with instances when registered khalifas and domullos spread religious views 
or organised communal.
8
  
4.1. Practice of Ruza and Id-i Ramazon 
In view of the situation, the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults requests that upon receipt of 
this letter you inform the local party heads and local Soviet organs of the arrival of the Muslim fast 
and holiday of uraz-bayram.
9
 At the same time you should develop and implement sophisticated 
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 Uraz-Bayram is a Turkish name denoting the month of fasting and the festival of Ramadan. Showing 
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representatives in various Muslim republics and oblasts of the USSR.  
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measures to limit the activity of the Muslim clergy, including registered societies, and counter the 
activity of the so-called ‘itinerant clergy’ and believers, who are much more active during this 
month.
10
  
This directive from CARC to its first commissioner in Gorno-Badakhshan suggests how 
vital it was for the council to assess religious activity, in particular that of ruza (fasting) 
during the month of Ramazon. A directive like this also reveals how the commissioners 
acted as bureaucrats to ensure the implementation of the centralised Communist Party 
and Soviet state policy in remote areas. While control over the religious situation 
involved party, local government and state security officials, the study of religious 
activity on the occasion of the religious festival was the priority of the commissioners. 
In the case of Id-i Ramazon, for instance, the commissioners had to indicate whether 
ruza was observed by children, the youth or elders, by the kolkhoz members, workers, 
teachers, doctors, and members of the Communist Party and Komsomol. In their reports 
the commissioners had to show where the communal prayer was being held during the 
festival. What in particular needed to be reported were the breaches of the state 
legislation by religious personnel, as well as by the authorities. On the whole, rites and 
rituals were studied in both qualitative and quantitative terms, indicating the number of 
individuals observing ruza and participating in communal prayer, and providing a 
description of the process of the rituals, especially those conducted by leading religious 
figures.
11
 
In their reports, the CARC commissioners in Gorno-Badakhshan highlighted the fact that 
Id-i Ramazon and Id-i Qurbon were celebrated by both the Sunni and the Shi’a Ismailis in 
Gorno-Badakhshan. The month-long fast was mainly kept by the Sunni Muslims in the 
districts of Wanj, Murgab and Qal’a-i Khumb. The Ismailis did not practice ruza.12 In each 
of their reports on the occasion of the month long fast, the commissioner repeatedly 
stressed the case that it were mainly elders and the retired people who practiced ruza. 
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Paradoxically, they also recorded instances, especially from the 1950s to the mid-1960s, 
when the majority of schoolchildren, youth and the middle-aged population, also observed 
ruza. These reports sometimes provide statistics about the number of individuals practicing 
ruza. However, it is not clear how the numbers were extrapolated from the general 
population, especially as fasting was an individual activity. Estimates of those fasting 
could possibly have been obtained by counting those who gathered for group namoz at the 
end of each day followed by the sharing of the iftor (special food for breaking the fast). 
Even if people from several villages gathered in one place for namozi id (holiday prayer), it 
could not be assumed that those praying on that day had actually been observing the fast 
for the whole month.
13
  
Group prayer and namozi id (holiday prayer) during the two festivals were often held in an 
open field, near mazors and ostons, or in mehmon-khonas (guest-houses) belonging to a 
mullo or one of the participants. Figures concerning the numbers of children and youth 
participating in prayer were not often provided, but it was mainly the elders, usually up to 
ten in number, who assembled for group prayer on each day of ruza. The highest number 
of those who gathered for communal holiday prayer in the 1950s was more than 70 in a 
few villages in the Wanj district. In some cases, these communal prayers were described as 
being very formal and short rather than lasting for hours as in the past. On one occasion, 
those gathered for a communal prayer were subsequently mobilised to conduct a day of 
subbotnik to plough the kolkhoz land for seasonal cultivation. Although a few cases of 
communal prayer are mentioned in the reports, there may have been more, especially in the 
years of concessions during the Second World War and the post-Stalinist years from 1953 
to 1959.  
There are reports of grave visitations by the Ismailis on the eve of the two festivals, but 
these were an individual family practice of worship rather than a communal prayer 
gathering. Instances of communal prayers during the month of Ramazon reportedly 
decreased significantly by the 1970s due to control by the local authorities and the 
increasing prevalence of atheist propaganda. 
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Despite the mass atheist propaganda being promoted at the time, instances of fasting 
among schoolchildren (girls from the age of nine and boys from twelve), the youth, 
members of the Komsomol and Communist Party were widespread. Where fasting was 
being observed by schoolchildren and the youth it was countered by an intensification of 
atheist propaganda in secondary schools and other educational and youth centres in each of 
district, sel’sovet and kolkhoz. The continuous polemical coverage of ruza in the regional 
and district newspapers, local radio stations, and in seminars, lectures by the Znanie 
society whose remit was to promote atheism during this period, hints at the strong and 
unabated influence of this practice among the Muslim population in Tajikistan.
14
 The fact 
that subsequent reports make fewer mentions of the subject of fasting can be seen as a 
purely pragmatic strategy by the commissioners to show the progress they were making in 
implementing the religious policy and affecting a decline in the role of religion, 
particularly among the younger generation of Soviet citizens.  
Apart from being “reactionary”, religious practice, by default, ruza was also considered a 
custom damaging individual health, productivity and the state economy. Commissioner 
Bodurov often noted that act of not eating and drinking for the whole day led to a decline 
in productivity in the kolkhozes. He described how sacrificing animal during the two 
festivals in the past had resulted in huge economic losses through the slaughter of 
thousands of livestock for the kolkhozes and individual households.
15
 In the period under 
study, the slaughter of animals was mainly reported during Id-i Qurbon, in which the 
sacrifice forms the main ritual. In 1951 Bodurov indicated that approximately sixty per 
cent of the Sunni population in the oblast, mainly older men and women, were observing 
ruza. The largest gathering of 70 people, for the communal holiday prayer, was reported in 
the village of Andarbak in Yazgulom Valley of the Wanj district.
16
 However, the 
communal prayer was not held on that day in the centre of the district because the people 
                                                          
14
 The CARC statistical reports for the period under study do not show a significant decrease in the numbers 
of people attending mosque for prayer during the month and celebration of Id-i Ramazon. 
15
 GA GBAO, f. 110, op. 2, d. 2, ‘Dokladnaia zapiska upolnomochennogo soveta po delam religioznykh 
kul'tov pri oblispolkome po Gorno-Badakhshanskoi avtonomnoi oblasti’, (8 August 1950), pp. 8-11. 
16
 Yazgulom is name of a valley, as well as particular sel'sovet in the Wanj district. The population of the 
valley speak a distinct Yazgulomi language, a branch of the group of Pamiri languages. The Ismaili 
population in Yazgulom were converted to Sunni Islam by the representatives of the emirate of Bukhara in 
the second half of the nineteenth century. See L. Monogarova, ‘Assimiliatsia i konsolidatsiia Pamirskikh 
narodov’ in V. I. Bushkov, ed., Sredneaziatskii etnographicheskii sbornik (Moscow, 2001), pp. 47-55. 
113 
 
could not collect the 4,000 roubles requested by the leading mullo as a donation to the state 
treasury. On the whole the celebration and communal prayer were held in a very peaceful 
atmosphere, without any anti-government expression by the clergy or believers.
17
  
In 1952 the representative reported that the majority of people in the Murgab district 
observed ruza and that the mullos organised communal prayers by gathering twenty or 
more people in each village. The reports of the numbers of animals slaughtered in each of 
the districts in Murgab during the festival were very high. For instance, in that year, it was 
noted that 500 sheep and goats were slaughtered on the day of the feast at the end of 
Ramazon, which was deemed by the representative to be a huge loss of livestock. 
However, the report does not mention that the main economic activity of this district was 
cattle breeding. Gradually, reports of instances of communal prayer decreased, and only a 
few members of the kolkhozes would gather for prayer in an open field or at the nearby 
shrines. In one case it was reported that a leading mullo (Abdulloev Dawlat) in the Wanj 
district refused to lead the communal prayer in the month of Ramazon for which the 
believers then called him an apostate.
18
 
In the years of relative freedom for religious activity, in the mid-1950s, communal prayer 
was often reported to have happened among the Sunni population of Gorno-Badakhshan. 
There were instances of administrative pressure by the local authorities on those observing 
rites but merely doing so was not considered a breach of the law. The secretary of the local 
party unit campaigned for stricter measures against fasting in a meeting with a group of 
women in a kolkhoz named after Stalin 
19
 in the Yazgulom Valley of the Wanj district. In 
the same district another official banned this practice and gave a warning that members of 
the kolkhoz would be expelled if they were found fasting. He even reportedly intimidated 
them by telling them of the arrest of an itinerant mullo in the neighbouring region of 
Gharm. Despite this warning, the fast was secretly observed in this and other districts, even 
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by children.
20
 Administrative pressure on believers was meted out by each of the party and 
local government departments. Despite the fact that some officials and party members 
were themselves observant, there were some who were still prepared to interfere in the 
individual practice of religion even if this was not manifest in the public sphere. 
In 1953 it was reported that teachers in a secondary school in the Wanj district used to 
force water into their students’ mouths to stop them fasting. One girl threw down the cup 
of water and complained to her parents. After this incident her father and a mullo advised 
the girl to stop fasting, because she had already drunk water. This was a clear violation of 
the rights of believers, which in theory the council and its commissioner on the ground 
should have protected. However, the CARC commissioner could not take any action other 
than going to explain to the students how detrimental fasting was. The commissioner 
described fasting as a kind of practice performed under peer and social pressure. He 
reported further that some individuals were taking food with them to their workplace and 
eating it in secret. Moreover, he stressed that believers did not need any guidance from the 
mullo on how to observe ruza. They could act freely during the month of Ramazon 
according to the freedoms granted to them by Soviet law. For instance, in 1957 a leading 
mullo (Abdulloev Dawlat) refused to lead communal namoz for those gathered in the 
centre of the Wanj district.  
In their meeting with the CARC commissioner, the believers asked him to force this mullo 
to lead the prayers for them. Bodurov, however, could not support them, stating that he 
was not obliged, nor was it recommended by Soviet legislation, to force someone to carry 
out religious activity if he declined it. On 1 May 1957, Bodurov reported that instead of the 
Id-i Ramazon, International Labour Day would be celebrated. Sudden interference by the 
authorities during the communal prayer on the occasions of ruza, Id-i Ramazon and Id-i 
Qurbon in a few villages in Wanj and Qal’a-i Khumb district, seems to have offended 
believers. Reporting on the situation in this district, Bodurov actively advised believers to 
stop fasting. For instance, he attempted to convince them not to conduct namozi tarobeh 
(communal evening prayer) and jum‘a namoz (Friday prayer) in an unregistered mosque in 
the village of Poi Mazor in the Wanj district.
21
 By this strategy, the CARC commissioner 
distanced himself from the strict measures taken by the local authorities and adopted a 
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neutral role between group of believers and officials. Mosques and prayer rooms had been 
closed in the region in the 1930s and it was therefore regarded as a violation of the law to 
use them for communal prayer or festival celebrations.
22
 However, by 1958 the 
commissioner indicated that tarobeh and the ritual of khatm-i Qur’on (reciting excerpts 
from the Qur’an) were held in open fields in some villages and that even the youth 
participated. 
The statistics provided by commissioner Bodurov for the years from 1953 to 1958 provide 
estimates of the approximate number of individuals praying at home. It is not clear as to 
how these numbers represented the percentage of all of the believers that were praying and 
practicing religion, i.e., participating in religious festivals in the villages and districts in 
each year. In 1955, the commissioner reported that due to the transfer of the population 
from the villages of the Yazgulom sel'sovet in the Wanj district to the city of Dushanbe the 
numbers of individuals conducting prayer in this district decreased. Thus, it was estimated 
that out of the total 9,462 population of the Wanj district in 1956, approximately 5,462 
conducted daily prayers at home. By 1957, however, their number had decreased to 2,495, 
even though most of the migrants had come back. In 1956 the number of individuals 
fasting is reported to have been 2,220. A year later their number had decreased further to 
1,443 individuals observing ruza.
23
 
Following the decrees of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet 
government limiting religious activity in the years from 1959 to 1964, more instances of 
fasting were uncovered by the commissioners and local authorities. In 1961 Arifov, the 
second commissioner in Gorno-Badakhshan reported that fasting was not only practiced in 
the remote villages but even by the secondary schools’ students in the district centres. A 
secretary of the Komsomol unit in the district of Qal’a-i Khumb, a Russian man named 
Fedorov, told the CARC commissioner in the province that half the members of that unit 
were fasting. Another interesting instance was when it was discovered that the staffs of the 
central canteen in the centre of the district were fasting, even though they had to prepare 
meals for visitors. In this district it was revealed that itinerant mullos brazenly gathered 
people together for communal prayer of namozi tarobeh in an open field, near a mazor. 
                                                          
22
 There were three mosques in this district that had not been used for religious service since 1938 and were 
designated as kolkhoz property. 
23
 GA GBAO, f. 110, op. 3, d. 15, ‘Informatsionnyi otchiot o proiskhozhdenie mesiachnogo post Uraza-
Bairam v predelakh GBAO’, (1 May 1957), pp. 1-4. 
116 
 
They organised the custom of khona-gashtak in each neighbourhood, obliging the 
householder to provide a feast for the guests who would stay until late and discuss 
religious themes.
24
 Arifov reported: 
It is not too much to note that, in the absence of mosques and other devotional buildings; the 
itinerant clergy were not only merely active, but become bold in the month of Ramazon. They seek 
easy money during ruza by gathering more believers, secretly taking them to visit their houses and 
mehmon-khonas (guest-houses). Worst of all is that by referring to the (sayings) of the Prophet 
Muhammad during this time, the clergy even insist that fasting is an obligation for children of both 
genders from the age of seven on.
25
 
By 1962 the commissioner noted that fasting and evenings of iftor were observed very 
simply without sacrifice or communal prayer in the Qal’a-i Khumb and Wanj districts. In 
contrast, it was observed that the festival was celebrated more lavishly in the villages in 
Afghanistan where people gathered for three days to celebrate the festival, playing 
buzkashi
26
 an event ending with a communal prayer.
27
 Albeit without this form of 
celebration, ruza was still observed on Soviet territory, even by a majority of the 
schoolchildren living at the centre of the Qal’a-i Khumb district.  
This was an alarming issue for the authorities, especially in the period of renewed anti-
religious struggle from 1959 to 1964. The commissioner Arifov, reported on how ruza was 
practised by the teachers, and even the director of the secondary school who organised 
shabi iftor (night of offering feast) in the month of Ramazon. Arifov immediately 
questioned the role of the teachers in educating schoolchildren and stated that both teachers 
and students remained under the influence of the mullos. For this reason he urged the 
provincial party and government authorities to isolate the youth from the influence of the 
itinerant mullos. The way to do this was to improve scientific and atheist propaganda 
among the population.
28
 The commissioner complained that mullos were not only 
gathering people for communal prayer but also propagating ruza. He reported an instance 
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when a mullo (Nodirov), in one of the villages of the Wanj district, made a speech after 
communal prayer that: 
‘Those who never keep ruza, God will turn away from them, they will be cursed and go to hell.’ The 
question that can be asked is where were the rural intelligentsia, activists and the administration of 
the kolkhoz that let Nodirov utter such provocative words. This suggests that in the Wanj district, 
especially in remote areas, the situation of educating children in the spirit of Communism remained 
unfavourable.
29
 
This statement reveals that the commissioner directed his criticism towards the 
intelligentsia and sel’skie activisty (rural activists) members of the Communist Party and 
local government who remained unable to control the religious situation. Among the Sunni 
Kyrgyz population in the Murgab district, where the itinerant mullos reportedly intensified 
their activities from time to time, ruza was observed by most of the population. An article 
in the Badakhkhshoni Soveti, the central oblast newspaper, denounced the activity of a 
mullo, Abdulamid Abdurahmonov, who collected money from each believer, forcing them 
to slaughter a sheep and a cow as khudoi (sacrifice to God).
30
 Slaughtering hundreds of 
animals (sheep and goats) in the Murgab district was unprecedented in the republic as a 
whole. The commissioner openly criticised the district authorities who were aware of, but 
made no attempt to prevent, sacrifices of this sort.  
The widespread cases of animal slaughter, which sharply reduced the numbers of livestock, 
were deemed detrimental to family. The same economic harm was done to the population 
when the mullos practiced the custom of isqot (dividing the property of the deceased at the 
end of the funeral), a practice from which the itinerant mullos greatly benefitted. Arifov 
wrote that this custom of isqot was not mentioned in any of the Islamic books, but 
practiced only by the Kyrgyz clergy in the Murgab district. It was a custom that decimated, 
and ultimately destroyed, the economy of family. Arifov called on the ispolkom to take 
measures to ban this extorting custom. In a meeting with the group of believers in Murgab 
district, the officials warned the mullos about the consequences of sacrificing, collecting 
payments during religious holidays and conducting faith-healing.
31
 
Mass propaganda was not sufficient and it was unrealistic to trust information from the 
districts, when some party members and officials were themselves observing ruza. All 
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these shortcomings of the ispolkoms and party units on the ground gave the clergy an 
opportunity to use new tactics for their own benefit during the month-long fast. According 
to information received from the Murgab district, the mullos preached that if someone was 
not able to observe ruza in the month of Ramazon, God not only forgave them, but also 
allowed them to observe a substitute fast. By this tactic, the mullos encouraged officials 
and rural activists to observe ruza at another time, which allowed the clergy to obtain 
benefits twice a year. To outsiders, it was therefore difficult to know who among the 
officials was observing ruza as they would eat freely in the month of Ramazon and fast on 
another occasion.
32
 What was reported as a successful measure to prevent fasting in this 
district was the enrolment of schoolchildren in the newly-formed internats (Soviet 
boarding schools), where food was supplied by the kolkhozes. The students studying in 
these internats lived apart from their families and were thus not affected by the ‘prejudice, 
belief and ideas’ preached by the mullos. 
At the height of the renewed anti-religious campaign in early 1963, more details of 
violations, such as mullos who gathered people for collective prayer, visited houses and 
collected fitri ruza (payment), even from schoolchildren, Komsomols and ‘backward 
members of the Communist Party’, were once again revealed. On one occasion, a club of a 
kolkhoz in Qal’a-i Khumb district was turned into a mosque during the month of Ramazon. 
Reporting this revival of religiosity, the commissioner Arifov immediately complained 
about the officials and rural activists who themselves were neither aware of the anti-
religious propaganda nor spread it among the ordinary people: 
The saddest condition is that some of the heads of the kolkhozes, especially the partorgs (organisers 
of Communist Party campaigns and events) in the district of Qal’a-i Khumb, who knew well the 
damage caused by ruza and its consequences for society, took a neutral position and did not take 
measures against believers every year. Therefore it was not surprising that some senior responsible 
officials and even members of the Communist Party did not reveal the true picture of the religious 
situation.
33
 
He further complained to the obkom and oblispolkom that ispolkoms in the districts and 
sel'sovets were not willing to report cases of violations by the clergy. Local officials 
remained reluctant to prevent people from observing fasting. The commissioner 
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complained about cases when high-profile party members, even as well as doctors who 
instead of promoting medicine themselves practiced ruza. Having observed this situation, 
Arifov urged the party and government heads in the province to prosecute those violating 
the law on religion, namely those individuals who turned the club building into a mosque 
in the month of Ramazon. He considered it a deception and believed that some officials 
and party members closed their eyes to cases of fasting, even though aware of the 
consequences.
34
As noted above, in theory the practice of ruza, conducting different forms 
of prayers, and the celebration of festivals, were not illegal activities. Conducting these 
rites and rituals within official mosques was approved by the spiritual directorate and was 
permitted.
35
 What was considered illegal and a breach of the law on religion was the 
attempt by the clergy to organise prayers, turn buildings into mosques, collect donations 
and preach. This was the standard approach by the council in its attempts to regulate 
religious life in most of the Muslim-populated areas of the Soviet Union. In the Sunni-
populated districts of Gorno-Badakhshan, organising group prayers, communal iftor and 
evening discussions at the homes of believers during the month of Ramazon, were all 
reported as illegal activities. 
Fasting was an issue continuously criticised by the Soviet health authorities for medical 
reasons.
36
 In 1966 the commissioner reported that despite the outbreak of measles in an 
unsanitary situation in the villages of Saghirdasht valley of the Qal’a-i Khumb district, 
parents categorically rejected any help from the health services. They did not allow their 
children to be taken to hospital because of ruza. The practice was even blamed for the 
death of a child in one village when a mother was not able to feed her baby because she 
herself had not been eating during ruza. Gradually, the commissioner indicated that the 
people of this district were divided in their opinion towards the practice of fasting. For 
instance, in 1966 it was pointed out that the intelligentsia in the Qal’a-i Khumb district was 
divided into those with “backward” views who supported fasting and those with 
“progressive” views who rejected it. In the same year, the commissioner reported that a 
teacher from this district refused to eat in the morning with the guests from the brigade of 
atheist lecturers who were staying in his house for a night. The teachers in this district also 
visited houses for the breakfast meal of iftor. As a result they were considered backward 
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and unable to prevent fasting among the students. The other group of people were the staff 
of the canteen in the central hospital, who practiced ruza. For the CARC commissioner, 
these instances pointed to weak atheist propaganda and a loss of control over the itinerant 
mullos whose influence prevailed among the various strata of the population.
37
 Reports of 
officials checking who among employees of the educational, health and public-catering 
sectors was fasting, suggest that a well-coordinated effort was in place to curb this practice.  
The provincial authorities declared that these measures would limit the practice of fasting 
to only a few elders in each village. What seemed to have been missed in this monitoring 
was that these elders were not a diminishing number but were an increasing demographic. 
Even some former officials and party members started to fast after retirement, organising 
iftors and assembling during festivals. For the clergy and believers, administrative 
interference was a fact of life, especially concerning activities considered to be violations 
of the law on religion. For instance, in 1969 when an unregistered mullo in the village of 
Kevron in the Qal’a-i Khumb district organised communal prayer, it was dissolved by the 
arrival of an instructor from the raykom party and the chairman of the kolkhoz. Even 
though the believers had not been conducting prayers or sharing a group meal, the 
gathering was immediately criticised in the meeting of the local party branch. The next 
CRA commissioner in Gorno-Badakhshan, Shohyoqub Nayimov, stated that the majority 
of people had stopped fasting under the influence of the socio-economic and cultural 
progress in their worldview. As for the elders, who were mainly above sixty, they 
continued to keep ruza as a result of social pressure.
38
  
These socio-cultural advances were not specified in the report, but presumably referred to 
the appearance of new schools, theatres, cultural houses, district radio stations, 
newspapers, hospitals, medical centres, roads, electricity, radio and telephone lines in the 
oblast.
39
 However, changing attitudes towards practices such as fasting were also very 
much dependent on the role of the family, especially the elders, as well as the religious 
personnel and how they adapted to the changing socio-cultural milieu. As for the official 
account of the decrease in the number of people keeping ruza, it also depended very much 
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on the reliability of the information received from the field. For instance Nayimov reported 
that, unlike in the past, the majority of Ismailis had stopped visiting graves and shrines 
during Id-i Ramazon, and did no more than only prepare special dishes and light candles to 
fulfil the wishes of the arwohs (spirits) at home. By considering these rituals as leftovers 
from a past society, he depicts Id-i Ramazon as a festival for the rich stratum of the 
population, especially the clergy. According to his account, in the past on the day of 
festivals the Ismaili pirs dressed themselves in new clothes and people would greet them 
by saying ‘muborak boshad’ (congratulations for your new clothes). If, however, a poor 
person dressed in new clothes, people were curious to know their provenance. Group 
celebrations and collective prayers were held therefore at the houses of pirs or near the 
ostons (the sacred stepping places). 
40
 
By 1971, Nayimov reported that most of the population of the Gorno-Badakhshan, 
especially the Ismailis had no knowledge of the calendar of religious festivals.
41
 What the 
commissioner did not point out was how the timing for festivals was set by the khalifas, 
mullos, okhons who were aware of the Islamic calendar. Their knowledge of Islamic 
calendar was based on the manuscripts preserved by them. Can it be than argued that 
Nayimov was unaware of this practice of Islamic calendar by some clergy and believers? 
The extent of the study of religious situation by the commissioners does not give doubt 
about their unawareness of the religious situation, even in the remote areas. Like their 
colleagues in other regions of the former Soviet Union, these party bureaucrats i.e., the 
commissioners in Gorno-Badakhshan provided less genuine information about religious 
life but moulded their reports to fit ideological demands of the state. Contradictory enough, 
the reports until the late 1980s refer to the existence of ruza and the continuous need for 
strengthening monitoring and spread of atheist policy. 
4.2. Id-i Qurbon 
The council’s instructions to study and monitor religious activity during the festival of 
sacrifice, Id-i Qurbon, were similar to those for Id-i Ramazon. However, what mainly 
troubled the authorities was the sacrifice of animals during Id-i Qurbon. The commissioner 
Bodurov from the beginning of his career monitored how a large number of animals were 
sacrificed by the Sunni population in the districts of Murgab and Wanj. Apart from the 
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sacrifices, a goup of twenty to forty or more men would usually gather for communal 
prayers on the day of this festival in these districts. The ritual of sacrifice was not only a 
concern to the authorities in this region but, as Ro’i indicates, was ‘a thorn in the side of 
the regime’ in all of the Muslim-populated republics and oblasts of the Soviet Union.42 
The first CARC commissioner Bodurov noted that prior to the 1950s, even kolkhoz 
livestock was used for sacrifices. By 1951, however, the numbers of sacrificed animals and 
individuals participating in communal prayer, decreased significantly. For instance, 600 
people attended communal prayer during Id-i Qurbon in 1947 and by 1951 the total 
number of Sunnis participating in communal prayer during this festival was 239 of which 
135 in the Wanj and 104 in the Murgab districts. This decrease in the numbers attending 
group prayers did not mean that the mullos had also ceased their activity. The 
commissioner noted that many mullos in the Sunni-populated districts were actively 
gathering people together for communal prayer during the festival and encouraging them to 
participate in the sacrificial practices.
43
 
Widespread slaughter of cattle was reported in 1956 among the Kyrgyz Sunni population 
in the Murgab district. The numbers of animals sacrificed in each of the kolkhozes and 
sel'sovets of this district increased by a few hundred in comparison to previous years. In 
contrast, the instances of gathering for communal namoz during the Id-i Qurbon had 
decreased by the mid-1950s. A small group of ten men gathered for the communal prayer 
of namozi tarobeh on the day of the festival in the Wanj district. The CARC commissioner 
visited the district on the day of the celebration and revealed that dozens of sheep, goats 
and more than 200 turkeys and hens had been sacrificed by believers. 
As for the Ismailis, the representative noted that believers, including the clergy, invited 
guests to their houses for a special feast during this festival, lit candles outside their 
houses, visited the graves of their dead to offer prayers and light candles there during the 
Id-i Qurbon. The candles were prepared in advance from a juniper stick tied in oiled cotton 
which would burn for several minutes. In that period the ritual of lighting candles was 
observed throughout the region by believers visiting the mazors attributed to the Shi‘i 
Imam Muhammad Boqir (the Shugnan district); the shrine of Shohburhonidin, and shrine 
of the Shohabdullo Wali (the Rosh’tqal‘a district); the ostons of Shoh Qambar (the 
Ishkashim district); the ostons of Khoja Nuriddin, Mushkilkusho in the Rushan district and 
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other sacred places in the region. However, instances of communal prayer even in small 
groups were not reported to have taken place among the Ismailis during the festival.
44
 The 
slaughter of kolkhoz livestock had reportedly ceased by this time, but individual sacrifices 
by each family were widespread up to 1957.Generally no serious violations of the law on 
religion by believers and religious figures during the festival of Id-i Qurbon were reported 
from 1950 to 1957. It was, however, indicated that some mullos in the Murgab district 
were leading the celebration with more than a hundred sheep and goats slaughtered in the 
centre of the district and the kolkhozes. The numbers of animals sacrificed among the 
Sunni population in the Wanj district for that year had not remained stable and a few cases 
of sacrifice were reported among the Ismailis.  
These few accounts can not reveal the full picture of how the festival was celebrated in 
different parts of the oblast where Ismailis were living. Individual Ismaili households in 
their villages celebrated Id-i Qurbon by slaughtering a designated sheep. It is plausible to 
note that the commissioner did not receive accurate information, or deliberately did not 
report what he observed about the celebration of religious festivals among the Ismailis. For 
instance, in 1957 the commissioner Bodurov compared the differences between the 
celebrations of Id-i Qurbon among the Ismailis living in Tajik SSR to that of their 
neighbours across the border in Afghanistan. He noted that among Ismailis living in the 
border villages of Soviet Tajikistan, Id-i Qurbon passed very quietly with the exception of 
few families lighting candles on graves. On the contrary, he reported that festival was 
celebrated lavishly in villages on the Afghan side of the border and that it was visible as 
candles were lit all over the villages, in houses, at graves.  
In the past, the commissioner noted that, the celebration of the two festivals had lasted for 
three days among the Ismailis, but in the 1950s they were only celebrated for one day in a 
family milieu.
45
 By 1950s, the commissioner reported that even among the Sunni 
population of Gorno-Badakhshan the sacrifices were confined to the family level rather 
than in the public milieu. 
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In the period of Khrushchev’s anti-religious campaign from 1959 to 1964 the CARC 
documents only mention scarce occurrences of sacrifices. It was however, reported that 
itinerant mullos in Wanj, Murgab and Qal’a-i Khumb actively organised a custom of 
khona-gashtak house to obtain benefits, which was deemed a detrimental custom in both 
material and spiritual senses. 
Firstly, on this day believers organise a big feast. Secondly, the clergy stay late discussing religious 
themes until morning in order to bother believers’ minds by talking about certain kinds of life after 
death. In the morning the clergy collects alms of khairiyot (charity) from few believers and then 
continues this practice till the end of the festivals. At the end of the holidays the clergy attempt to 
gather more believers for prayer in an open field and to collect money from each individual. The 
clergy conduct all the religious prescriptions secretly, for they are well aware that for such gross 
violations of the legislation on religion, they are criminally responsible in the eyes of society. In 
addition to violating the law on religion, such gatherings do not end without an animal being 
sacrificed.
46
  
In the period of the renewed anti-religious campaign from 1959 to 1964, few instances of 
sacrificing animals were reported by the commissioners. This either means that the 
numbers of animals slaughtered had decreased due to administrative pressure or that 
instances of sacrifice were deliberately not monitored by the rural activists in the villages. 
Regarding the observation and perception of various festivals among the different groups 
in society, he stated: 
The population of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast in general and the faithful in 
particular, do not consider ‘Uraz-Bayram’ and ‘Kurban-Bayram’ as their national tradition. What 
concerns young people that they do not pay attention to these festivals? At present neither the elderly 
nor the young people visit these graves or sacred places. Cases of children skipping school during 
the festivals were not noted. Lavish celebration of these festivals by believers was also not observed. 
Since there was no sociological study regarding these festivals in our oblast, we do not have any 
statistical material. It should be noted that not all of the precepts of the shar‘ia are obeyed as the 
majority of the believers do not even know its prescriptions and even less the youth. The religious 
festival of mourning of ashura (shahsei-wahsei) of the Shi‘is, the day of the adoption of Islam, 
Mawludi Nabi (the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad), shabi Laylat ul-qadr (night of power), and 
many other Muslim religious holidays and other memorable dates are gradually disappearing from 
people’s mind.47 
                                                          
46
 GA GBAO, f. 110, op. 3, d. 6, ‘Informatsiia o sostoianii religioznosti naseleniia i provedeniiakh 
meropriatii po usileniiu kontrolia za sobliudeniem zakonodatel'stva o kul'takh po Gorno-Badakhshanskoi 
Avtonomnoi oblasti za 1962 god’, (2 January 1963), p. 25. 
47
 GA GBAO, f. 110, op. 3, d. 8, ‘Godovoi informatsionnyi otchiot’, (14 February 1972), p. 21.  
125 
 
The celebration of some of these festivals and rituals such as Mawludi Nabi was briefly 
recorded in reports dating from the 1950s. As for the observation of ashura, the documents 
do not reveal any information about its practice among the Muslim communities in Gorno-
Badakhshan. The situation in other parts of the Tajik SSR was different with Mawludi 
Nabi being celebrated, especially in the registered mosques. The ceremony of ashura in the 
month of Muharram was actively commemorated among the Shi‘i population in the 
Azerbaijan SSR, in Dagestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and in the Bukhara 
province of the Uzbek SSR.
48
The ceremonies performed in the month of Muharram, 
including large crowds gathering for communal prayer, performing the ritual of shahsei-
wahsei (self flagellation and scourging) and ta’ziyah (passion play) in the registered and 
unregistered mosques, caused more concern for the Soviet authorities than the two 
festivals.
49
 As the commissioner Nayimov reported this kind of commemoration of ashura 
with rituals of mourning was not practised by the Ismaili Shi’is living in Badakhshan. 
However, he did report how the population of some remote villages commemorated the 
shahada (martyrdom) of the third Shi’i Imam Husayn ibn ‘Ali (626-680) which lasted for 
ten days during which it was forbidden to wash the body or clothes or slaughter animals for 
food. This period ended with the sacrifice of a designated sheep as oshi pir (feast of the 
pir). It should be noted that, although it was not practiced continuously, this manner of 
celebration/commemoration still exists.
50
 
The commissioners do not provide consistent information about the celebration of Id-i 
Qurbon for some years from the 1960s to 1970s indicating that the festival had almost 
disappeared. However by 1977, the new CRA commissioner in Gorno-Badakhshan, 
Nishon Hamroev, reported on his plan to inform the local party and government authorities 
to strengthen control over the activity of the registered and unregistered religious figures 
during the celebration of Idi-i Qurbon.
51
 This information about the monitoring of Id-i 
Qurbon suggests bureaucratic shortcomings in both implementing religious policy and 
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studying the ritual. For if the festival had ceased to exist, why would the commissioners 
have received special instructions from the council to monitor and report on religious 
situation during celebration of Id-i Qurbon in the region? Likewise, as had been reported 
that communal prayer, sacrifice and shrine visitation had ceased to exist, why was there 
any need to dispatch a special brigade to conduct atheist lectures to highlight the 
detriments of these practices.
52
 
4.3. Ritual of Charogh-i rawshan  
As shown above, the celebration of the two main Muslim festivals by the Sunni Muslim 
population in Gorno-Badakhshan featured prominently in the reports under study. By 
contrast, less information was revealed about the celebration of Id-i Qurbon and Id-i 
Ramazon among the Ismailis. The priorities for the commissioners studying the religious 
situation were to define how ritual performance facilitated an increase in religiosity among 
the population. The rituals performed on the occasion of funerals were considered by the 
authorities as the most deep-rooted religious rituals among the Ismailis in this period. That 
did not mean that the funeral ceremony among the Sunni population was not monitored by 
the authorities. Funeral rites among the Sunni population in other regions of the Tajik SSR 
and other Muslim-populated areas of the former Soviet Union were also strictly monitored 
and reported on. Funeral prayers held in the registered mosques were noted, with the 
estimates of the numbers of attendees and the payments made by them
 
. The ceremony was 
considered a problem for the authorities when large numbers of visitors paid respect to the 
deceased.
53
  
The CARC archives from Gorno-Badakhshan however, provide relatively little 
information about funerals among the Sunni population in this province. Apart from 
describing the funeral process and including some excerpts about janoza (funeral prayer), 
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the archives under study do not reveal any data about discussions or disputes that may have 
occurred between Sunni mullos in conducting funeral-related rituals in this province. What 
was considered detrimental about the funerals among the Sunni population in Murgab 
district was the feast expenses and animal slaughter. In addition to this a custom known as 
isqot or khairiyot (distributing the property of the dead by the mullos among the Kyrgyz 
Sunni population) was denounced and banned by the authorities. The number of annual 
reports on the two Muslim festivals exceeded those on life-cycle rituals. In the case of 
funerals among the Ismailis, these reports provided more detailed information about the 
ceremony itself, including the differences in practice, the recitation of religious texts and 
prayers and the activity of religious figures. The commissioners described different forms 
of prayers conducted by the Sunni Muslim population, such as the namozi id, tarobeh, 
khatm-i Qur’on and the jum‘a namoz (the Friday prayer) and gatherings at the end of 
festivals. Nevertheless, apart from providing a short sample of a daily prayer, there is no 
detailed description of the kinds of prayer or religious discussion that took place. 
In the case of the charogh-i rawshan or da‘wat, the archives provide fairly good 
summaries of the text of charogh-noma the prayers and the content of some of the 
maddohs sung during the three days of the funeral. There were different samples of the 
texts of) the charogh-noma or qandil-noma (book of the candle/lamp) used by the Ismailis 
during the performance of the ritual of charogh-i rawshan. It goes beyond the scope of this 
thesis to provide a textual analysis of these samples of charogh-noma or the content of the 
various prayers recited during the festivals.
54
 What is relevant for this thesis is to analyse 
the practice of the funeral rites in the light of changing religious policy, the continuous 
administrative interference and pressure, and atheist propaganda during the Soviet period. 
In the case of charogh-i rawshan or da‘wat it is important to examine how this ceremony 
provided a space for religious figures to extend their influence among the believers, and 
served as a means of spreading religious views and transmitting Islamic knowledge in an 
environment dominated by widespread atheist propaganda.  
The CARC documents reveal the disputes and rivalries among the Ismaili clergy in leading 
funerals which suggest how important this ceremony was for connecting the individual to 
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religion.
55
 In this period it seemed that the ritual of da‘wat was used less for following the 
religious path per se than for strengthening religious identity. 
In the years of the Stalinist concession to religion in the mid-1940s, not only were the rites 
resumed but ceremonies such as the da‘wat were used for summoning people to support 
the Soviet front.
56
 By the early 1950s, however, the authorities again resumed their strict 
monitoring of religious activity, with the council instructing its commissioner to provide 
detailed description of each religious figure and the rituals practiced by Muslim 
communities, down to and including every life-cycle ritual celebrated within Muslim 
families in Gorno-Badakhshan. Following instructions from the council, the commissioner 
Bodurov reported instances of dispute and tension between religious figures, ordinary 
Ismailis, and the authorities, concerning their conduct of the rituals of charogh-i rawshan 
and tasbeh at funerals in the 1950s.  
This detailed information on funerals even listed how many instances of da‘wats were held 
by khalifas for members of the Communist Party and Soviet officials. This is what the 
council needed in order to measure the rise and fall of religiosity among the Ismailis, for 
which funeral related rites served as the best benchmark. However, reading between the 
lines of the report on da‘wat we can sense the emerging rivalry between the Ismaili 
khalifas and mullos over the religious market in the relatively free milieu for religious 
activity from the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s. For instance, the commissioner Bodurov 
reported that during a funeral in the city of Khorog, a mullo, who himself had grown up in 
a detdom (orphanage) complained about the khalifas that had kamsawod (poor knowledge). 
This mullo had reportedly pointed out that the Islamic rites had been reformed by the 
Prophet Muhammad and the Shi’i Imams. It was therefore inappropriate for the khalifas to 
allow animal slaughter, and perform the charogh-i rawshan during funerals. Instead, the 
mullo supported the ritual of tasbeh which was less expensive and requested the wakili din 
(representative for religious affairs) i.e., the commissioner to prohibit da‘wat.57  
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Instances of da‘wat during funerals were also monitored by rural aktivs in each village who 
were there to also report on the activities of the mullohoi namoyoni din (notable religious 
figures), the khalifas and religious teachers. In their reports the commissioners had to 
indicate cases when funerals or any other rites were performed by clerics not officially 
designated as khalifas (for the Ismailis) or mullos (for the Sunnis).  
Religious activities had been subject to strict monitoring and control since the 
establishment of Soviet rule. What made it different in the period under study was the way 
in which these activities were regulated by the council and its commissioners on the 
ground. Moreover, the consequences of this monitoring were not as catastrophic for 
believers as they had been in the 1930s. In the 1930s the Soviet government banned the 
khalifas to conduct religious rites at funerals. Thus some khalifas had had to hide their 
participation in funeral rituals and performing the charogh-i rawshan at the houses of the 
deceased.
58
  
Funeral-related rituals were monitored because of a number of relevant points of Soviet 
religious policy in the post-war period. First of all funeral related rites were deemed 
detrimental for the household economy, due to their huge expenses, the wastage of food 
and the sacrificing of animals. Secondly, the funeral was an occasion that enabled khalifas 
and mullos to extend their zone of activity by travelling from their own village to 
neighbouring ones to perform funeral rites for their relatives. Thirdly, a funeral lasted for a 
few days with people visiting the family to offer prayers for the deceased. Like everywhere 
in the Muslim world, it served as the most appropriate occasion for clergy and believers to 
express their sense of belonging to a religious community, kinship and solidarity. Last and 
not least, for the Ismailis the ritual of da‘wat at the end of funerals played a vital role in 
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transmitting religious knowledge through the recitation of the charogh-noma, the 
performance of maddohkhoni and discussion of religious themes. 
The number of mourners and the standard of performance of the da‘wat and charogh-i 
rawshan depended on how much authority the dead person had enjoyed or how established 
his/her family was. Obviously the death of a respected or young person brought more 
people to the funeral, to mourn, pray and participate in the da‘wat ceremony. In 1952 
Bodurov reported the death of the ishan Sayyidkozum Sayidfarrukhshoev. The kolkhoz 
members used to visit this ishan during his lifetime. During the funeral and the da‘wat 
approximately 400 kolkhoz members and even rural aktivs, visited his house over three to 
four days. The commissioner himself visited the family members on the first day and 
reported on the active participation of the leading khalifas in performing funeral rites at the 
house.
59
 In the same year Bodurov reported that the chairman of a kolkhoz in the village of 
Tawdem in the Shugnan district held a lavish funeral ceremony on the death of his father. 
The ceremony lasted for four days during which religious figures allowed maddohkhoni 
and conducted the ritual of charogh-i rawshan at the end. A young mullo reportedly 
criticised such an expensive and long ritual.  
Subsequently, Bodurov received dozens of reports from aktivi dini about the da‘wati 
namoyon (lavish summoning ceremony) lead by khalifas even for the family of party 
members and officials.
60
 For instance, in the same year it was reported that a member of 
the kolkhoz in the village of Mun in the Shugnan district held a da‘wati namoyon at the 
funeral of his mother, in which more than a hundred people, including 50 Sufis and several 
maddohkhons participated. Over the three days a bull and a sheep were slaughtered and 60 
kilograms of wheat were used for preparing food for visitors. Another such instance of 
da‘wat with maddohkhoni was organised by the secretary of the Communist Party in a 
sel'sovet in the Shugnan district for the funeral of his daughter.
61
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The commissioner Bodurov pointed out the growing numbers of followers of the tasbeh 
ritual and the increasingly frequent disputes between them and those following the existing 
da‘wat ceremony. He reported an instance when the director of an evening educational 
course in the city of Khorog, himself a party aktiv, asked the khalifa to conduct the ritual of 
tasbeh at the funeral of his father. On the final night of the funeral a dispute took place 
between various mullos, sufis, and the janozagars (those reciting the funeral prayer) who 
were followers of both the tasbeh and the charogh-i rawshan rituals in his house. In this 
dispute a mullo from Khorog, Bandishoev Imatsho reportedly considered the ritual of 
tasbeh as a custom of the chor-yoris.
62
According to this mullo the Ismailis needed to 
perform the charogh-i rawshan in order to lead the soul of the dead into paradise, whereas 
there was no benefit for the soul from performing the ritual of tasbeh. This mullo 
reportedly viewed people as deluded to use the tasbeh as it was not their traditional rite 
even if it was approved by the Soviet officials. Despite this dispute the director requested 
the khalifa to end the funeral with the ritual of tasbeh. 
A similar dispute between sufis and mullos was reported at the funeral of a party member 
in upper part of Khorog. On that occasion it was reported that sufis and mullos such as 
Sulaimonov Abdurahmon, who was also an employee of raifo (the district funding office); 
mullo Bandishoev Imatsho; the official khalifa Metarshoev Aynalisho and another mullo 
Muborakqadamov Berd, all proponents of charogh-i rawshan, described the tasbeh as the 
rite belonging to the madhab (school) of those who followed the shar‘ria. Even if the 
family had initially preferred the ritual of tasbeh, the funeral ended with da’wat-i 
charogh.
63
 In the 1950s there were many disputes and tensions when a khalifa did not 
agree to perform tasbeh at the house of certain individuals, especially party members and 
officials. Similarly there were cases when a khalifa himself following the tasbeh ritual 
would complain about the interference of mullos performing the charogh-i rawshan. 
In 1953 Bodurov wrote a letter to his senior colleague in the republic to ask for guidance 
especially about this dispute, i.e. on which groups of Ismailis the CARC representative in 
the oblast could rely for his work. He also asked for solutions to a number of questions that 
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emerged from his work with the believers in the oblast. These were questions about: a) 
how to deal with the khalifas (Ismailis) and mullos (Sunnis) who were acting beyond the 
confines of legislation; b) Whether the representative could rely on the support of the 
clergy; and c) How to obtain information from remote areas where there were no aktivs. 
Bodurov also pointed out the shortcomings of atheist propaganda among the population 
which in turn enabled the religious figures to revive their activity. Therefore, he further 
asked if he was allowed to raise this issue in the meeting with the aktivs or conduct 
propaganda himself. The other questions were linked to his position as a party bureaucrat, 
such as: How could he reply to the criticism of his work in meetings with the aktivs? And 
what could the commissioner do if the local officials did not provide support to him, 
especially sending him the personal details of the khalifas, mullos and those practicing 
prayers (namozkhons) in the remote areas. These issues, noted Bodurov, made his task 
more difficult.64  
There was no immediate response by the CARC commissioner in the republic, as well as 
the provincial authorities regarding the questions that Bodurov rose above. However, 
reviewing Bodurov’s report, the council in Moscow instructed him to record details about 
the level of religiosity, ritual performance and the activities of the Ismaili clergy. Although 
there was no specific recommendation on how to deal with the two different groups, the 
council made it clear that the commissioner should not interfere in the believers’ decision: 
The council instructs you to take into account the fact that struggling against religion is not your 
responsibility. It is also not permitted for you to interfere in the appointment and dismissal of 
ministers of religion. It is not clear why believers and the clergy complain to you or consult with you 
on such matters. The council is satisfied with the account that you provided about mazors, a task 
which you need to carry out further and update in your records. Even though there are no registered 
religious societies in Gorno-Badakshan and yet the levels of religiosity remain high, it is wrong to 
prohibit the believers from worshipping. Such unnecessary action would not yield any results except 
an increase in the cases of disagreement and unhealthy sentiment among the believers.
65
 
These instructions not to interfere in the appointment of clergy and not to prohibit the 
performance of any kind of rituals also meant that the commissioner should not take the 
side of either of the two groups of Ismailis. Subsequently, when the disputes emerged 
between the religious figures and groups of believers about rituals, the commissioner 
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instructed them to consider the wishes of all believers and act within the Soviet legislation 
on religion. According to a letter dated 29 July 1954, from the khalifa Mizrobshoev in the 
Suchon village of Shugnan district, the Ismailis in this kolkhoz were divided into two 
groups and had dispute with each other over funeral rites. One group followed the ritual of 
charogh-i rawshan or da’wat-i charogh, which included the recitation of the charogh-
noma religious poem and the lighting of a candle made from the fat of the sacrificed sheep. 
The other group followed the ritual of tasbeh (prayer with beads) while reciting the text of 
the Pir-i Shoh prayer that was introduced among the Ismailis of Badakhshan by the 
Panjabhai missionaries in the 1920s.
66
 In contrast to the ritual of da’wat-i charogh, which 
was described by the commissioner as a large ceremony for spreading religious views, the 
ritual of tasbeh was a simplified religious performance. As a result of this intra-Ismaili 
dispute, when the khalifa conducted the rite of tasbeh the group which followed the old rite 
i.e. the da’wati charogh, during the funeral, would make their objections known.  
The CARC commissioner used the term staroobriiadtsi for the Ismailis who performed the 
ritual of charogh-i rawshan. In contrast he applied the term novoobriiadtsi to the group of 
the Ismailis who practiced the rite of tasbeh.
67
 Nevertheless, commissioner Bodurov did 
not explain how the dispute among Ismailis could be described using terminology applied 
to the Christian population in the Soviet Union. It would appear that the commissioner 
simply used terminology familiar to the CARC experts in Moscow. As for the khalifa 
Mizrobshoev, he wanted to take it upon himself to perform the ritual of charogh-i 
rawshan. This view was shared by the rural activists who also recommended conducting 
the old rite during funerals. Despite this, the khalifa raised the issue of disputes over ritual 
performance with the commissioner Bodurov: 
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Mizrobshoev: Would you as the CARC upolnomochennyi (commissioner) in Gorno-Badakhshan 
recommend providing support for the staroobriiadtsi i.e., those following the old ritual of 
da’wat during funerals? 
Bodurov: You as a khalifa represent a religious society and conduct rites, which are permitted by the 
Soviet legislation. This law should be maintained and in case it is violated, the state will 
take measures against it. You have to have dignity and also work according to the wishes 
of the believers of the tasbeh group. Neither you nor I introduced the tasbeh ritual, but it 
has existed since 1923. As for obliging believers to conduct the ceremony of charogh-i 
rawshan, it is not allowed to advocate it; maybe some believers do not want to observe it. 
Therefore, it is not allowed to oblige them.
68
 
Generally, the appearance of these kinds of disputes and disagreements over the 
performance of rituals between the clergy and believers can be related to the relatively free 
milieu of the 1950s. It seems that the group defined as novoobriadtsi, although small, was 
favoured by the local authorities, but those labelled as staroobriiadtsi, especially the 
khalifas and mullos, were depicted as exploiters who abused the material and spiritual 
interests of believers during funerals. It was apparent that the commissioners pointed out 
that the ritual of tasbeh was simpler, less expensive and less effective for preaching.
69
 
When reporting on disputes about the funeral rites, the CARC commissioner often 
indicated that the da‘wat had powerful role in spreading religious propaganda.  
In the context of the Soviet anti-religious policy and continuous atheist propaganda, 
performing the da‘wat that drew people to religion raised more concerns than the short, 
basic, ritual recitation of tasbeh. Despite this, the local authorities could not prevent the 
performance of the ritual of the charogh-i rawshan or replace it with the tasbeh ritual. 
What was costly though was the loss of jobs and future careers within the system for some 
officials and party members who allowed the da‘wat or charogh-i rawshan ceremony to be 
conducted at the funeral of one of their family members. For instance, on January 1955 
Bodurov reported about the funeral of the son of the provincial prosecutor at which more 
than four hundred people gathered. Initially, the khalifa and other family members decided 
to conduct the ceremony of da‘wat. When the father of the dead boy, the provincial 
prosecutor, arrived late he did not allow the family and the khalifa to hold the ceremony of 
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da‘wat at his house. The prosecutor told them that he was a party aktiv and did not 
recognize religious practices. The mullos in turn spread rumours about this prosecutor 
considering him an impostor and insinuated that soon their children would become 
unbelievers by studying in Soviet schools.
70
 
The reports under study remain almost silent on whether the CARC commissioners offered 
protection to some party members who were accused of assisting religious figures and 
participating in religious rituals. The general rule of the state was that official and party 
members were excluded from the category of the population defined as believers. In 
reality, however, this was far from being the case with the officials in Muslim-populated 
republics, with religion being at the heart of the life-cycle rituals such as circumcision, 
marriage and death. Party members were themselves subject to pressure from their 
colleagues and the party committee, for participating in religious rituals. From the 1960s to 
mid 1980s, the archives rarely mention disputes and tension between Ismailis in 
performing rituals. As an analysis of the CARC documents has revealed, religious figures 
in Gorno-Badakhshan were aware of this freedom afforded to religious activity by the 
Soviet state.  
The appointment of the special commissioner for religious affairs in the province in turn 
gave khalifas and mullos an opportunity to discuss religious issues with him, denounce 
each other to the authorities and to vie for position. According to the Soviet legislation, the 
commissioners like any other party members were not allowed to participate in any 
religious event. In practice, however the commissioners could not isolate themselves from 
the events in their communities, such as wedding and funerals, which draw together all 
Muslim people, party members, religious figures and believers.  
The performance of most rituals in the family space in some areas of Soviet Central Asia 
and the Caucasus gave ground for the argument about the domestication of religion. For 
instance, in her observation of religious practices in Soviet Azerbaijan and Georgia, 
Dragadze stressed the continuation of the domestication of religion up until perestroika in 
the mid-1980s. She gives an example of how villagers preferred to perform rituals for their 
dying relatives at home rather than in hospital.
71
 This idea about the domestication of Islam 
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seemed to have been informed more by the theoretical concepts stressing the division 
between profane and sacred spaces, and public and domestic spheres. In the context of this 
study, the blurred lines dividing religious life into public and private spheres were not 
clarified. Examples like this suggested little about the domestication of religion, especial 
when applied to Muslim communities in Gorno-Badakhshan. 
Funeral related rituals in the context of the Tajik SSR involved not only immediate family 
members but also relatives and the wider community. Funerals and burial ceremonies 
formed a public space in the Muslim populated areas of the USSR, in which party officials, 
heads of the kolkhozes participated together with religious figures and the ordinary people 
in rituals. 
72
 Similarly as Abashin’s study reveals in different Muslim-populated regions of 
Central Asia, there were distinct social relations and governing orders, practices and 
negotiations in a milieu defined as an ‘informal public sphere.’73 In rural areas, private 
houses were turned into spaces for the observation of communal rites, for instance, during 
the da‘wat among the Ismailis in Gorno-Badakhshan. Funeral prayers were even held in 
registered and unregistered mosques in the Tajik SSR. The number of people attending 
mosque for prayers after the funeral also contradicts the idea that religious rituals were 
practiced only in the domestic sphere.
74
 
4.4. Muslim Perception of New Soviet Rituals 
In order to find alternatives to existing religious rituals, the Soviet state introduced secular 
rituals such as patriotic celebrations on the anniversary of the October Revolution, 
International Women’s Day, Labour Day and Victory Day, which were common to all of 
its citizens. In the Tajik SSR, some temporary seasonal festivals such as the Harvest 
Festival and the Melon and Watermelon Festival were introduced. The celebration of the 
traditional New Year’s festival of Nawruz was also allowed to be celebrated from 1976.75 
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In 1972 the oblispolkom of Gorno-Badakhshan formed a commission of 11 individuals to 
implement the newly conceptualised Soviet rituals, a mix of existing seasonal and life-
cycle celebrations. These rituals signalled important transitions on the path of life, 
education and career, and were comprised of: registration of birth, graduation from 
secondary school, achieving Komsomol and party membership, seeing off youngsters to 
join the Soviet Army, retirement, civil funerals and a number of other civil rituals. The new 
Soviet rituals were intended gradually to replace the existing religious rites of nikoh 
(marriage ceremony), janoza (funeral), and other religious festivals. 
76
 
In that year, it was reported that the oblispolkom of Gorno-Badakhshan had organised 
extensive seminars for the chairs of the assistance commission of the ispolkom of the city 
of Khorog. In this seminar all the heads of the provincial party government units, the 
prosecutor, the head of the internal affairs unit, the teachers union, the agricultural 
department, the head of the Komsomol unit, the culture unit, the cinema service and the 
Znanie society, participated; altogether comprising 95 people. The seminar addressed the 
following tasks and issues concerning the atheist upbringing of workers: the ideological 
prerequisites for educating the population, improving the culture and lifestyle of the 
workers, the role of the administrative authorities in “the struggle against remnants of the 
past” and compliance with the legislation.  
Each of these issues was discussed in detail in speeches by the secretary of the obkom, the 
party, the head of the department of culture, deputy prosecutors, the judiciary and chairmen 
of the assistance commissions in the town and districts. The CRA commissioner Nayimov 
presented a talk on the role of the assistance commissions in implementing the new Soviet 
rituals. While at this seminar the provincial authorities called for the introduction of new 
civil rituals, in districts such as Qal’a-i Khumb the problems of registration had not even 
been solved yet.
77
 Therefore, the oblispolkom ordered the chairman of the ispolkom of this 
district immediately to submit all completed applications for the registration of religious 
figures.
78
The oblispolkom also ordered the commissioner Nayimov, to review the work of 
the commissions on the implementation of the new Soviet rituals. In response to the 
decisions and orders of the oblispolkom, on 25 October 1972 he pointed out that most of 
                                                          
76
 GA GBAO, f. 110, op. 3, d. 22, (29 August 1972), pp. 1-9. 
77
  Ibid., pp. 6-9. 
78
 GA GBAO, f. 110, op. 3, d. 22, see the decision of the GBAO’s oblispolkom from 25 October 1972, pp. 
10-15. 
138 
 
the ispolkoms of the districts had been successful in implementing state religious policy. 
Nevertheless in district such as Qal’a-i Khumb, the social commissions under the ispolkom 
were not conducting a sufficient analysis of the views and movements of religious 
figures.
79
 
The atheist policy was continuously adapted to the needs and circumstances of each of the 
religious groups, especially in the Muslim areas where religion maintained a strong 
influence.
80
 To solve the problem of weak atheist propaganda in this province, the Znanie 
society reportedly dispatched its key lecturers from the judiciary, the central province 
hospital and the teacher-training institute to the districts of Wanj, Qal’a-i Khumb and 
Murgab. The themes of these lectures ranged from the ‘damage’ caused by religious 
practices, the inferior role of women in Islam and the denunciation of the reactionary role 
of religion.  
The commissioner himself travelled to a number of districts to provide practical support 
for the work of the commissions under the ispolkoms on the eve of the month of Ramazon 
and published an article in the regional newspaper on the damage caused by ruza. From the 
mid-1960s onwards the regional newspaper Badakhshoni Soveti and the district 
newspapers increased their coverage of atheist and scientific themes by highlighting Soviet 
developments in medicine, technology and space exploration. Articles criticising and 
mocking the practice of healing through azoim-khoni (healing through prayer) and amulets 
regularly appeared in the press and on local radio broadcasts.
81
 
In spite of these efforts, the CRA commissioner noted that the ispolkoms of some districts 
such as Qal’a-i Khumb were not providing details about fasting and other religious 
customs but reported on the general activities of the Znanie society instead. The social 
commissions in other districts remained merely names on paper without any activity such 
as holding meetings or reporting. For this reason Nayimov pointed out that the ispolkoms 
of the district undermined the recommendations issued by the oblispolkom about the new 
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rituals and ensuring compliance with the legislation. However, it appeared that this 
criticism of the work of the ispolkoms and the commissions was merely a bureaucratic 
exercise for the commissioners. They stressed in each report the success and shortcomings 
of the atheist propaganda in a similar manner. In his criticism of the work of the ispolkoms 
and related commissions, the CRA commissioner even went so far as to state that there was 
insufficient information on some illegal practices, such as circumcision. 
In 1973 the party obkom of Gorno-Badakhshan, together with the Znanie society, officials 
of the aktivs and ideological workers held another conference where the following 
presentations were made: a) the work of a public organisation in implementing the new 
rituals, given by the deputy of the oblispolkom Qadamshoeva; b) the reactionary essence of 
religious customs and ways to overcome them, by the head of the culture department 
comrade Mirzoshoev; c) the decrees of the Congress of the Communist Party for educating 
workers, by head of provincial education unit, Faqirov; and d) freedom of conscience and 
conducting atheist propaganda by the CRA commissioner, Nayimov.
82
 
In her presentation the deputy chair of the oblispolkom, Qadamshoeva, pointed out that 
religious figures were adapting themselves to the new situation and wished to accept civil 
ceremonies. However, she claimed that the mullos were making money by visiting 
people’s houses for prayer and healing, while the community incurred huge expenses on 
food, sacrificing animals for funerals and religious holidays. The participation of children 
in the ritual of the charogh-i rawshan at funerals was considered against the legislation and 
had to be banned. Similarly the practice of circumcision was considered by the authorities 
as a criminal act as result of which children could become infected and need hospital 
treatment. 
The deputy also called on the local party officials and the intelligentsia to extend their 
support to the related social and public commissions to ensure compliance with the law on 
religion. Going further, the deputy chair pointed out that in recent years religious figures 
had tried to celebrate rituals on different dates for their own ends. She referred to stories 
about the religious figures from Roshtqal‘a, who had complained that ‘Nawruz (the spring 
holiday) was celebrated on the same day everywhere, and the khalifas will have no effect 
on the followers’. Another story that she retold was about the mullos of Khorog who stated 
that ‘they could not conduct religious rites during the celebration of Nawruz, and therefore 
the people should only celebrate the festivals of Id-i Ramazon and Id-i Qurbon’. As these 
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two religious festivals were not celebrated in many villages, the influence of the religious 
figures was therefore weakened among the population. The celebration of the harvest was 
highlighted as a successful example of the new Soviet rituals in the kolkhozes where it was 
accompanied by music, sport games (wrestling, buzkashi and running), a market and an 
exhibition of agricultural products.  
In order to implement the new Soviet rituals, special ritual committees were organised 
under the ispolkom of each district and town. In her speech the deputy of the oblispolkom 
stressed the need for managing graves and grazhdanskaia panikhida (civil funeral rites). 
The committee for implementing the new Soviet rituals needed to arrange new areas for 
burials in various locations with facilities for washing and erecting a headstone with the 
family name, a black and white portrait of and the dates of birth and death of the deceased. 
Generally the procedure for new civil funeral rites did not specifically point to the banning 
of janoza, or other religious rites. However, in her speech the deputy of the chairman of 
oblispolkom noted that it was recommended that family members of a deceased person 
should immediately inform the committee members to arrange the grazhdanskaia 
panikhida. These committee members should carry out the registration of the death, and 
appoint a date, place and transport for the funeral. During the funeral according to the civil 
ceremony the practice of religious rites and the spending of large sum of money were 
discouraged.
83
  
The aforementioned conference was followed by a regional seminar in September 1973 
where chairmen of the social assistance commissions under the ispolkoms reported on their 
work of monitoring the activity of religious figures, especially on the eve of religious 
festivals.
84
 Subsequently, such meetings and seminars undertook detailed assessments of 
the process of implementing atheist propaganda and the new rituals with the assistance 
commissions under the ispolkoms. The job of the CRA commissioner then shifted to 
providing guidance, presenting talks on general political and ideological themes such as 
class consciousness, scientific and atheistic ideas, and reviewing the work of the social 
commissions.  
Unlike the performance of the new Soviet rituals, the purpose of which was continuously 
stressed as being the duty of all citizens, the traditional religious rituals were considered to 
be a matter of respect, honour and obligation. For instance, one of the khalifas who often 
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features in the reports, Sobirov Ghulomnabi, complained to the chairman of the assistance 
commission and the sel'sovet about people’s attitude to celebrating the new Soviet rituals. 
In this khalifa’s view, when celebrating the new Soviet rituals such as seeing off the 
youngsters to the Soviet Army, house-warmings and birthday parties, people became 
unfriendly due to the excessive use of vodka that led to disputes and fighting, even 
between relatives. The khalifas were often not invited to these celebrations. Sobirov further 
stated that religion was not an obstacle to the actions of the state, justifying it by the 
Prophetic tradition that says ‘government is a shadow of God on the earth.’ Furthermore, 
this khalifa, like the rest of his fellow clergy, praised the Soviet state’s efforts to improve 
people’s standard of living by providing pensions to the elderly and support for families 
with many children. This khalifa did not acknowledge that he accepted payment for 
conducting religious rituals. He complained about a group of mullos, his rivals in the 
village of Porshnev, who were conducting religious rituals without his agreement.
85
 
The official khalifas and mullos were not the only source of information about the religious 
situation in their localities, or even their own activities. Information came in from various 
sources on the ground, including the different aktivs, members of the assistance 
commission, party and kolkhoz members, the community at large and those participating in 
religious ceremonies. Thus, even if the aforementioned khalifa denied that he had received 
payment for his services, it was reported through other channels that he was “conducting 
healing and practicing sorcery” among the population of his sel'sovet. It was reported that 
this khalifa collected money and animal skins, the sina (breast) of sacrificed lambs, and 
new fabrics and suits (worth 60-90 roubles) when leading the funeral ceremonies. This 
kind of payment to the registered khalifas became a custom as believers and their 
households were keen to give generously to the khalifa or domullo in order to preserve the 
family’s good reputation.86 Obviously, these customs made huge demands on the family of 
the deceased and raised the concern of the officials and the members of the assistance 
commissions.  
There were many cases where official khalifas and domullos were criticised and taxed 
more on money donations collected during religious festivals, and marriage and funeral 
ceremonies. This manner of conducting rituals by the khalifas and domullos was deemed 
by the Soviet government and Communist Party authorities to be an anti-social and illegal 
                                                          
85
 GA GBAO, f. 110, op. 3, d. 7, (10 February 1971), p. 56. 
86
 GA GBAO, f. 110, op. 3, d. 7, (10 February 1971), p. 105. 
142 
 
activity that strengthened the influence of religion. In their view, religious rites rituals 
distracted Soviet citizens from being progressive, productive and enlightened. For their 
part, the religious figures also considered the newly-introduced Soviet rituals as occasions 
for encouraging immorality, spreading alcoholism, fighting and stirring up hostility, even 
among relatives. 
Having observed all this, the CRA commissioner concluded that the increased activity of 
the khalifas, and their influence on believers, especially during funerals, was related to the 
poor work of the social commissions in introducing the Soviet rituals. Nayimov noted that 
some of the social assistance commissions were inactive, as a result of which funerals and 
other events were left in the hands of the clergy. He quoted a khalifa from the sel'sovet of 
Wer in the Shugnan district who said: 
When someone dies, it does not matter whether he is a member of the kolkhoz or Soviet worker; the 
funeral is led by the khalifas. If it is necessary to conduct an engagement ceremony, for 
whomsoever, then it will be conducted secretly, and even close relatives would not know about it.
87
 
Nayimov therefore recommended strengthening the work of the social assistance 
commissions under the ispolkoms to implement the new Soviet rituals throughout the 
whole oblast. To what extent these new rituals were intended to replace the pre-existing 
religious practices can only be understood within the context of the larger socio-cultural, 
demographic and economic changes in the region during this period. The fact that the new 
Soviet rituals were widespread cannot be denied, but it was unlikely to be the case that 
they actually replaced the religious rituals.  
The growing demand for performing religious rituals, especially janoza and nikoh, made it 
inevitable that the religious personnel would be active and undertake the dissemination of 
their ideas. Hence, the introduction of the new Soviet rituals cannot be seen merely as 
replacement of existing religious and cultural rituals, even if it was their stated aim. In her 
extensive analysis of Soviet rituals, Christel Lane points out that the implementation of 
Soviet rituals demonstrated the elite’s drive to strengthen its rule over the public by means 
of new symbols and structures.
88
  
The implementation of new Soviet rituals, involved a set of complex measures, including 
atheist propaganda and continuous criticism of the symbols and structure of religious 
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customs. This process itself suggests that the state, as represented by central policy makers, 
elites and the local organs of government, had to engage with the religious symbols and 
views that were being perpetuated by religious figures. In other words, the policy of 
making a distinction between secular state rites and religious customs involved these two 
categories in an intimate interaction with each other. 
Conclusion 
This examination of religious rituals and celebrations among the Muslim communities in 
Gorno-Badakhshan reveals radical changes in the ways these continued to be practiced. In 
quantitative terms, the changes constituted a decrease in instances of the practice of ruza, 
communal prayers and shrine visitation among the Sunni and Ismaili population in Gorno-
Badakhshan. The obvious causes for this decrease were the continuous administrative 
pressures and propaganda by various central and local party state organs and authorities. 
Generally, the decrease in the instances of ritual performance by Muslim communities in 
Gorno-Badakhshan resembled that occurring in other parts of Tajik SSR and the Soviet 
Union. The striking difference, however, is that in other parts of Soviet Union, in particular 
in the Muslim-dominated republics of Central Asia, Islamic practices, especially 
communal prayers in registered and unregistered mosques, and mass visitation to popular 
sacred cites caused serious concern for the local and central authorities.
89
  
In the context of Gorno-Badakhshan, there are no reports of instances of mass visitations 
undermining local government efforts to target religious activities. The reasons for these 
were the difficulties in reaching the remote and small villages. This absence of communal 
prayers and mass visitation in this province for much of the period under study does not 
suggest their total disappearance from the religious landscape. These practices continued to 
exist, in particular small group prayers among Sunni Muslims. Among the Ismailis, the 
communal performance of religious rituals was observed on the occasions of funerals as 
evidenced in the case of the reciting of the charogh-noma and maddohkhoni during the 
ceremony of charogh-i rawshan as part of funerals.  
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These communal and individual instances of practicing religion mainly took place in 
private houses, which provided the space for the people to assemble during festivals and 
life-cycle events. Outside Gorno-Badakhshan, this space was provided by the registered 
and unregistered mosques. Private houses also served as space for the celebration of new 
Soviet civil rituals, on birthdays, weddings, graduation from school, enlisting and returning 
from military service and a number of other Soviet secular and political events. Contrary to 
religious rituals, most of these Soviet rituals were celebrated in public, in state-built 
cultural houses and school halls. 
The data presented in this chapter show that the changes in the ritual performance during 
this period were not of content, but rather of form and location. Apart from the instance 
when some Ismailis started to recite new prayer texts, no other instances of change or 
reform in the content of existing religious texts were recorded by CARC commissioners. In 
the 1950s, ritual performance often became the locus and source of disputes among the 
Ismailis during funerals. Sunnis and Ismailis in Gorno-Badakhshan had different ways of 
performing the main religious rituals such as nikoh (matrimonial ceremony), funeral 
rituals, reciting prayers and observing religious festivals. The only religious practice that 
was common to both was faith-healing conducted by Ismaili mullos in the Sunni-populated 
areas and vice versa. The reports of the CARC commissioners provide records of ritual 
performances that were more targeted by the authorities from 1959 to 1964. The local 
authorities instituted punitive measures against a number of religious figures and 
pressurized their family members who were working as party state officials. From the 
1970s onwards, the archives tend to provide more records of the content of texts of prayers 
used by both the Sunnis and Ismailis and the views of the prominent khalifas and mullos.  
This increase in the amount of information in the archives by 1980s suggests a serious 
attempt by the central state policy-makers to come to terms with religious rites. Obviously, 
this must have been in line with a general understanding among the Soviet researchers and 
policymakers to undertake a more in-depth analysis of religious life, rather than trying to 
highlight its disappearance. By stating the fact that religious situation in Muslim populated 
areas of the USSR were controlled by numerous unregistered mullos the CRA 
commissioners’ confirmed the failure of Soviet anti-religious and atheist policy.90  
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 See introduction to Islam i Sovetskoe gosudarstvo(1944-1990). Sbornik dokumentov, pp. 19-27. 
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The distinct ways of practicing religion among Muslim communities in Gorno-
Badakhshan, however, challenged this effort by the central policy-makers to study Islam. 
First, the conceptual problem of studying religious life in different parts of Soviet Union 
existed in the terminology used by the council and its commissioners. As in many other 
parts of Soviet Union, the CRA commissioners in Gorno-Badakhshan often used the word 
‘sect’ to identify the two Muslim communities in this province.91 Secondly, an analysis of 
the data suggests how confusing it was for the commissioners in Gorno-Badakhshan to 
define the legality of ritual performance, in particular when the first commissioner asked 
the council to instruct him regarding the disputes that surfaced during Ismaili funerals. 
Finally, the incomplete description of the content of rituals by commissioners in Gorno-
Badakhshan reveals the limits of their expertise. It can be also seen as part of their strategy 
to deliberately offer fragmented accounts of ritual performance, in order to conform to the 
demand of central policy that religious rites were diminishing among the Soviet citizens in 
this province. There is a difference in size and content of the information sent to Moscow 
and that preserved inside the files of CRA commissioners in the regional archive in Gorno-
Badakhshan. The internal documents preserved in the files of the commissioners provide 
more detailed information on ritual performance. What was reported to Moscow was more 
a watered-down report about religious activities and practices. 
To sum up, ritual performance in the period under study adjusted itself not only to 
ideological and administrative pressures but also to the changing socio-cultural and 
economic context. The practice of religious rituals did not provide a sense of solidarity and 
collectivity among the majority of population, especially the new Soviet generation in this 
province. It was the occasions of the initiation into Communist Party and its youth wing 
Komsomol, public holidays of the Workers’ Solidarity on 1 May, Victory Day on 9 May 
and Anniversary of Great October Revolution on 7 November, which indeed involved both 
                                                          
91
 The word ‘sect’ in the CARC commissioners report also denotes ‘non-Orthodox Christian denominations’ 
in Soviet Russia, Belorussia and Ukraine. For a comparisons of how the word ‘sect’ was applied by the 
CARC commissioners to identify unregistered religious groups in the Mari Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic (Mari ASSR) in the Russian Federation, see Sonja Luehrmann, ‘A Multireligious Region in an 
Atheist State: Uniowide Policies Meet Communal Distinctions in the Postwar Mari Republic’, in Catherine 
Wanner, ed., State Secularism and Lived Religion in Soviet Russia and Ukraine (New York, 2012), pp. 272-
301. 
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religious and secular-minded people in celebration, despite their different views.
92
 
However, adherence to the rites of nikoh and the funeral ceremony formed the common 
denominator of what constituted traditional Islamic values for the Muslim population, 
despite the different views of these practices held by the clergy and the local officials. 
Socio-economic stability and rising living standards in Soviet Badakhshan in return 
motivated various segments of society, including party elites, the intelligentsia and the 
workers in various fields, to spend more lavishly on both religious and secular rituals. 
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 For a detailed analysis of how ritual performance produced social stability and conformity in the Soviet 
society see, Thomas, O. Cushman, ‘Ritual and Conformity in Soviet Society’, Journal of Communist Studies, 
2 (1986), pp. 162-180. 
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Chapter 5: Transmitting Islamic Knowledge  
Introduction 
This chapter examines religious education as one of the main components of religious life 
in Tajik SSR in the years from the 1950s to the mid-1980s. Looking at the events that 
unfolded in the lives of Muslim believers prior to the Second World War, it appears that 
this aspect of their religious life had undergone dramatic, interesting and important 
changes. Centuries-old traditional religious institutes, teachings and practices in places like 
Central Asia disappeared with the physical destruction of material and human resources by 
the Soviet government between the 1920s and 1940s. During the Second World War and in 
the post-war period, especially in the post-Stalinist era after 1953, religious teaching 
continued within the family and then spread to hujras through a network of teachers and 
students. In the post-war period the Soviet government allowed the opening of an official 
madrasa in Bukhara and later an Islamic Institute in Tashkent (Uzbek SSR), which drew 
Muslim students from every part of the Soviet Union.
1
 
Parallel to official Islamic education, religious teaching flourished in private and 
clandestine schools in spite of the continuous administrative pressure and in the face of 
atheist propaganda and the thrust of Soviet secular education which aimed to weaken the 
influence of religion. It was perhaps this clandestine nature of religious teaching that 
prevented the Soviet authorities from accurately measuring it,
2
 and hence it is, not well 
documented in the archival reports under study.
3
 
                                                          
1
 For more on the instances of private and clandestine teaching exposed by the authorities in Tajikistan see 
Ro’i, Islam in the Soviet Union, pp. 357-359; and for the transmission of learning from 1950 to 1991 through 
‘cells’ (hujras) and literary circles in the Tajik SSR, see Stephane A. Dudoignon, ‘From Revival to Mutation: 
the Religious Personnel of Islam in Soviet Tajikistan, from de-Stalinization to Independence (1955-91)’, 
Central Asian Survey, 1 (2011), pp. 53-80; and also a study by Abdullo Rahnamo, Ulamoi Islomi dar 
Tojikiston (Dushanbe, 2009). 
2
 For instance, attending prayers during and on the eve the celebration of Id-i Qurbon, observing ruza 
(fasting) during Id-i Ramazon, performing rituals such as khatm-i Qur’on as well as shrine visitation were 
occasions for measuring the influence of religion among believers. 
3
 Unlike the detailed annual report on the celebration of religious festivals and rituals, the reports by the 
representative of the CARC later the CRA only referred to the cases of illegal religious teaching when 
uncovered by the authorities. Some reports listed the titles of the religious books possessed by the religious 
khalifas, mullos and okhons. This does not suggest that religious teaching ceased during this period. On the 
contrary, cases of illegal teaching were discovered in many parts of Tajikistan for which mullos who were 
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The development of religious teaching in official educational centres and in informal 
circles in a milieu dominated by a secular state and atheistic education also makes it 
difficult to establish accurate facts about religious education in this period.
4
 This chapter is 
divided into four sections. The first section gives an overview of official Islamic education 
in Soviet Central Asia and its implications for the Muslim community in Tajik SSR. The 
second section looks into spread of informal religious teaching through internal migration 
in the republic. The third section explores the context and content of religious teaching in 
the specific family maktabs, and in hujras. The final section analyses the transmission of 
religious knowledge among the Ismaili population in Gorno-Badakhshan. 
In the years after the Second World War there were only limited opportunities for a small 
portion of the Muslim younger generation in Tajik SSR to study Islam in formal and state-
supervised centres of learning. In contrast, larger numbers of students and teachers 
benefitted from the evolution of religious education in private and family schools and an 
informal network of learning. Hence, the spread of religious teaching was not only related 
to the fact that there was a need for religious figures to lead the congregation at the 
mosques, or to perform basic religious rites for the community. The rise of religious 
teaching in the post-war period had more to do with existing practices of learning, 
traditions of transmission of religious knowledge and a worldview distinct from that of 
state secular and atheist dominated education.
5
 As the analysis in this chapter reveals, the 
specialists in the field of religious teaching and its proponents made a clear distinction 
between their ‘ilm as the unique tradition and religious identity for the new generation and 
secular Soviet upbringing. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
caught were given prison sentences. See Islam in the Soviet Union, pp. 356-359; and also Arapov Dmitry Yu, 
Islam i sovetskoe gosudarstvo (1944-1990. Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow, 2011). 
4
 In addition to the limited information about clandestine religious education in the archival sources, it 
requires extended time to cross-check the information from oral interviews with the former students and 
teachers of private circles throughout various parts of Tajikistan.  
5
 The term ‘practice’ in this chapter is not used in a limited sense of exercise or revising but in a broader 
sense of Bourdieu’s theory of practice in the religious field. See Terry Rey, Bourdieu on Religion: Imposing 
Faith and Legitimacy (London, 2007). The evolving teaching practice in this period reveals a more complex 
set of activities and relations, traditions, manners and habitus of learning, the production of religious capital, 
transmitting religious knowledge through copying religious works and oral performance through network of 
teachers and students in the informal religious schools.  
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5.1. Official Islamic Education in Soviet Union 
In 1946, SADUM was permitted to re-open the Mir Arab madrasa in Bukhara, Uzbek SSR 
which was then the only official madrasa for studying Islam in the Soviet Union. This 
madrasa initially accepted 26 students, but their numbers reached 65 in the academic year 
1949-50. The 14 students from the Tajik SSR in that year were the second largest group 
after the 36 students from the Uzbek SSR. The madrasa had 74 students by 1953-54.
6
 In 
that academic year, it was also estimated that 14 students from Tajikistan studied there. 
Four of them were enrolled in 1946 and completed the five years of study. Those enrolled 
later, in the late 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s, were still completing their studies in 
1954.
7
 Subsequently, the number of students enrolled fell to seven and sometimes even 
fewer, few students from the Tajik SSR were accepted there for study.
8
 
In the official reports, the educational attainment and standard of teaching in this madrasa 
were deemed low and the number of graduates decreased to only 85 students between 1945 
and 1970, and 80 students reportedly dropped out of their studies.
9
 In 1956 another 
madrasa was allowed to open in Tashkent (Uzbek SSR) to train cadres for registered 
mosques, but it was closed soon thereafter in 1961. By the beginning of the 1958-59, 
academic years there were 96 students in both of these madrasas. A decade later in 1971, a 
more advanced centre for providing religious instruction for official religious figures, an 
Islamic Institute named after a theologian, Ismail al-Bukhari (810-870), was opened in 
Tashkent. The institute offered four years of study to Muslim students from all over of the 
USSR.
10
 Most of the graduates of the Mir Arab madrasa continued their study at this 
                                                          
6
 Islam in the Soviet Union, p. 162. 
7
 See BMDJT. f. 1516, op.1, ed.khr.35, d. 6, ‘Materialy kaziata po Tadzhikistanu’, See the ‘List of the 
students of Mir Arab madrasa in Bukhara, and also the list of the graduates of this school’, (7 January 1954), 
p.53. 
8
 In the 1966-67 academic year there were five students from the Tajik SSR in Mir Arab madrasa. See 
GARF, f. 6991, op. 6, d. 92, (9 October 1967), pp. 1-11; There were six students from the Tajik SSR in 1968. 
GARF, f. 6991, op. 6, d.197, (18 March 1967), p. 22, and seven students in 1971, see GARF, f. 6991, op. 6, 
d. 311, (1 March 1971), pp. 8-22. Of the ten applicants from the Tajik SSR in the 1975-1976 academic year, 
only two were accepted. GARF, f. 6991, op. 6, d. 934, (23 September 1975), p. 5. 
9
 Islam in the Soviet Union, pp. 161-63. 
10
 All of the three students from the Tajik SSR out of the first 21 graduates of this institute in 1975 were sent 
to work with the qoziyot office representing SADUM in Dushanbe. See GARF, f. 6991, op. 6, d.735, (26 
September 1975), p. 135. 
 150 
institute for four more years to receive a higher theological degree and become religious 
scholars. Some of them were assigned to mosques as readers of the Qur’an. Others were 
appointed as imom-khatibs or ordinary official imoms.
11
 Starting from the mid-1950s, a 
few graduates of this madrasa and those continuing their studies at the Tashkent Islamic 
Institute were sent to universities in Middle Eastern countries.
12
 The total period of study at 
the Mir Arab madrasa was nine years, with the first four years being the ibtido’i 
(elementary) stage and other years being the rushdi (advanced) stage.
13
 
The syllabus in the Tashkent Islamic Institute initially included the Uzbek and Arab 
languages, hadith, tafsir and fiqh, Islamic history, akhlaq, the Qur’an, Persian, 
mathematics, geography, the Soviet constitution and the history of the peoples of the 
USSR.
14
 Since the standard of teaching and the quality of the curriculum were regarded as 
poor in the 1950s, SADUM asked the authorities to acquire books from abroad (Egypt).
15
 
As far as admissions were concerned, formal applications for admission to these official 
centres were submitted through SADUM and the three other spiritual directorates, 
particularly by recommendation from the offices of the qoziyots and in each republic. In 
practice, admission to these centres was, however, related to the existing network of 
teachers and students. As the former secretary of the qoziyot office in the Tajik SSR, 
Khudoiberdi Egamberdiev mentioned that he first studied at informal school with one of 
the official clergy in the Tajik SSR who then helped him to enter the Mir Arab madrasa. 
Egamberdiev studied in the Mir Arab madrasa from 1964 to 1971 and was then appointed 
imom in Qaramishqor mosque, one of the registered Friday mosques in Dushanbe. In 1974, 
he was sent to study in Syria and upon his return worked at the office of the qoziyot of the 
Tajik SSR until his retirement.
16
  
                                                          
11
 James Thrower, ‘Notes on Muslim Theological Education in the USSR in the 1980s’, in Shirin Akiner 
(ed.), Political and Economic Trends in Central Asia (London, 1994), pp. 175-180. 
12
 Islam in the Soviet Union, p. 164. 
13
 Ashirbek Muminov et al., ‘Islamic Education in Uzbekistan’, in Michael Kemper and Stephan Reichmuth, 
ed., Islamic Education in the Soviet Union and its Successor States (London, 2010), p. 251. 
14
 See James Thrower, ‘Notes on Muslim Theological Education in the USSR in the 1980s’, in Shirin Akiner 
ed., Political and Economic Trends in Central Asia (London, 1994), pp. 175-198. 
15
 Islam in the Soviet Union, p.163. 
16
 Interview with Khudoiberdi Egamberdiev (b. 1936) in the village Gullistion of the Rudaki district nearby 
Dushanbe (14 April 2011). 
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The reports by the CARC commissioner categorised religious figures in terms of the 
various levels of religious and secular education they had received. However, the 
categorisation of religious figures according to the three levels (primary, secondary and 
higher) remained confused. Until the 1960s, the primary level of religious education for 
religious figures seemed to have been defined based on their study in the family milieu and 
existing maktabs, and the intermediate level based on their study in a madrasa prior to the 
establishment of the Soviet government.  
From the mid-1950s, the education levels were also considered, by the length of the 
clergy’s service in the official mosques and for others based on their studies in the Mir 
Arab madrasa.
17
According to the statistical report, in 1954 there were 26 officially 
registered mosques in the Tajik SSR, one of which was later closed. 35 registered religious 
figures, including 12 khatibs, 19 imoms and 4 shaykhs were serving the congregations in 
these mosques.
18
 In the first half of 1955, there were 29 registered mosques with 39 clerics. 
25 of these Sunni clerics were described as imom-khatibs most of whom had served before 
the 1940s in these posts; nine as imoms and five as shaykhs.
19
 By 1956, there were 30 
registered mosques for the Sunni population in the Tajik SSR, with 41 registered 
clergymen. Among these clergy there were 26 imom-khatibs; 10 described as being ‘other 
                                                          
17
 For more details about the numbers of clergy classified as having higher, secondary and primary education 
see Islam in the Soviet Union, pp. 67-68. 
18
 Regarding their general or state provided educational degree it was indicated that only one khatib and two 
imams had been to a primary state school. The rest of the clergy had not attained even that level of secular 
education. Nine of these khatibs had secondary and three higher-level religious education. Two imams (in the 
mosques) had a higher level; ten had secondary and seven a primary level religious education. All four 
shaykhs in these registered mosques had received intermediate religious education. See BMDJT, f.1516., 
op.1, ed. xr. 32, d. 1, ‘Statisticheskii otchet o zaregistrirovannykh religioznykh obshchestvakh, molitvennykh 
pomesheniiakh i sluzhitel'iakh kul'tov po Tadzhikskoi SSR’, (28 June 1954), pp. 21-22.  
19
 Seven of the khatibs had a higher level religious education, twelve had secondary and six had primary. 
Two of the imams had intermediate and seven had just a primary level of religious education. Two of the 
shaykhs had intermediate or middle and three had primary level. Only one of the khatibs had completed 
primary level general state education, compared to eight of the imams who had primary and one who had 
reached secondary level state secular education. Three of the shaykhs also had primary level secular 
education. See statistics about the registered religious society, buildings and their staff; see BMDJT, f. 1569, 
op.1 ed. xr. 47, d. 1, (16 February 1956), pp. 42-43. 
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kinds of clergy’ and as shaykhs of Muslim shrines.20 The majority of these khatibs and 
ordinary imoms were reported to have reached secondary, and some even higher, levels of 
religious education.
21
 As the figures in the box below show, the numbers of registered 
mosques had increased to 33 in 1957. 43 religious figures, including 28 khatibs, 10 
ordinary imoms and 5 shaykhs were serving in these mosques. There were 13 khatibs with 
secondary, and 5 with a primary level religious education. One more ordinary imom had 
completed intermediate level religious education. The level of state secular education 
among the clergy remained unchanged.
22
 
Box: 2 Registered Mosques and Religious Figures in the Tajik SSR 
Year Mosques 
Nos. 
of 
clergy 
Types of registered 
clergy 
Educational Level 
Religious 
Education 
Secular 
Education 
khatibs imoms shaykhs 
pri
23
 
sec s pri sec h 
1954 26 35 12 19 4 7 23 5 3   
1955 29 39 25 9 5 16 16 7 12 1  
1956 30 41 26 10 5 14 14 8 11   
1957 33 43 28 10 5 5 22 8 11   
1960 20 51 20 12 19
24
  30 21 26 11  
 
According to the statistical report of the CARC commissioner in the Tajik SSR by 1960 
there were 92 registered staff in 20 registered mosques in the republic. 10 prayer houses or 
                                                          
20
 This is another cause of confusion in the terms and position of clergy within the mosques that appear in the 
statistical report of the CARC representatives. 
21
 In that year, 12 of these khatibs were estimated to have higher and 6 secondary level religious education. 
Among the imams or muazzins, 2 had intermediate and 8 primary level religious education. Only one of the 
khatibs, but 9 imams and 3 shaykhs had reached the primary level of general state education. See BMDJT, f. 
1569, op. 1. ed. khr. 47, d. 1, (26 July 1956), pp. 13-16. 
22
 BMDJT, f. 1569, op. 1, ed. khr. 56, d. 1, (28 July 1957), pp.5-6. 
23
 (pri) stands for primary level education; (sec) for secondary or intermediate education and (h) for the 
higher level education  
24
 Adapted from statistical reports for the years 1954 to 1960. See the reports by the CARC commissioner in 
Tajik SSR in the collection of the Upolnomochennyi soveta po delam religii pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR po 
Tadzhikskoi SSR in BMDJT, f. 1569, op. 1, (1944-1962). 
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mosques were closed in 1960 and there were a further 230 that were not used in the Tajik 
SSR. There were 20 imom khatibs, 12 serving as ordinary imoms, and 19 described as sufis 
in the registered mosques.
25
  
As can be seen from the analysis of this statistical report, there were no Sunni Muslim 
clergy with primary level religious education, and a significant number were categorised 
with higher and intermediate levels of religious education. In comparison to previous years 
the numbers of the imom-khatibs, the ordinary imoms who had attained secondary level of 
secular education increased by 1961.
26
 While these figures indicate the educational levels 
of the various kinds of religious figures, they do not reveal much about how these levels 
were defined.
27
 Was it the religious figures themselves who defined their level of education 
or the commissioner who categorised it according to the specially designed forms? Since 
most of the graduates of the Mir Arab madrasa were sent to serve in the registered 
mosques, it was likely that the educational levels were also defined in the 1960s based on 
their studies at this madrasa.  
By the end of the period under study quite a significant number of registered religious 
figures such as the staff of the qoziyot, the imom-khatibs and ordinary imoms of the 
seventeen registered mosques in the former Tajik SSR were students and graduates of the 
Mir Arab madrasa and Tashkent Islamic Institute. For instance, the long-serving qozi of 
Tajikistan, Kalonov Abdullojon, from Leninobod province, completed his studies in the 
Mir Arab madrasa six years before being appointed as a qozi and representative of 
SADUM in the Tajik SSR. He replaced the qozi Abdulmajid Yusupov.
28
 Hoji Akbar 
                                                          
25
 See BMDJT, f. 1516, op. 1, ed. xr. 41, d. 1, (28 February 1961), p. 64. 
26
 It appears that in their reports the upolnomochennye did not clarify these titles, as in some statistical reports 
registered clergy serving in mosques are described as imom-khatibs, mutawallis, ishans, and others in some 
as khatibs, imoms and sufis. 
27
 The statistical forms were provided by the council to the upolnomochennye in the republics and oblasts to 
provide detailed information about the backgrounds of religious figures. See for instance, Islam in the Soviet 
Union, pp. 243-253 and also Eren Tasar, ‘Soviet and Muslim: The Institutionalisation of Islam in Central 
Asia, 1943-1991’, pp. 143-146. 
28
 At the meeting of the SADUM presidium in 1961, Yusupov was criticized for not carrying out the 
instructions of the SADUM. He was blamed for not preaching about SADUM’s fatwas in mosques and was 
occupied with his family due to his old age. He was also criticized for not speaking sufficient Arabic and 
Russian which were important for establishing links with foreign countries. This qozi therefore was 
considered inappropriate for the contemporary demands of SADUM’s work and hence removed. Abdullojon 
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Turajonzoda, who served as the last qozi of the Tajik SSR from 1988 to 1991, also 
undertook his studies first in Mir Arab madrasa, then in the Islamic Institute of Tashkent 
and finally graduated with a degree from a university in Amman, Jordan.
29
 Several other 
well-known religious figures from the Tajik SSR followed the same educational and career 
path, by first studying at these two centres, then abroad and returning to serve in the 
registered mosques in the Tajik SSR.
30
 
Students accepted that they should study at these official institutions for the purpose of 
learning Islam; however they received their first religious training in illegal, private family 
and separate circles known as hujra-based schools. In 1975, the admission commission at 
Mir Arab madrasa found that 88 out of the 98 candidates applying for the academic year 
1975-76 showed a good knowledge of Arabic and knew some verses of the Qur’an by 
heart. To the question posed by the admission commission as to who had taught them 
Arabic and Qur’an, 88 students replied that they were taught by their grandfathers and 
parents, neighbours and religious figures. Eight students replied that they had learned it 
independently. When asked what motivated these candidates to apply to the Mir Arab 
madrasa, 94 of them replied that they had applied because of their ‘personal interest and 
religious belief and the insistence of their parents’. Only 3 of these candidates replied that 
they were motivated by a) ‘a passion and drive to learn the Arabic language, about the 
people of the Middle East’, b) ‘a wish to know more about Muslim people’, and c) ‘a 
desire to understand the words of Qur’an as the Soviet Muslim must understand the law of 
the shari‘a correctly’.31 
While a limited number of youth from Sunni Muslim families from the Tajik SSR had the 
opportunity to study at these official centres, a relatively larger number were encompassed 
by the informal circles of learning. Regarding the Ismaili khalifas in Gorno-Badakhshan, it 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Kalonov was considered an appropriate person for this position due to his skills, studying at the Mir Arab 
madrasa and working as a SADUM-appointed muhosib (accountant) in the Samarqand and Bukhara 
provinces of the Uzbek SSR and later teaching at the Mir Arab madrasa. See BMDJT. f. 1516, op. 1, ed. xr. 
95, d. 9, (11 December 1961), p. 1. 
29
 See Tim Epkenhans, ‘Institutions of Islamic Learning in Tajikistan’, in Michael Kemper and Stephan 
Reichmuth, ed., Islamic Education in the Soviet Union and its Successor States (London, 2010), p. 318.  
30
 See Abdullo Rahnamo, ‘Chastnoe religioznoe obrazovanie v Tadzhikistane. Sovremennoe polozhenie 
problem i vyvody’ available at http://islamnews.tj  
31
 See GARF, f. 6991, op. 6, d. 736, (25 September 1975), p. 5. 
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was reported that none of them had a higher level of religious education in the post-Second 
World War period. This was due to the differences in the teachings of Shi‘a Ismaili 
Muslims from the curriculum prepared by the Sunni SADUM teachers and scholars for the 
Mir Arab madrasa and later at Tashkent Islamic Institute. The registered Ismaili khalifas in 
Gorno-Badakhshan with secondary level religious education in the 1950s had reportedly 
attained this level in the traditional maktabs prior to the establishment of the Soviet 
Union.
32
 In his presentation to the meetings of the CARC commissioners in Tashkent, 
Mirzobek Bodurov, pointed out that only 11 out of 174 Ismaili religious figures in Gorno-
Badakhshan were able to read Arabic and had a good understanding of some of the Ismaili 
teachings. The rest of the religious figures, according to Bodurov, were illiterate, and had 
some knowledge of the oral performance of some of the Ismaili rituals as a formality. He 
concluded in his presentation that: 
Due to the change in the ideology and in the minds of the Soviet people, including the people of 
Pamir, religion and religious practice will disappear by themselves. Belief in religion will decline. 
Hence, the demand for religious figures will decrease.
33
  
From the bureaucratic position of the CARC commissioner, deliberately portraying the low 
level of religious knowledge among the religious figures in Gorno-Badakhshan was a 
convenient way of highlighting the weakening role of religion in society as a whole. In this 
case, the CARC commissioner in Gorno-Badakhshan, like many of his colleagues in other 
parts of the Soviet Union, downplayed the information on religious figures and the level of 
religiosity in Gorno-Badakhshan for a specific audience, the council.
34
  
Research on Islamic education in the Uzbek SSR, where the two official religious 
institutions operated in the Soviet period, also highlight the fact that significant numbers of 
students spent time at these institutions simply in order to obtain official certificates and 
diplomas. However, these students had received better religious education in the private 
milieu of the hujra type of schools. In addition, the teaching curriculum at these official 
centres for studying religion was dominated by secular subjects and the modules taught in 
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universities in some Middle Eastern countries.
35
 This argument indicates that the quality of 
teaching in the official religious centres may not have been higher than what was taught in 
the family and hujra type of schools. The dramatic growth of the Muslim population and 
the need for religious experts in turn rendered these two official centres unable to cope 
with the demands for religious cadres. It can thus be seen that the private and illegal 
family-based teaching did not merely provide students with a primary background in 
religious teaching, but also gave rise to more advanced and different types of clandestine 
schooling in this period. 
5.2. Private and Underground Religious Teaching 
When I spoke at a conference on Islam in 1996, they asked me from which higher Arabic (Islamic 
institute) I had graduated. I replied: ‘az madrasai olii tag-tagi podvalhoyi Dushanbe’, (From the higher 
level madrasa in the basement rooms of Dushanbe city).
36
 
Private learning survived during the years of persecution in the 1930s and came above 
ground with the concession to religious activity from the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s. The 
religious teachers adapted their activity very quickly to the new repressive measures 
against religion authorised by the Soviet leader Khrushchev from 1959 to 1964 by going 
underground. It was therefore not so much the concession, but also the strict measures 
against religion from 1959 to 1964, the shortage of official centres for religious learning, as 
well as the demographic changes in places like the Tajik SSR, that together created 
favourable conditions for the rise of underground teaching.  
It is difficult to establish the dates of origin and the number of private and informal 
teaching circles in the Tajik SSR as the data on religious teaching is not provided 
accurately in the archival documents. Instances when registered and unregistered ishans 
and domullos organised separate teaching circles were considered as violations of the 
Soviet legislation on religion. In the years of moderate religious policy, three attempts to 
organise religious schools, apart from the Mir Arab madrasa, were rejected in 1947 by the 
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officials.
37
 In an internal memorandum sent in 1955 by the CARC commissioner in the 
Tajik SSR to the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party it was reported that there were 40 registered mosques in the Tajik SSR. It 
was also mentioned in this memorandum that the influence of religion was high as 
religious activity had increased among the population. Significant numbers of unregistered 
religious figures such as ishan Bobojon, in the kolkhoz named after Lenin around the city 
of Stalinobod (present-day Dushanbe), had about three thousand murids. Another ishan, 
Hamidjon, in the Hissor district, reportedly had two thousands murids. In 1953 ishan 
Hamidjon organised religious schools teaching the Qur’an and the basics of the shari‘a.38 
Cases of clandestine religious instruction for small groups of children were also uncovered 
in 1962 in Hissor and Regar districts and in the cities of Leninobod and Qurghonteppa.
39
 
These instances are just a few examples of the spread of private religious teaching from the 
family milieu into independent circles. 
These separate circles of teaching drew more students through the ties of relatives, teachers 
and students. Since Islamic maktabs and the madrasa ceased to exist by 1950s the 
generation born at that period received their education in family schools. By the mid-1950s 
and early 1960s after they had completed secondary state education, they were free to 
leave home. It was after this that young people aged fifteen or above could join the circles 
that had emerged. These learning and teaching circles were initially organised by elderly 
religious figures, some of whom even received their education prior to the establishment of 
the Soviet regime. Thus, from the mid-1950s, underground religious teaching shifted from 
a primary level, limited to the basic knowledge of Islamic principles and the Arabic script, 
to the next or intermediate level of studying specific subjects according to the curriculum 
set out by the teachers themselves. The intermediate level of study in these circles provided 
the basis for an advanced or higher level of study of a specific branch of Islamic education, 
literature, the Qur’an or fiqh (jurisprudence) under specialist teachers. 
Private religious teaching developed throughout the 1970s, in size, content and form, with 
the emergence of more advanced, relatively higher level underground circles in the capital 
city of Dushanbe and in other highly populated towns and districts of the Tajik SSR. 
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During the field research for this study thesis I interviewed 10 individuals who joined the 
informal hujra school from the age of 15, and in their youth, had had to travel to other 
parts of the Tajik SSR and even to the Uzbek SSR to study religious subjects under a 
known domullo. Several informants mentioned that they continued to study for more than 
ten years, learning different religious subjects under different teachers in the hujras.
40
 
The organisers of illegal private schools, if discovered by the officials and especially the 
staff of the KGB, had to face punishment according to the law. For instance, in 1971 a 
mullo and another individual were put on trial. It was discovered that they had organised a 
school for 22 children in a private house in one of the villages in Leninobod province in 
the north of Tajik SSR. They were both sentenced for three years in prison. Another 
unregistered mullo in the Karl Marx kolkhoz in the Qurghon-Teppa province organised a 
school in a private home for 18 students from whom he received tuition fees. These 
students were from the city of Qurghon-Teppa, and its nearby districts of Wakhsh and 
Shaartuz. In 1982, 20 such schools, some with as much as about 50 students, were reported 
as functioning in the Tajik SSR. Their number increased in subsequent years.
41
 This 
evidence again pointed to the flourishing of private and informal religious teaching. From 
the 1960s to the late 1980s two of these kinds of teaching circles in Dushanbe were 
attracting students from all over the Tajik SSR for higher-level Islamic education. 
One of these religious schools among the Sunni population was organised by Abd al-
Rashid Musobekov (Musobekzoda) (1883-1978) who served as the qozi of the Tajik SSR 
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from 1951 to 1958.
42
 Another such type of teaching circle was formed by Muhammadjon 
Rustamov known as Mawlawi Hindustoni (1892-1989). Both of these Sunni religious 
figures migrated to the Tajik SSR from Uzbek SSR in the years after the Second World 
War and organised private teaching schools in Dushanbe.
43
  
The spread of religious teaching in the capital city, towns, and other urban and modernised 
areas of the Tajik SSR, contradicted the official Soviet view that Islam had a strong 
presence only in rural areas.
44
 This argument stemmed from the fact that the larger portion 
of the Muslim population lived in the rural areas of the Tajik SSR. New Soviet-built cities 
such as Dushanbe were considered places with a modern style of life rather than the 
traditional one as found in rural areas. In contrast to these interpretations of Islam in Soviet 
sources, religious views were widely spread among the urban population, especially the 
intelligentsia, party careerists and bureaucrats. Significant numbers of the urban population 
were attending mosques; some members of the Communist party were even participated in 
shrine pilgrimages. Many instances were reported where heads of party units, officials and 
the intelligentsia made no effort to propagate atheism. Some of the religious scholars were 
employed in the newly established Oriental research institutes in the capital cities in 
Central Asia and the Caucasus. Although working in the subordinate positions of language 
teacher and keeper of the Islamic manuscript collections, these scholars produced a 
significant amount of unpublished catalogues in these centres. 
45
 As can be noticed in the 
case of the Tajik SSR, the department of Oriental studies hosted students and researchers, 
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many of whom had received a prior religious education, reading Islamic texts in Arabic 
and Persian with their families. The known intellectual, Muhammadjon Hindustoni who 
studied in the madrasas of Bukhara and India in the early Soviet period, also worked for 
some years at the department, which later became the Institute of Oriental Studies and 
Written Legacy of the Academy of Sciences of the Tajik SSR. He was appointed a teacher 
of Urdu and expert in classical manuscripts.
46
  
In the 1950s, researchers from the Institutes of Oriental Studies in Leningrad, Tashkent and 
Dushanbe organised an expedition to collect and catalogue the Islamic manuscripts 
preserved by the families of the ishans, khalifas, domullos, okhons and other individuals. 
One of the examples of this kind of research into Islamic heritage was the systematic 
collection of manuscripts among the Ismaili population in the Gorno-Badakhshan 
Autonomous Oblast from 1959 to 1961. Facsimiles of 186 different manuscripts (a total 
253 copies including 67 duplicates) were submitted to the library of the Institute of 
Oriental Studies in Dushanbe for cataloguing. This kind of research also suggests how 
religious literature was preserved and transmitted through kotibi (copying) to the next 
generation of students in private religious schools. Soviet Orientalist researchers, non-
Muslims and those titled ‘co-opted Muslim researcher’ produced extensive literary studies 
based on these manuscripts.
47
 
5.3. Migration and the Changing Religious Milieu in the Tajik SSR 
In order to understand the development of religious teaching in urban and newly-developed 
areas, it is important to look at the internal migration process in the Tajik SSR. Internal 
migration radically altered the ethnic and demographic composition of the republic’s 
population. As a result of forced internal and external migration motivated by the 
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development of the cotton industry, the less populated broad valleys of the southern Tajik 
SSR turned into densely populated industrial and agricultural areas.
48
 
The forced internal migrations also changed the religious landscape of the country, 
resulting in an increasing exchange and competition between the officially appointed and 
the unregistered religious personnel, especially the Sufi leaders. Dudoignon refers to the 
rivalry between two kinds of religious figures, the Tajik-speaking highlanders who were 
linked to learning centres in Bukhara and Samarqand, and the Uzbek-speaking lowlanders 
who originated from the Fergana Valley.
49
 These changes in the religious landscape were 
mainly experienced by the Sunni Muslim majority. However, as a result of mass migration, 
groups of the Ismaili minority were also moved from their traditional homelands and 
settled among other ethnic and religious groups in various districts of the Wakhsh Valley 
in the current Khatlon province of Tajikistan.
50
 
Shortly after the creation of the Tajik SSR, the Soviet government planned to develop an 
irrigation system and cotton industry in plains such as the Wakhsh Valley. Starting in the 
mid-1920s the population of the mountainous areas of Qarotegin and Darwoz were forcibly 
resettled in this valley, primarily to develop the cotton industry. This phase of migration 
was not successful as only 30% of the original 56,000 remained in the new areas, the rest 
returned home or moved into other places. The forcible resettlement of the populations of 
the mountain areas of Gharm, Kulob and Gorno-Badakhshan continued from 1925 to 1941 
with the transfer of 48,700 families into the Wakhsh Valley. Between 1942 and 1947 some 
20,000 more households were transferred to the lowlands of Wakhsh. From 1947 to 1960, 
the Soviet government forcibly moved the inhabitants of remote villages in the Gorno-
Badakhshan and Kulob to this area. On the whole, during the 1950s the Soviet government 
resettled over 100,000 people in this valley, which radically changed the demography and 
ethnic composition of the population of the Qurghonteppa region. As mentioned, migrants, 
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mainly Tajiks from mountain areas, some Uzbeks from the Fergana Valley, Russians, 
Germans and other nationalities composed 90% of the population in 1980. The remaining 
population of the region was composed of the indigenous Laqay, Kungrat and Uzbek 
inhabitants.
51
 Within this context of settlement in the Wakhsh Valley from the 1950s to the 
end of the Soviet era it is important to examine how the immigrant population practiced 
and understood their religion while living among various other populations.  
The analysis of the kind of religious practice and education that existed among the 
population of the mountain areas prior to their migration to new settlements reveals 
important details of the history of religious life at this period. As mentioned above, in the 
years of repression in the 1930s, significant numbers of religious figures fled to 
neighbouring countries, especially Afghanistan. Some took refuge in other parts of 
Tajikistan, and some spent years underground. According to the information provided by 
the CARC commissioner for the Gharm province, there were about 350 mosques and 25 
madrasas, and the same number of maktabs until 1930.
52
 Hundreds of mullos, ishans and 
khalifas were training students in these madrasas and maktabs. In the absence of other 
archival sources at the present stage it is impossible to judge the accuracy of these figures 
about religious schools and clergy. What these numbers figures reveal though is that 
religious education was well developed among the population of the former Gharm Oblast 
(Qarotegin Valley) prior to the establishment of the Soviet regime in this region. Of the 
thirty-seven great and influential ishans living in the region prior to 1930, only two 
remained in 1950, and had no influence among the population. None of the maktabs and 
madrasas were functioning by the end of 1930s. The various ishans, mullos and religious 
figures had left the territory of Gharm and Qarotegin, and lived with the transferred 
population in the Wakhsh Valley. As for the mosque buildings, most of them fell into ruin 
except for six buildings, which were used as storehouses.
53
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Life in the new densely populated areas seemed to create more favourable conditions for 
the development of private religious teaching. Migrants from the same districts, villages 
and neighbourhoods, were often settled together in these new areas. This resettlement of 
migrants based on regional and ethnic affiliation strengthened the strong sense of 
belonging to a particular regional group rather than to family or other lineage. For decades 
migrants such as Gharmis, Kulobis and Badakhshanis living in the Wakhsh Valley 
remained attached to their regional identities.
54
 The migrant groups from these regions 
attempted to preserve their differences both from each other and from the local inhabitants. 
While it appeared that regional geography played an important role for the migrants’ sense 
of identity in the new settlements, the boundaries of religious identity were very much 
shaped by the activity and influence of the individual religious figures among the Sunni 
Muslims, including the Sufi ishans.
55
  
Regarding the Ismaili minority who had migrated from Gorno-Badakhshan, it appears that 
they maintained their distinct religious identity through the performance of specific 
religious rituals, led by selected khalifas. Few khalifas functioned among the Pamiri 
Ismailis in the districts of Qumsangir, Kolkhozobod, Jilikul and the city of Qurghon-
Teppa. These khalifas gave religious instruction to their own sons and the children of 
relatives and friends. The most notable khalifas were Murodbekov Sultonaidar and 
Jannatov Shermuhammad in the district of Qumsangir. In the Soviet period, the Ismailis 
together with other migrants from Gorno-Badakhshan formed a special brigade to work in 
a kolkhoz named after Lenin in Qumsangir. This kolkhoz provided the Pamiri brigade with 
their own plot of land and a store-room, which they later turned into a choi-khona (tea-
house). This was then turned into a jamo’at-khona in 1991.56 In the district of Jilikul, the 
most notable religious figure among the Ismailis was Shohhusaynov Fakhriddinsho who 
taught Arabic and Qur’anic recitation to both Ismaili and Sunni children. Fakhriddinsho 
was the son of an Ismaili pir, Shoh Husayn from the Rushan district. In the 1930s together 
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with his brother Sayidzamonidin he fled from Soviet territory to Afghanistan. In 1960 he 
crossed back to the Soviet Union.
57
 After being interrogated by the KGB for some time, 
Fakhriddinsho was allowed to live in the territory of the Tajik SSR. He first worked as a 
guard in the Hissor district. Later on, at the request of the Pamiri chairman of a kolkhoz, 
Fakhriddinsho was brought to the Jilikul district to serve as an Ismaili khalifa. 
Fakhriddinsho’s knowledge of the Qur’an, Islamic subjects and Persian allowed him to 
establish himself as a religious teacher among both Sunnis and Ismailis.
58
 As mentioned 
above, it was first in the 1930s and then in the 1950s that some of the population from 
Gorno-Badahshan were transferred to the Wakhsh Valley. From one document it can be 
established that by 1931 there was a group of Ismailis living in the city of Qurghonteppa 
and that they organised a religious community. A person named Mirzo Qoim collected 
zakot of around 500 rubles from them to be delivered to the court of Aga Khan III. By his 
farmon of 20 March-18
 
April 1931, Aga Khan III appointed Khodja Mumin as the head of 
the Ismaili community of Qurghonteppa.
59
 
The social setting in Wakhsh Valley seemed to offer more opportunities and space for 
religious activity than the isolated, narrow and less populated mountain villages. The new 
settlements in the Wakhsh Valley, especially the kolkhozes and their sub-divisions, the 
brigade, were formed based on traditional solidarity groupings, the clans and fellow 
villagers. For instance, migrants from Gorno-Badakhshan had their own separate brigade 
within a kolkhoz dominated by people from Qarotegin in the Qumsangir district. Kolkhozes 
were also composed on the basis of a particular ethnic group such as Germans, Koreans, 
and Russians living in neighbouring posiolkas (villages). It was this creation of new 
solidarity groups with their own particular territories, administrative buildings, offices, 
teahouses and factories that provided spaces for religious activity. It has been noted that 
this kind of settlement, with its regional and ethnic composition, resulted in various groups 
preserving their separate identity and cultural practices. Religious activity was not 
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restricted to the territories of these kolkhozes and posyolkas; a Tajik mullo from one 
kolkhoz attracted an audience even among the Laqay (Uzbek), Turkmen, Arab tribes living 
in other districts. This kind of development was a peculiar characteristic of Sufi 
brotherhoods in Central Asia designed to attract followers, and to create networks of pirs 
and murids, despite differences in their nationality and locations.
60
 
The new administrative and territorial centres in the Wakhsh Valley placed various groups 
and nationalities in one settlement, and provided space for work on a common piece of 
land or in cotton-cleaning plants, avtobaza (haulage companies), as well as in schools, 
libraries, kindergartens, or places of rest like choi-khonas. These entities, especially choi-
khona, offered a comfortable milieu for religious activity, debates, and even for teaching. It 
was in some of the buildings in these avtobazas, cotton plants and other work places, that 
underground religious teaching evolved. In 1957 the CARC commissioner in the Tajik 
SSR reported that some kolkhozes had their own reasons for creating conditions for 
religious activity within their territories: 
In many districts of the republic, (Tajikistan) there were small village mosques, which had been used 
as the storage buildings of the kolkhozes up to three years ago. In recent years, the administration of 
the kolkhozes decided to not use these buildings as storage and gave them to the group that gathers 
for prayer (namoz). The administrations of the kolkhozes are concerned that the believers should not 
waste their time travelling to pray in mosques located some distance away.
61
 
In the same report it was mentioned that by December 1957 there were 33 registered 
mosques and five mazors in the republic. The CARC commissioner in the republic 
acknowledged that he could not provide an appropriate estimate of the hundreds of 
unregistered religious figures. The reason for the activity of the unregistered figures and 
illegal gatherings for prayer was that the majority of the population had no opportunity to 
attend registered mosques. In the absence of registered mosques people prayed in small 
groups during the celebrations of Id-i Qurbon and Id-i Ramazon, in unregistered mosques 
in their villages and in open fields. In many cases daily or weekend prayer and the 
celebration of large festivals, were observed during busy seasonal work. Winter was 
mentioned as a favourable time of the year for believers to come together for prayer, 
discussion of religious themes and teaching religion to children. The other places used as 
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prayer-houses were the mehmon-khonas in the evenings, especially during ruza, believers 
invited guests for discussion, listened to the radio and read newspapers. According to this 
report, the majority of the unregistered religious figures, the ishans and mullos, were in 
Stalinabad (Dushanbe) and its surrounding areas, such as in the former Kuktosh district. 
They had followers, especially among the local Laqays living in the valleys, hills and auls 
(villages). Religion had a strong presence among the laqays as some of them were teaching 
Arabic and the basics of Islam to their children. There were 20 unregistered religious 
groups in the Regar district, some of which had special prayer rooms, and mehmon-khonas. 
More of these groups were to be found in the Hissor district, eight in Kolkhozobod and in 
Panj, and 13 in the Shaartuz district, all located in the Wakhsh Valley. Nine of these 
unregistered religious figures operated in Orjonikidzeobod district.
62
 
Unregistered figures, groups and prayer houses, also existed in other districts of the 
republic, especially in the places where registered mosques did not exist. The imoms 
leading prayer and other rituals in unofficial mosques were selected by believers, rather 
than appointed by the office of the qoziyot of the Tajik SSR. The existence of most the 
non-registered religious figures in the capital city, their gathering in the mehmon-khonas 
itself suggest that favourable conditions also existed for religious activity in the 
industrialised cities. An analysis of the religious situation in different settlements suggests 
that it was difficult for the Soviet government to regulate religious activities in the cities 
and towns with larger populations. In contrast it was perhaps more easier for local 
bureaucrats and party members to keep an eye on or prevent illegal religious activity in the 
less populated rural villages in the regions of Gharm, Kulob and Gorno-Badakhshan. 
One of the main changes in the religious landscape caused by migration and socio-
economic development in the Tajik SSR was the expansion of the religious networks, such 
as the link between the religious figures and their followers. Another change in the 
religious landscape was the spread of religious teaching through the networks of teachers 
and students. In the mid-1950s, dozens of family-based and hujra circles appeared in the 
Wakhsh Valley and other highly populated areas of Tajikistan. Religious schools were 
organised in the Wakhsh Valley by Mullo Jurai Zargari and Dommullo Safarali in the city 
of Qurghonteppa, and by Eshoni Abdulhayi Chughdabiyoni, Eshoni Mahmadsayid, Eshoni 
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Nosihiddin, Akhmadkhoja and Azizkhoja in other places.
63
 Sufi tariqa-based teachings 
were organised in the area of Khoja Obi Gharm by Eshoni Abdurahmonjon.
64
 Another 
famous place where underground religious teaching flourished at this period was the 
posiolka of Yuzhniy in the suburbs of Dushanbe. 
65
 Private lessons were also taught by 
Makhdumi Tojiddin in Orjonikidzeobod (present Wahdat) district; by Domullo 
Muhammadsharif in Hisor, and Domullo Muhammadyusuf in the Yowon district. Several 
other religious figures, such as Makhdumi Sangi Kulula, Mullo Khujam, Mullo Loyiq and 
Makhdumi Abdulqodir, taught students in the Sunni-populated Kulob region. Another 
known religious teacher Eshoni Shaykh taught in the Elok village in the Faizobod 
district.
66
 There were also dozens of private religious schools in the northern region of 
Leninobod. Listing the names of teachers teaching in certain parts of Dushanbe and its 
surroundings, however, does not mean that teachers, students and circles always operated 
in the same area. As the former students and teachers of these underground circles 
revealed, they often had to change rooms or stop lessons to keep one step ahead of the 
authorities and especially the KGB. The changes in the location of the schools were also 
related to the migration of a domullo from one area to another. In this case students from 
other places needed to stay illegally in the place where the teachers were organising 
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informal schools. This was a form of illegal migration in the context of the Tajik SSR, 
where internal migration for the purpose of education and jobs was allocated and 
controlled by the state. 
5.4. Teaching Curriculum 
As shown above, unofficial religious teaching became a widespread phenomenon among 
the Muslim population of the Tajik SSR living in both rural and urban areas. It attracted 
students from the various strata of the population including the intelligentsia, members of 
the kolkhozes, the children of Soviet officials and Communist party members. Apart from 
tracing the development of religious teaching, there is a need to understand the means and 
tools through which knowledge of Islam was passed from the older to the younger 
generation. What were the main sources and resources which enabled private family and 
separate hujra-based schools to function? To answer this fundamental question it is 
important to examine the content of teaching or kind of curriculum used in private and 
secret schools. 
Within a family, the first stage of teaching involved the Arabic alphabet, a basic 
understanding of religion from introductory textbooks, and learning duos (prayers) by 
heart. An understanding of adab (manner) was also a requirement for teaching and 
bringing up a person according to the Muslim way of life. Learning Islam in this way was 
not an innovation of the Muslim clergy in this period, but a continuation of what had been 
taught in maktabs prior to their abolition in the 1920s. Learning in maktabs across Central 
Asia started with the repetition and memorisation of letters, basic arithmetic and an 
acquisition of adab. It was then followed by the memorisation of books called Haftyak, 
Chahor Kitob (introductory books of Arabic grammar), and examples of classical Persian 
literature. This was the main kind of curriculum through which ‘ilm (knowledge) turned 
into ta‘lim (teaching) in the maktab.  
Religious knowledge was also transmitted through various forms of oral recitation often 
accompanied by musical performances of devotional poetry, qasidas and maddohs.
67
 The 
books, which dominated the maktab curriculum in Central Asia for centuries, were 
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certainly not included in any subjects taught at Soviet-established secular primary schools. 
Nevertheless, examples of classical Persian literature featured in the new textbooks, 
especially those sections that emphasised adab. When analysing the context of education 
in the Soviet period, it would therefore be appropriate not only to compare the changes or 
differences, but also the similarities in the methods and content of learning and teaching in 
the Soviet secular schools with that of Islamic maktabs and madrasas. 
Changes in the traditional ways of learning and teaching knowledge for the Muslim 
population in the Soviet period can therefore be explained by a) the disappearance of the 
Islamic maktabs and madrasas as institutions of learning; and b) the appearance of new 
secular schools. It can also be explained by the replacement of the old curriculum with the 
new subjects of history, literature and science that propagated the scientific and atheist 
worldview in an attempt to remove religious views and ways of upbringing from a 
student’s mind. Nevertheless, in many cases, teachers working at Soviet elementary 
schools secretly taught the Arabic alphabet and religious books to their children daughters 
and sons and other close relatives at home.
68
 In this way the teachers played the double 
role of teaching both the secular curriculum and transmitting religious knowledge in 
private. Examples of elementary books explaining parts of the Qur’an, and Islamic prayers 
and rituals, were preserved by the families of religious figures and other learned 
individuals. The domullos and okhons, and the kotibs-masters of calligraphy mainly 
reproduced copies of these books. Printed religious literature emerged later with copies 
sold secretly and smuggled by those who travelled abroad. Learning from the 
aforementioned religious books, lasted in a family milieu approximately from the ages of 
seven to fourteen, parallel to the time when students completed their study at state schools 
at grade seven or eight. 
The next stage of religious teaching in a separate hujra included the continuation of the 
initial knowledge received in the family milieu. Studying in circles or hujras started with 
learning basic Arabic grammar, and an explanation of the meaning of prayers and other 
simple texts. It further proceeded by teaching advanced Arabic grammar like Qofiya 
(upper-intermediate or higher level of Arabic grammar) and Sharhi Mullo (a commentary 
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on Arabic grammar). It was also at this level that students started to study the interpretation 
and commentaries of hadith and certain Qur’anic verses. Learning at this stage lasted 
usually one to five or more years under an independent teacher. The most advanced stage 
of religious schools in that period appeared in the mid-1960s in the form of teaching circles 
organised by two leading religious figures: Qozi Abd al-Rashid Musabikzoda 
(Musobekzoda, Musobekov) and Muhammadjon Rustamov known as Mawlawi 
Hindustoni.  
Studies in the circle or assembly of these two well-known teachers lasted for more than ten 
years for some students. Qozi Abd al-Rashid, as most of his students recall, mainly taught 
the mas’alahoi fiqh (issues of jurisprudence). This however does not mean that students 
were not also studying these subjects in the hujra schools of Mawlawi Hindustoni. His 
teaching curriculum was a combination of various theological and scholarly textbooks 
including hadith, lectures on the Qur’an, and textbooks such as Fiqh al-akhbar, Aqidat al-
nasafi, Mantiq (logic), adab, ethics expressed in classical Persian literature, Islamic 
cosmology, narrative history and medicine.
69
According to his former students, 
Hindustoni’s teaching curriculum was distinguished by a focus on mas’alahoi adabiyot wa 
zabon (issues of language and literature) and mantiq (logic); his expertise lay in Qur’anic 
commentary, interpretation of Persian poetry, and particularly the sophisticated poems of 
Mirzo Abd al-Qadir Bedil (1644-1721). Qozi Abd al-Rashid came with an educational 
background from madrasas of Central Asia (Qoqand and Bukhara). Hindustoni received 
his initial religious education in Qoqand and Bukhara and then studied in madrasas in 
Afghanistan and India. The differences in the educational backgrounds of these two figures 
were obviously later reflected in the way they developed curricula for their students. As 
has been pointed out, Qozi Abd al-Rashid criticized and opposed the teaching curriculum 
of Hindustoni, especially the teaching of didactic and gnostic literature and secular 
(dunyawi) issues.
70
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5.5. Religious Teaching among the Ismailis in Gorno-Badakhshan 
The reports by the CARC later CRA commissioners in Gorno-Badakhshan do not indicate 
that there were any legal proceedings against clerics and believers involved in religious 
teaching. Apart from referring to some religious literature possessed by the khalifas and 
mullos, there is no information on religious teaching in the archival reports from 1950 to 
1991. This absence of records on religious education in the archival sources does not mean, 
however, that this phenomenon had ceased among the population of the oblast in the 
period under study. As my interviews revealed there were dozens of individuals, including 
those defined in these archival documents as unregistered okhons and a few bibiotuns, who 
were teaching religion to their own and to their relatives’ children at this time. 
The tradition of transmitting religious knowledge thus continued in individual families 
who claimed to be from the awlod (clan) of sayyids, pirs, and other groups of clergy. 
Religious teaching in Gorno-Badakshhan, however, did not spread beyond the domestic 
space, as happened in other provinces of the Tajik SSR. The teaching activities, methods 
and literature within the family schools in the Ismaili-populated areas of Gorno-
Badakhshan were quite similar to each other. Significant changes were not introduced in 
the subjects or books studied. What made religious learning in this period different from 
the traditional ways of learning in the maktab was its clandestine nature, with lessons 
mainly conducted during the evening hours. One informant, who completed all the stages 
of Islamic learning within the family environment, described his experience as follows: 
These maktabs existed mainly among the families of sayyids and other groups of clergy. They 
continued to function from 1950 to the 1970s and even until now. Anyone who wanted his children 
to learn in this type of school would take them to the okhon, then he received a fotiha
71
 according to 
the sunnat (tradition) to enter into the religious school. This ceremony was called ‘fotihayi ba 
maktab dokhil shudan’ (prayer to enter the school). For instance, if a man had five children and he 
wanted one to study religion, he had to take him to the okhon for a fotiha. After this the child stayed 
with the teacher and they secretly started learning. Teaching was mainly conducted in a family 
school after the harvest and during the winter time. The teaching would continue as long as it took 
the student to complete the study programme. Some students completed the subjects in one winter, 
some studied for three winters, depending on the aptitude of the shogird (student). The usual age to 
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start studying in a family school was seven years old and above. Usually there were 2-3 children at a 
time receiving sabaq (lesson) in a family school.
72
 
This description of how learning started and lasted in a family milieu by an informant who 
seems to have completed all stages of learning reveals the typical process of learning in a 
traditional Islamic milieu. Although confined to the family context, the study of Islam was 
encouraged by the generation of clerics who had themselves received this education prior 
to the Soviet period. Some of the clerics who were classified as khalifas and itinerant 
clergy in the list of the commissioner were also known among the people as okhons, 
although it should be noted that the term okhon was used rarely in the reports as a 
religious-clerical definition. 
73
 One of the reasons for the absence of this term in the reports 
was the fact that religious teaching itself was not documented in these reports. The word 
okhon was also applied to teachers in Soviet schools. 
Thus dozens of individuals known widely to the people as okhons were categorised in the 
reports as khalifas, mullos and tabibs (healers) of the class of unregistered brodyachii 
dukhovenstva (itinerant clergy). For instance, the name of a known local scholar and poet, 
Shohfitur Muhabatshozoda is given in the list of unregistered religious personnel living in 
the Roshtqal‘a district of the Gorno-Badakhshan but the archive does not mention that 
Shohfitur was widely known as an author and okhon.
74
 Shohfitur wrote poetry on both 
religious and secular themes and his name constantly featured in maddohkhoni.
75
 It should 
also be noted that there were many learned persons, including Shohfutur Muhabatshozoda, 
who were also classified as clergy in these documents, but not as olimi namoyoni din. 
There were also many other mullos and khalifas who were known also as poets and 
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teachers in their areas. Born and educated in the pre-Soviet period, some of these 
individuals were still alive in the 1950s. One poet, Shamsher, for instance, was known as a 
mullo in his locality due to his knowledge of religious subjects. Sobiri Andarobi was 
another cleric who had been educated in the maktabi kuhna (old school), learning Haftyak, 
the Qur’an, the works of Nasir-i Khusraw and other classical Persian authors.76 There were 
many other individuals in the Ishkashim district, like Dawlatbekov Alidod from the village 
of Darshai, and Shohkhudododov Khodja Orif from Baghush village
77
 teaching in a family 
circle. The tradition of teaching and learning within the family of the Ismaili pirs of 
Shugnan was continued by their sons and grandsons, especially by Shohikalon 
Shohzodammuhamadov.
78
 Other named teachers were Khodji Sayidahmad and Mullo 
Kalandarsho from the Ghund Valley
 
of the Shugnan district.
79
 In the Rushan district, 
individuals known as okhons, such as Hoji Zuurbekov, Janob Sanglijov, Ruzadorov 
Shikori, Bandisho Sumonzoda, Amodinov Alishoh, Shojonov Sayidkhusraw, and 
Sayidmehtar iner alia were reportedly involved in teaching religion in the family milieu. 
80
 
Some of these religious figures in various parts of Gorno-Badakhshan had also practiced 
kotibi i.e., copying by hand classical and medieval Islamic manuscripts.
81
 Similarly dozens 
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of Sunni clerics in the districts of Wanj, Murgab and Qal’a-i Khumb clandestinely taught 
Islam to children. 
Similarly, many other individuals known among the people as okhons are classified simply 
as mullo or mulloyi namoyon (distinguished clergy) in the archival documents. The 
informant quoted above indicated that it was his grandmother who had taught him religion 
at an early age in the 1940s. The names of a few women, such as Yusupova Zaydabegim 
(Khorog), Sayyidfarukhshoeva Bibi (Porshnev village of the Shugnan district) and 
Sayidkumronova Sayyidkhonim from the Wer village (of the Shugnan district), are 
mentioned as bibiotuns among the unregistered clergy in the archive. These various kinds 
of clergy, according to the commissioner Bodurov, still enjoyed authority and influence 
over the Ismaili and Sunni believers in the Gorno-Badakhshan.
82
 
What is interesting to note about the activity of the clerics, their role regarding religious 
teaching and the performance of rituals, is that a mullo who carried out these duties was 
also known as an okhon and would teach religion in the family milieu. The boundaries of 
these activities were somewhat blurred as many formal khalifas and mullos from the 1960s 
up to the 1980s were only required to lead basic rituals. In theory, from this year onward 
an informal mullo would have rarely been involved in leading rituals, a state of affairs 
formally agreed to by the officially appointed khalifa or mullo. In practice, however, this 
was not observed as there were cases recorded by the CARC commissioner where the 
unofficial clerics carried out ritual activities which should have been the preserve of the 
registered khalifa or mullo. 
The oral sources for this thesis revealed that in this period there were significant numbers 
of clergy, termed as itinerant mullos in these documents, who continued religious teaching 
and learning in a family circle. These clergy were known as okhons like those teaching in 
Soviet schools. The local researchers, who had received their religious education in the 
family milieu, stressed the way that religious teaching passed from one okhon to another in 
a family circle. As the academic secretary at the centre of Islamic Studies, describes:  
In the past if there was someone from an awlod (clan) who learned religious knowledge, he would 
then continue teaching others through a silsila (chain) in a family. For instance, my grandfather, 
Mahrambek, set up his own school. My great-grandfather, Hoji Mirzo, was rich enough to hire a 
teacher named Shohrustam from Afghanistan who taught my grandfather, Mahrambek, until 1917. 
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Religious education was free until the 1930s. Apart from this school in Roshtqal‘a district there was 
the family school of khalifa Tayib whose father had studied in a madrasa in Bukhara. In the 1930s, 
religious education was suppressed and many of the clerics were exiled. Until the 1960s religious 
teaching almost came to a total stop. Since the geographical position of Badakhshan was remote and 
isolated, whatever happened there was known by almost everyone in the area and neighbours would 
report unauthorised activities. After the 1960s religious teaching revived in Badakhshan. In this 
period religious teaching in this district was revived by individuals such as Jamshed son of Tayib, 
Okhon Niyoz, Gulbek Ahmadbekov and a few others. In such a way it passed from father to son and 
to the next generation.
83
 
A number of clergy with a secondary or higher level of education were mentioned in these 
reports, as well as in oral interviews, as olimi namoyoni din (outstanding religious 
scholars). It was an exaggeration though to regard the ordinary clerics as religious scholars 
as none of them appear to have written any works on religious topics. Nevertheless this 
reference should be understood within a context when religious teaching was a rare and 
underground activity in comparison to widespread Soviet education and continuous atheist 
propaganda. Interviews and discussions with the former students of the family school, the 
sons and relatives of the okhons, khalifas and mullos, revealed that the initial pedagogical 
techniques and the subjects learnt did not differ from those in traditional mainstream 
Muslim maktabs in Central Asia. Ideally, students joining a maktab were first taught the 
alifbe (alphabet) and abjad (counting). This was followed by reading Qoidai Baghdodi (a 
book on the correct pronunciation of Qur’anic words), reading and reciting Si-pora Panj-
sura (thirty pieces from five Qur’anic suras). These were the subjects taught at the 
elementary level. In the next level students studied the grammar books of Haftyak and 
Chahor Kitob. When the shogirds (students) completed these books, they would then read 
the poetical works of classical authors.  
In the Ismaili family school they learned samples of poetry which were mainly taken from 
the poems in the Rawshanoi-noma (The Book of Light) and Saodat-noma (The Book of 
Happiness) attributed to the medieval Ismaili author Nasir-i Khusraw. These short books 
were purposely selected by the teachers to introduce Ismaili students to the specificities of 
the Ismaili teachings of Islam. After reading these accessible poetical works the students 
would embark on studying other works by Nasir-i Khusraw, particularly the treatise of 
Wajh-i din which offers a comprehensive explanation and analysis of religious issues, 
duties and norms according to Ismaili doctrine.  
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This clandestine style of teaching in a family circle continued with the existing khalifas, 
mullos and okhons in the oblast until the final years of Soviet rule. However, unlike other 
parts of the Tajik SSR, religious teaching in Gorno-Badakhshan did not flourish outside the 
family circle. Neither was there any innovation in the curriculum or teaching style in the 
isolated and remote villages. It was only from the 1980s onwards that new religious 
literature seems to have been introduced by those students of the Oriental department 
studying abroad, as well as those serving as interpreters for the Soviet Army in 
neighbouring Afghanistan. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has traced the evolution of religious education in its various forms in the Tajik 
SSR in the period between 1950 and 1985. The rise of religious education during this 
period was generally conditioned by the concessions that the Soviet state had made to 
religious societies and believers during the Second World War. At the official level, the 
Soviet state allowed the establishment of a madrasa and an Islamic institute, which were 
unable to respond to the growing needs of a Muslim generation. While limited numbers of 
students from the Tajik SSR studied in these official centres for Islamic education, the 
majority of Muslims had to rely on the family religious schools. With the population 
growth and mass migration from rural to urban areas informal religious teaching 
transferred from family schools to separate circles through a network of students and 
teachers. This network of hujra schools was widespread by the end of the 1970s. Beyond 
the impact of these general socio-economic and policy changes on Islamic education, the 
chapter revealed strategies that are more complex and the distinct worldview that drove 
this practice. 
The strategies of clandestine learning, textbooks, and production the promotion of a 
specific worldview emerged not simply due to the lack of space for learning and literature 
but more as a protective response to the intrusion of atheist propaganda. The point of 
teaching religion for most of its proponents, students and teachers, was to maintain a 
distinct identity and morality, as well as the ethic of respect for tradition and authority that 
is provided in Islamic tradition. Like most of the Muslim clergy, the religious teachers 
whether Sunni domullos or Ismaili khalifas did not attempt to turn their students against 
Soviet ideology or the state. Evidence from my interviews and from the archives turned up 
no evidence of anti-Soviet teachings.  
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The discourse of the Muslim clergy highlighted the differences and similarities between 
Islamic doctrine and the ideology of Communism. However, in the views of teachers and 
students there seems to have been less commonality between Islamic education and atheist 
teaching. The very title of ilmi din (religious knowledge or science) or olimi ilmi din 
(religious scholar) suggested a different worldview to that of knowledge taught at Soviet 
schools.  
What therefore made religious teaching a distinct phenomenon was that it became an 
enterprise, and a source of social capital for the networks of students and teachers. 
Studying in a clandestine family maktab or in separate hujra school created an informal 
market in which teachers gained authority and presumably material reward. Families in the 
neighbourhoods where the hujra was located offered food and rooms for students who 
travelled from distant places. Support also came in the form patronage and protection, if 
there were pressures from security service and local administration. Clandestine Islamic 
teaching evolved among both Ismailis and Sunnis albeit in different ways and settings, in 
the family maktab and larger circle or hujra style and in official institutions. Geographic 
and demographic changes from the 1950s to 1980s, in the Wakhsh Valley and other parts 
of the Tajik SSR, created more favourable conditions for the network of informal 
schooling among Sunni Muslims. As for the Ismaili population in Gorno-Badakhshan, 
Islamic schools were family based, but knowledge was also spread through preaching and 
the tradition of maddohkhoni during funerals. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has examined religious life from two perspectives: the changes in the policy, 
rules and decrees towards religious institutions and the ways in which Muslims practiced 
their religion milieu. From 1950 to 1985, religious life among Muslim communities and 
institutions in the Tajik SSR, like everywhere else in the Soviet state, evolved in the 
context of state policies that were at times relatively moderate and other times far stricter 
towards believers. The contours of these policies were defined by the central Communist 
Party leadership, by the Soviet state legislation at the top and the administrative and 
bureaucratic party state system of monitoring and interference on the ground. 
The Soviet policy of the institutionalisation of religious activity might have produced 
different result in Gorno-Badakhshan had the number of the khalifas and mullos not been 
reduced in this province. With the renewed anti-religious campaign from 1959 to 1964, the 
bureaucratic foundation for monitoring religious activity and spreading atheist propaganda 
was laid among the population of Gorno-Badakhshan. On the one hand, the CARC 
commissioners tasked with the surveillance of and reporting on the religious situation in 
their own community embarked on the dichotomous role of inspecting the activity of 
religious figures with whom they had social and kinship ties.
1
 On the other hand, they had 
to prove their loyalty to the Soviet bureaucratic and ideological system whose aim was the 
eradication of religious views and practices, in a context of limited legalisation, by means 
of atheist propaganda and education. Studies on Soviet religious policy points to the way in 
which legislation applied to the whole Soviet Union, differed in terms of its 
implementation in the various republics with their respective varieties of religious 
structures. Tracing the history of religious life in the context of changing state decisions 
and decrees over span of almost five decades from 1950 to 1985 in Gorno-Badakhshan, 
therefore, reveals the varied experience of Muslims under Soviet rule. 
The documents from the offices of the CARC and later the CRA at first glance reveal the 
degree of regulation and control of religious activity, the compliance of the believers with 
legislation and the decrees and decisions of the Communist Party and Soviet government 
in the field of religious policy. A critical reading of the archival documents against the 
                                                          
1
 Of the six CARC/CRA upolnomochennye appointed by the oblispolkom of Gorno-Badakhshan only one 
came from outside the province.  
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information from oral interviews, however, reveals a different trajectory of adaptation, 
adjustment, and appropriation of the central state religious policy by local officials. In this 
process of the institutionalisation of religious activity, religious figures actively involved 
themselves with the central state policy. At times some of the khalifas and mullos even 
attempted to dovetail their religious views to match with Soviet state ideology, which 
stressed on the issues of friendship and peace, justice equality and stability. 
One of the daunting tasks of the institutionalisation of religious activity in the Tajik SSR 
was that of registering of religious figures and mosques, a process marred by a number of 
problems created by local government. The registration process ended with the dramatic 
decline of requests from religious societies, i.e., group of believers to the local government 
to allow opening prayer rooms, mosques or registering official imom-khatibs and khalifas. 
Their number decreased as the state aimed to create sharp divisions between the registered 
clergy and unregistered itinerant religious figures. The registered clergy, whose activity 
was institutionalised then became subject to routine monitoring by local officials, and were 
liable to taxation on the income they accrued from conducting rituals. As for the itinerant 
clergy, their religious activity was de facto illegal, but they were arguably far freer 
ideologically, economically and administratively in moving from one territory to another 
and performing rituals among community. The division of the clergy into the categories of 
registered and unregistered did not mean that all control over the issue was ceded to the 
authorities. Cases involving registered khalifas selecting and training their own deputies 
and assistants, often their own sons, without informing the authorities, were common. 
Another of the unintended consequences of the dysfunctional process of registration was 
the burgeoning market in religious practice. Instances of the official khalifas and domullos 
accusing their fellow clergy of conducting decadent rituals and faith-healing called for 
interference by the CARC commissioners and local officials in religious affairs.  
The integration or accommodation of the official clergy into a Soviet society whose 
ideology was characterised by widespread atheist policy and emphasis on scientific 
achievement was not a smooth process. As the commissioners continuously stressed in 
their report, the influence of religion primarily prevailed among the stratum of population 
that remained under pressure from their families and neighbours. This suggests that family, 
in Gorno-Badakhshan like the mosques and shrines in other Muslim-populated areas of 
Central Asia, remained the main source of preaching and teaching about religion, and 
manners of respecting traditional values. In his ethnographic observation of religious life 
among the Muslim population in Soviet Central Asian republics, including the Tajik SSR, 
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Poliakov highlights the spaces for transmitting knowledge of Islam: family-mullos, mazors 
(shrines) and mosques. As can be seen, parents and religious figures (mullos or otyns) 
remains at the centre of this space.
2
 While the archives do not provide a detailed record of 
the content of the preaching and teaching of the religious figures, the oral sources for this 
thesis have revealed how Islamic knowledge was spread through clandestine teaching and 
oral performance, such as maddohkhoni in the case of Ismailis. According to most of my 
interviewees, it was it was for the parents and elders was to raise their children as boadab 
(an ethical person) and mu‘min musulmon (literally, a believing Muslim). This latter term 
was used also in relation to a faithful person who had to act ethically, be compassionate to 
all, believe in good deeds reward, and to live a life without deceiving others. 
On a social level, religious figures in Gorno-Badakhshan employed different strategies to 
adapt to Soviet state policy. At times they appeared to be an influential social actor in their 
respective localities, even raising their voices vis-à-vis the decisions of the local 
government authorities. What empowered the emergence of the post-war generation of 
religious figures, especially the registered khalifas and domullos in this province, as 
dynamic social actors in their communities? An analysis of the archives and oral sources 
shows that the generation of the individuals serving as clergy from 1950s to the mid 1980s 
were very aware of their rights as believing citizens, as well being informed about state 
policy towards religion. Generally, as the CARC reports from Gorno-Badakhshan noted 
how registered khalifas and mullos expressed their readiness to cooperate with the 
authorities in theory, thereby displaying their loyalty to the Soviet government. The 
records of the discussions of the commissioners with the religious figures reveal that the 
latter praised the progress and achievements of Soviet state. Praise about the Soviet state 
and its development was also expressed in the poems written by some khalifas, okhons and 
mullos.
3
  
The CARC commissioners did not reveal the regular tensions between the registered and 
unregistered religious figures in Gorno-Badakhshan. On the contrary, for other parts of the 
                                                          
2
 Sergei P. Poliakov, Everyday Islam: Religion and Tradition in Rural Central Asia (London, 1992), pp. 68-
69.  
3
 Many of the khalifas and mullos produced autobiographic, didactic and devotional poetry and eulogies 
(marsiia) on the death of their family members. At the same time they also praised the Soviet state and its 
improved life style in their poetry. For samples of the poetry written by some khalifas and mullos, see 
La’ljubai Mirzohasan and Alidodi Charoghabdol, ed., Tazkirai adiboni Badakhshon (Khorog, 2007). 
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Tajik SSR the commissioners observed frequents tensions and disputes between the 
itinerary mullos and the registered imom-khatibs, ordinary imoms and other staff of the 
registered mosques. Disputes between the Ismaili clergy over ritual performance however 
came to the surface during the relatively tolerant years of state policy towards believers in 
the mid 1950s. However, these disputes were far less frequent in comparison to scores of 
fatwas that SADUM issued banning the activities of the numerous mullos and ishans who 
organised shrine visitation, as well as communal prayers and faith-healing on the occasions 
of religious festivals in the unregistered mosques, in parts of the Tajik SSR and other 
Soviet Central Asian republics.
4
 Hence, it can be argued that the absence of a central 
religious administration such as SADUM in Gorno-Badakhshan lessened the degree of 
tension between registered and unregistered religious figures in this province. 
The lack of religious administration in Gorno-Badakhshan meant that the challenges to 
control the activities of the khalifas and mullos were even greater. At the central level 
neither the council nor Communist Party authorities responded to the request by the CARC 
commissioner in the Tajik SSR to open a religious administration or to appoint a senior 
religious supervisor for the Ismaili khalifas in Gorno-Badakhshan. At the provincial level, 
the commissioner also rejected similar suggestions by the khalifas to establish a connection 
between the Ismailis of Gorno-Badakhshan and the office of the Ismaili Imam abroad. For 
instance, Olimshoev Shoabdullo, the official khalifa of Khorog, asked the CRA 
commissioner Nayimov about the possibility of believers requesting the oblispolkom of 
Gorno-Badakhshan to allow them to visit the office of the Ismaili Imam and to receive 
farmons from him. In response, Nayimov noted to the khalifa the letter and verse of the 
Soviet legislation dealing with the separation of church from state. The commissioner 
stated to the khalifa that the state would not interfere in religious affairs, and neither was 
there any need for the Ismailis in Gorno-Badakhshan to send a delegation to the Aga Khan 
to receive instructions from him.
5
 
Despite the absence of external links and a centralised religious institution or hierarchy, 
some of the Ismaili khalifas, mullos, and even the secular educated strata, had some 
awareness of news about the leadership of the Ismailis and some of the developments 
concerning the lives of their fellow-believers abroad. From the mid-1960s, articles started 
                                                          
4
 See Bakhtiiar Babadzhanov, ‘O fetvakh SADUM protiv ‘neislamskikh obychaev’, in A. Malashenko and 
M. Bril Olkott, ed., Islam na postsovetskom prostranstve: vzgliad iznutri (Moscow, 2001), pp. 170-184. 
5
 GA GBAO, f. 110, op. 3, d. 7, (13 February 1972), p. 55.  
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appearing first in the leading atheist journals in the Soviet Union such as Nauka i Religia 
and then in the local press in the Tajik SSR, discussing the life and activities of the 49
th
 
Imam of the Ismailis, Shah Karim al-Husaini, Aga Khan IV.
6
 Recent studies have 
highlighted the role of Communist Party leaders in Gorno-Badakhshan and the editor of 
the provincial newspaper of Badakhshoni Soweti in republishing these articles.
7
 The report 
of the CRA commissioner, at that time indicated how the Ismaili clergy in Gorno-
Badakhshan perceived the publication of the articles on their Imam. Nayimov for instance, 
noted that these articles were being published in the Soviet press as part of its ongoing 
criticism of the activities of religious leaders, in this case the Ismaili Imam. However, he 
mentioned that Ismaili clergy in Gorno-Badakhshan used these articles as a tool to 
propagate the notion that their Imam was even recognised by the Soviet government, and 
that even the Soviet press were writing positively about his wealth and glory.
8
 
Some few distinct features of the religious life of Muslims in Gorno-Badakhshan 
differentiated their experience of state policy from that of their fellow believers in other 
parts of the USSR. One feature was that religious activity in Gorno-Badakhshan mainly 
revolved around the activity of religious figures not connected to the mosques and 
religious administration such as SADUM. In the absence of these two institutions, i.e., the 
mosque and spiritual directorate, the burden of organising ritual performance fell on the 
individual religious figures. The assessment, monitoring and regulating of religious activity 
was led by the CARC commissioners and the local government authorities.  
A second feature is that the context of ritual performance was distinct due to the presence 
of the two Muslim communities in this province. What again made the ritual performance 
among the Muslim communities in Gorno-Badakshhan different was its unclear legal 
recognition and status. The legitimacy of Muslim practice, among the Sunni population of 
                                                          
6
 See articles by S. Levin, ‘Finansovaia imperiia Aga Khana IV’, Nauka i religiia, 8 (1971), pp. 58- 60; I. 
Davydov, ‘Zemnoi rai Aga Khana’, Nauka i religiia, 12 (1966), pp. 48-49 ; L. Sergeev, ‘ Imperiia Aga 
Khana IV’, Aziia i Afrika Segodnia , 9 (1965), pp. 22-23 and its Tajik translation ‘ Imperiiai Oghokhoni IV’, 
Sadoi Sharq, 12 (1965), pp. 48-49. 
7
 See notes in Shohkhumorov’s study of Razdelenie Badakhshana i sud’by Ismailizma (Moscow, 2008), pp. 
107-108 on Nazarshoev Moyonsho (1929-1994), the first secretary of the Communist Party Committee of the 
Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast from 1963 to 1970 who agreed that the article about the Ismaili 
Imam could be published in the newspaper Badakhshoni Soweti. For copies of the articles about the Ismaili 
Imam published in the Soviet press, see also Q. Alamshoev, Pomir 1937 (Dushanbe, 2012), pp. 249-287.  
8
 GA GBAO, f. 110, op. 3, d. 7, (10 February 1971), p. 104.  
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Central Asia was confirmed by the fact it had to be performed by the SADUM supervised 
religious figure in registered mosques in the Tajik SSR and other republics in Soviet 
Central Asia. In Gorno-Badakhshan, it remained unclear what kind of religious practice 
was considered legal even among the Sunni population, although in theory it was known 
that outside registered mosques the performance of any collective prayer was illegal. 
Regarding the ritual performed by the Ismailis, the commissioners continuously reported 
on instances of the performance of the charogh-i rawshan and the singing of devotional 
poems by the maddohkhons, but could not clearly declare these rites as the illegal religious 
activity. It emerged that the very performance of the collective prayer and da‘wat during 
funerals inevitably made these rites legitimate in the eyes of the Soviet authorities and the 
bureaucrats representing the Council for the Religious Affairs. 
The issues of which rituals were to be considered legitimate seem to have been solved 
when the rituals were performed by the official khalifas and domullos. When the problems 
of registering official religious figures were solved, the reports by the commissioners 
uncover also uncovered fewer occasions of violation of state legislation by the believers. 
From the 1970s onwards, the CRA documents also reveal fewer instances of the practice of 
religious rituals such as fasting, shrine visitation, and the celebration of Id-i Ramazon and 
Id-i Qurbon. On the contrary, atheist propaganda was spread by special experts, group 
campaigns, mass media and secular education to every corner of the Gorno-Badakhshan. In 
the opinion of the last CRA commissioner and in coverage by the local Soviet press, the 
Gorno-Badakhshan province was one of the best and success stories regarding 
implementation of atheist policy in the USSR. Finally, the most distinguishing feature of 
the evolution of religious life in this province was that each of the scattered, remote and 
scarcely-populated districts was affected differently by the unionwide religious policy. In 
their turn the existing kinship and social settings and even the different forms of 
conducting religious rites in each village and valley each offered a distinct milieu for the 
Muslim experience of state religious policy.  
The data on the religious situation that is presented in the reports by the commissioners 
were not always based on their interviews with the khalifas, mullos and other religious 
figures. Information also arrived filtered through different channels, such as the various 
agents of local government and the Communist Party known as aktivs. For this reason, any 
future anthropological study of the life of the Muslim community in a particular locale in 
Gorno-Badakhshan can bring into the light new details of the interactions between the 
various local actors: officials and religious figures, households, kolkhoz and sovkhoz 
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system with regard to Soviet state policy and Muslim practice. Historical research on the 
biography and works of the khalifas, domullos, okhons, maddohkhons and other prominent 
religious figures may yield new and interesting insights regarding religious history in 
Gorno-Badakhshan and other parts of the Tajik SSR in the Soviet period.  
The detailed analysis of the archives in this thesis may contribute to a better understanding 
of the history, the successes and limitations of applying Soviet religious in Gorno-
Badakhshan. It also uncovers the distinct strategies by which this central state policy was 
adjusted to local realities by the indigenous party state officials, who combined being 
Soviet with the practice of their Muslim faith. The findings of this thesis can also add to 
the corpus of academic studies on the religious history in Central Asia.  
This analysis of the CARC and CRA archives has also thrown up potential ideas for future 
research on other kinds of documents in the Communist Party and Soviet State archives, in 
particular the reports by the State Security Committee on Islamic figures, rites and other 
religious institutions. It is equally important in the future to study the documents that have 
been preserved by the religious figures, including their writings, personal-notebooks, texts 
of sermons, prayers and manuals that they used for conducting religious rituals. These 
sources will allow researchers to throw light on some important aspects of the evolution of 
Muslim practices and institutions in the peripheral regions of Central Asia, such as the 
Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast of Tajikistan. 
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Glossary 
 
aktivs: individuals who regularly participated in events organised by the Communist party 
and government offices, and actively reported on the situation in the villages and districts; 
they were known as either sel’skii aktivy (rural activists) or (district activists) raiaktivy.  
adab: manner, etiquette of behaviour. 
azoim-khoni: healing through prayer. 
brodiachie dukhovenstvo: itinerant clergy. 
Chahor kitob: an introductory book of Arabic grammar used in religious schools in Soviet 
Central Asia. 
charogh-noma: ‘Book of Light’, the poetic text recited during the ceremony of charogh-i 
rawshan on the final night of an Ismaili funeral in Central Asia. 
charogh-i rawshan: ‘Luminous Lamp’, the religious ritual of kindling conducted on the 
final day Ismaili funerals in Central Asia. 
da‘wati fano: ‘summons of demise’, a ceremony that takes place on the final day of Ismaili 
funerals in Central Asia, which includes the ritual of charogh-i rawshan. 
da‘wati baqo: ‘summons of eternity’, another summoning ritual which in contrast to 
da‘wati fano is held during the lifetime of an Ismaili. Its aim is to purify the soul of the 
person from the misdeeds of the material world and prepare him for the olami baqo 
(eternal world). This ritual was rarely practiced among the Ismaili population of Gorno-
Badakhshan in the Soviet period.  
dindoron: the stratum of the population who practiced religion. 
domullo: honorific title for a religious teacher. The title was also used by the CARC 
commissioners to define the registered clergy among the Sunni Muslim community in 
Gorno-Badakhshan. 
duokhon: an individual who recites prayers. 
dukhovenstvo: clergy. 
 farmon: order, instruction. Refers to the instructions sent from the Ismaili Imam to his 
followers. 
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Haftyak: introductory grammar book for learning Arabic, widely used in religious schools 
in the Tajik SSR. 
Hanafi: one of the four schools of Sunni jurisprudence, predominant in Central Asia. 
hojji: one who has performed the Hajj, the Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca. 
hujra: ‘cell’, a separate room where informal and underground religious teaching was 
conducted in the Tajik SSR and other parts of Soviet Central Asia. 
ibtido’i: primary stage of education. 
imom: religious figure responsible for leading prayers in Sunni mosques.  
imom-khatib: the head of a registered mosque in the Tajik SSR, appointed by SADUM. 
The mam-khatib was responsible for leading the congregation during prayer, reading the 
sermon and speeches, and welcoming official delegations, especially foreign visitors, to the 
mosques. 
imongui: in the Soviet period the term was used to refer to those individuals, especially 
elders who were reciting prayers. 
intelligentsia: a stratum of Soviet citizens including teachers, doctors, and other educated 
groups. 
ishan/ishon: an honorific title for religious figures including Sufi masters and Ismaili pirs. 
ispolkom: executive committee of the local Soviet government in the provinces and 
districts. 
jamo’at-khona: prayer house of the Ismaili community. 
kotibs: copyist, were known also as master of calligraphy. 
khalifa: a religious title for the individuals who prior to the establishment of the Soviet 
government served as the deputy of the pirs among the Ismailis of Badakhshan. In the 
Soviet period khalifa become the sole official religious figure for conducting required 
religious rites. 
khatm-i Qur’on: completing the recitiation of the Qur’an. A communal prayer held on the 
occasion of completing the learning of the parts of the Qur’an by a man trained as qori . 
khodataistva: an appeal to register a religious society or clergy. 
kolkhoz: collective farm, the main unit of the Soviet agricultural economy that appeared 
during the collectivization campaign in the late 1920s and 1930s 
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Komsomol: shorter form of the All Union Leninist Young Communist League, the youth 
branch of the Communist Party. 
khudoi: ‘belonging to God’, the practice of animal sacrificing, at feast times by Muslim 
communities in the Tajik SSR. 
madhhab: system or school of religious law for Muslims. 
maddoh: panegyric, a genre of devotional religious poetry among the Ismailis of Gorno-
Badakhshan. 
maddohkhoni: the singing of devotional religious poetry among the Ismailis of Gorno-
Badakhshan.  
madrasa: religious school, Islamic educational institution. 
Mawlo also mawlono: literary lord, used as reference to the Ismaili Imam by his followers 
muazzin: reciter of the adhan (Islamic call to prayer). 
mullo: religious figure who conducts basic Islamic rites. The term was often used by the 
CARC commissioners to refer to unregistered religious figures who performed basic 
religious rites at life-cycle events and faith-healing.  
murid: disciple or follower of a Sufi pir (master). It is also used as reference to the 
followers of the Ismaili Imam and tariqa.  
obkom: shorter form of the oblastnoi komitet partii (provincial party committee). 
oblispolkom: shorter form of the oblastnoi ispolnitel'nyi komitet, (executive committee of 
the provincial government in the Soviet Union.  
okhon: teacher. 
otun: female religious teacher (as used in the CARC reports). 
pir: Sufi master. A pir was highest rank in the Ismaili religious hierarchy after the Imom. 
Pir-i Shoh: form for the prayer text used by the Ismailis in Gorno-Badakhshan in the 
Soviet period. 
qasida: form of Arabic poetry, ode. 
qozi (qadi): judge in the shar‘ia law system. In the context of this study it refers to the 
representative of SADUM in the Tajik SSR. 
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qoziyot: the office of SADUM’s representative in the Tajik SSR and other republics of 
Central Asia and Kazakhstan. 
qori: reciter of the Qur’an. 
oshi pir: ritual observed in the month of Muharram in some villages among the Ismailis of 
Gorno-Badakhshan to commemorate the death of the Shi’i Imom Husain, grandson of the 
Prophet Muhammad.  
raiaktiv: district activist. 
raiispolkom: executive committee of the government of rayon (district) in the USSR. 
raikom: district party committee. 
registratsiia: act of registering and licencing official religious figures, societies and 
mosques by the local government and CARC representative. It granted them legal right to 
conduct religious rites that were required by the community. 
Sharhi mullo: a commentary on Arabic grammar, textbook used in the religious schools in 
the Tajik SSR. 
 sel'sovet: village council, the smallest administrative unit in the Soviet state. 
tariqa: way or path, referring to the mystical path followed by Sufi disciples. The word 
tariqa is also used by the Ismaiis for interpreting their religious doctrine'' 
tarobeh or namozi tarobeh: evening prayer during the month of Ramazon 
tasbeh: a ritual of counting the rosary, and reciting the prayer during the funeral ritual. The 
rite introduced by the Panjabhai missionaries among the Ismailis of Gorno-Badakhshan in 
the 1920s in order to replace the ritual of charogh-i rawshan. 
 upolnomochennyi (plural upolnomochennye): plenipotentiary representative or 
commissioner of the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults (CARC) later the Council 
for Religious Affairs (CRA) in the union republics and provinces.  
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Appendices 
Table 1: Educational Background of the Interviewees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
440
 Primary, secondary, and higher levels of education. 
Type of Informants No. Level of Religious 
Education 
 Level of Secular 
Education 
pri
440
 sec high pri  sec  high 
 khalifas 8  8  2 5 1 
 domullos  6   6  3 3 
 imom-khatibs  4   4  3 1 
 maddohkhons 5  5   4 1 
 bibi-otuns  4  4   2 2 
 Researchers 5  2 3   5 
Communist Party 
secretaries and CRA 
commissioners 
5 3 1    5 
Total 37 3 20 13 2 19 18 
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Table 2: Religious Figures in Gorno-Badakhshan (1 January 1950) 
 
 
Source: GA GBAO, f.110.op.1, d.1, (14 February 1950), pp. 12-13 
  
Districts  khalifas mullos 
Shugnan 8 11 mullos 2 ishans 
Ishkashim 9 11 
Rushan 9 13 
Roshtqal’a 7 5 
Bartang 8 9 
Murgab   11 
Wanj   30 
Total 42 103 (2 ishans) 
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Table 3: Statistical Reports about Religious Personnel in Gorno-Badakhsan by 1951 
Districts 
Type of 
clergy 
Level of secular 
education Level of religious education 
 
khalifas high sec pri h Sec pri 
Without 
education 
Shugnan 12 
  
2 1 2 8 1 
Roshtqal'a 7 
  
2 
 
4 2 1 
Ishkashim 9 
  
1 2 6 1 
 Rushan 7 
  
2 
 
4 3 
 Bartang  8 
  
1 
 
6 1 1 
Total 43 
  
8 3 22 15 3 
Districts  mullos 
       Shugnan 49 
 
3 10 16 17 15 1 
Roshtqal'a 26 
  
3 3 11 11 1 
Ishkashim 10 
  
1 2 7 1 
 Rushan 24 
  
2 3 12 8 1 
Bartang 8 
   
1 4 2 1 
Wanj (Sunni) 27 
   
2 15 10 
 Murgab (Sunni) 18 
  
2 2 9 7 
 Total 162 1 3 18 29 75 54 4 
 
Source: GA GBAO, f. 110, op.1, d. 6, ‘Kvartal'nyi statisticheskii otchiot’, (1 April 1951), p. 1. 
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Table 4: Religious Figures in Gorno-Badakhshan (1960-1990) 
 years khalifas domullos unregistered total 
1960 24 18 258 400 
1965 26 11 213 250 
1970 27  12 n/a 39 
1975 27 14 n/a 41 
1980 26 16 n/a 42 
1985 26 16 n/a 42 
 
Source: Adapted from Statistical Reports by CARC Commissioners in the GBAO (1950-
1985) 
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